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During the past decade the landscape of world trade liberalization has dramatically 
changed to a bilateral phenomena from the multilateral negotiations practiced few 
decades ago. Trade Gravity Model has been extensively used in trade literature to 
ascertain the impact of both bilateral and multilateral trade liberalizations including 
Free Trading Agreements (FTA). The present study argues that cross-sectional gravity 
models fail to estimate or overestimate the real impact of FTA due to specification 
errors, endogeneity and omitted variable bias. Alternatively, this study shows that 
FTA impact can be effectively estimated using more sophisticated panel data analysis.  
 
Using Augmented Gravity Model in Panel context covering 9,832 country pairs (184 
countries) over 9 years, the present study examines the impact of FTA, trade creation 
(TC) and trade diversion (TD) effects of Regional Trading Blocs (RTBs) and the FTA 
and RTB interactive effects in promoting trade for member and non-member 
countries with the help of seven selected RTBs, namely; ASEAN, NAFTA, EFTA, 
DR-CAFTA, EU, CARICOM and SAARC networked with 79 FTAs. The main 
research problems are, 
a. What is the average treatment effect of FTA?  
b. Are Regional Trading Blocs (RTBs) in general trade creating or diverting?  
c. Does an FTA between an outsider and insider country of a RTB create 
trade for both parties equally or unequally or does it at least help outsider 
countries to overcome any trade diversionary effect caused by RTA? 
An extensive research followed by a number of sensitivity analysis robustly concludes 
that ATE of FTA is not overwhelming as predicted in trade literature but only about 
3%-4% per annum, which implies that the bilateral trade will be doubled only after18-
 viii
19 years for a country pair forming an FTA now, given all the other factors remain 
unchanged.  
 
In connection to TC and TD effects of RTB we find mixed results where the intra-
bloc trade of NAFTA and ASEAN is overwhelming while that of EU and DR-
CAFTA is moderate. On the other hand, the intra-bloc trade of EFTA is negative 
whereas the effects are insignificant for SAARC and CARICOM. Although these 
findings suggest most of RTBs are gross trade-creating in general, only NAFTA and 
ASEAN was found to be net-trade-creating for the world. All the other examined 
blocs show no evidence for either TC or TD with only exception that EU is 
marginally trade diverting.  
 
As the first empirical study in trade literature ascertaining RTB and FTA interactive 
effects our findings suggest that outsider-countries trading with RTB are adversely 
exploited by RTB insider-countries for their own benefits, rather than mutual, in 
absence of FTA. More interestingly it was found that the countries being exploited 
can effectively reverse their adverse position by forming an FTA with the RTB 
concerned. 
The bottom line is that trading “with an FTA” is always more beneficial for both 
parties than trading “without an FTA”, though the benefits are unequal  
 
Key words:  Gravity Model, Free Trading Agreements, Regional Blocs, 
Average treatment effect, trade creation, trade diversion 
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In this chapter we will have a brief overview of the landscape of the present World 
Trading System, the nature of FTA proliferation and the motivation behind the study 
followed by the objectives of the study, the research questions, and the methodology.   
============================================================= 
1.1 THREE FACES OF WORLD TRADE LIBERALIZATION: 
MULTILATERALISM, REGIONALISM, AND BILATERALISM 
The landscape of the present World Trading System (WTS) can be known as three 
faced object having Multilateralism, Regionalism, and Bilateralism in each side. 
Today every country in the world is a member of at least one regional, multilateral or 
bilateral trading agreement.  
 
Geographic proximity followed by similarity in economic cultural historical 
characteristics has necessarily fostered enthusiasm towards formation of Regional 
Trading Blocs (RTB). There have been widespread attempts at RTBs in 1960s but the 
origin of RTA descends back to centuries as long as there have been nation-states that 
discriminated trade policies in favor of some valued neighbors and against others.  
“Regional trading arrangements have at times played major roles in political history. 
For example, the German Zollverein, the custom union that was formed among 18 
small states in 1834, was a step on the way to the creation of the nation of Germany 
later in the century”. (Frankel, 1997)  
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During past few decades the World Trade Organization1 (WTO) has been working 
mostly towards an arena of multilateralism where the concept of Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) is of paramount importance. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which is 
called Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, brought together 53 countries accounting 
for 80% of international trade to cut tariffs by an average of 35%. In the Tokyo Round 
(1979) approximately 100 nations agreed upon further tariff reductions and to the 
reduction of non-tariff barriers such as quotas and licensing. Most remarkable 
multilateral negotiations took place as a result of the Uruguay Round launched in 
1986 and concluded almost 10 years later with conformity to reduce industrial tariffs, 
agricultural tariffs and subsidies, and to protect intellectual property rights. However, 
the most recent one, Doha round almost collapsed in 2006 after five year prolong 
talks as both USA and EU kept themselves more on the defensive side. Nevertheless, 
GATT/WTO has shown major deviations from the MFN allowing countries to form 
Regional Trading Agreements (RTA), Custom Unions (CU) or Preferential Treading 
Agreements (PTA)under Article-XXIV subject to a several conditions including that 
trade barriers against non-members not be made more restrictive than before. All 
these can be known as one or other form of multilateralism. Presently there are more 
than 30 Multilateral RTAs notified to WTO (See the Descriptive Appendix Table 
1(A) for the list of RTAs and member countries)  
 
In recent past Free Trading Agreements (FTA) on bilateral basis have become the 
pioneering driving force of trade linearization partly because narrower pacts are easier 
to negotiate less time consuming and can closely address the needs of both parties. 
Often they can lay the groundwork for larger accords. During the recent past, 
                                                 
1 Known as GATT-General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs prior to 1995 
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especially after 1995, the number of FTAs grew so rapidly that relevant literature uses 
the terminology of “Proliferation of FTA” to signify the explosion in number of 
FTAs. There are four recent trends in RTA/FTA proliferation (Roberto et al, 2007).  
1. A shift from multilateral trade objectives to pursuance of preferential 
agreements 
2. An increasing level of sophistication in RTAs including linearization of trade 
in services which was not regulated multilaterally 
3. Geopolitics of RTAs shows an increase of North-South RTAs 
4. Expansion and consolidation of regional integration schemes into Continent-
wide regional trading blocs 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In this study our major interest lies with selected Regional Trading Blocs (RTB) and 
FTAs to ascertain their impact on world trade in general and on bilateral trade in 
particular. Accordingly, the objectives of the study are as follows. 
1. To differentiate Trade Creation (TC) and Trade Diversion (TD) Effects of 
selected Regional Trading Blocs from their Gross Trade Creation (GTC) 
Effect.  
2. To identify whether a bilateral FTA between a member and a non-member 
country of RTB improves welfare of the non-member or exploit the non-
member for the benefit of RTB itself.   




1.3 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Regional Trading Agreements (RTA) has become the common term used to denote all 
kinds of regional arrangements including FTAs, RTBs CUs, and PTAs without 
differentiating among their unique identities. Not to confuse among the terminologies, 
throughout this study, we use RTB to denote Regional Trading Blocs and RTA to 
denote all above in common.  
 
Quantifying the actual number of RTAs presently in the world is a methodological 
challenge for many reasons. There are 194 RTAs notified to WTO as at September 
24, 2007. This includes 114 FTAs, 18 Custom unions, 49 Economic Integration 
Agreements, and 13 partial scope arrangements. However, this could not be the actual 
number because there are many RTAs/FTAs under negotiation but so far not notified 
to WTO. According to Roberto, Luis and Cristelle (Roberto et al, 2007) Total number 
of RTAs active and in force by end 2006 were 214 and there are approximately 70 
RTAs not notified, 30 just signed and yet to implement, 65 under negotiation and at 
least another 30 proposed. If all these are implemented we will be having a global 
RTA network of 400 RTAs by 2010.  
 
The Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of FTAs (related to goods) from 1960 to 2007 (It 
does not include inactive FTAs or FTAs related to services and investment) It can be 
seen that FTA proliferation is mostly evident during the period from 2000 to 2006.   
 
 5
FIGURE 1.1: EVALUATION OF NUMBER OF FTAs 1960-2007  
Figure 1.1 
EVOLUTION OF NUMBER OF FTAs 1960-2007





















CUM FTA 10 15 18 23 28 34 41 45 53 64 74 83 98 109 116 118
CUM Included 7 11 13 16 19 24 27 30 35 45 55 63 69 79 79 79
FTA Included 7 4 2 3 3 5 3 3 5 10 10 8 6 10 0 0
FTA Excluded 3 1 1 2 2 1 4 1 3 1 0 1 9 1 7 2
1960- 
1993
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Source: Author’s calculation using WTO statistics. “FTA included” are the FTAs considered in this study. “FTA excluded” 
arises for two reasons. Either (a) Study period may not cover the time of their occurrence or (b) dataset does not include at least 
one country related to the omitted FTA. 
 
According to the Figure 1.1 the total number of FTAs considered in this study is 78. 
Indeed, this number should be read as 705 in terms of number of bilateral FTAs as 
shown in Figure 1.2 below.  
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FIGURE 1.2: FTA PROLIFERATION IN TERMS OF BTAs 1997-2005 
Figure 1.2 
FTA PROLIFERATION IN TERMS OF BTAs 1997-2005 
















CUM FTA Included 24 27 30 35 45 55 63 69 79
CUM BTA Included 148 166 172 250 293 357 431 668 705
1960-97 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from WTO 
 
It is interesting to see what was happening in the global trade behind the FTA 
proliferation. The Figure 1.3 shows the value of total world exports and the value of 
export covered by FTAs during the proliferation period. Interestingly the Figure 
exhibits by year 2005 approximately 18% of world total merchandise exports 
occurred under 705 bilateral FTAs. This is a remarkable percentage when we recall 
that there more than 25,000 country pairs2 in the world presently trading among each 
other. This is similar to claiming that 18% of world trade takes place among of 3% of 
the total number of trading pairs, who are tied up each other by an FTA. The other 
side of the story is that 97% of the total number of trading pairs who are not 
connected to each other by FTAs shares only 82% of world trade. This implies the 
number of FTAs is not overwhelming but trade under them is remarkably outstanding.  
                                                 
2 Given 198 countries in the world, potential number of trading pairs is (1982-198)/2=19,503 and 
therefore potential Export Flows are 19,503*2=39,006. But actual number is around 25,000 as not all 
countries trade with all the other countries in the world.  
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FIGURE 1.3: EVALUATION OF WORLD EXPORT UNDER FTA 1999-2005 
Figure 1.3 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
FTA Exports as % World Exports 14.1% 14.3% 14.6% 14.2% 15.5% 17.5% 17.9%
Exports Under FTA (US$ Mio) 577,439 687,036 663,321 670,506 842,685 1,168,9 1,389,6




























EVOLUTION OF WORLD EXPORTS UNDER FTA 1999-2005
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from WTO 
 
Most distinct feature of RTA evolution is that over 80% of the RTA currently in force 
and more than 92% of the proposed RTAs falls under FTAs. Furthermore we 
observed that during the FTA proliferation period around 18% of world total 
merchandise exports took place under FTAs. Then it is interesting to question whether 
we can attribute all the credit to FTAs as an overwhelming phenomenon governing 
world trade? Of course not! The Trade Gravity model suggests there are many other 
factors driving trade and therefore FTA may be only one factor among them. 
 
This provides the motivation for our first research question that how much of bilateral 
trade has been really boosted by FTA on average. In short what is the average 
treatment effect of FTA? This is the central issue we broadly discuss in chapter VI. 
 
Turning towards the RTB’s performance during the proliferation period, statistics 
suggest that the proportion of intra-trade (trade among members) and extra-trade 
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(trade between members and non-members) of RTBs, except for few, has continued 
be same as before without a noticeable change. For example, we show trading 
performance of EU, ASEAN and NAFTA below.  
 
As shown by Figure 1.4 for all years, EU has shown higher trade integration among 
member countries3 accounting 68% of total exports from EU intra-exports and 67% of 
total imports from EU intra-imports. It is equivalent to saying that only 30% of EU 
trade is shared with the rest of the world (ROW) while 70% of trade occurs within the 
bloc. This composition does not seem to have changed during the 7 year period 
concerned. This follows the idea that EU still treats the non-member countries exactly 
as the way they used to treat them seven years ago.  



































































EU Intra-Exports as % of Total EU Exports EU Extra-Exports as % of Total EU 
Exports
EU Intra-Imports as % of Total EU ImportsEU Extra-Imports as % of Total EU Imports
EUROPEAN UNION (EU) INTRA AND EXTRA TRADE AS A PERCENTAGE OF EU TOTAL TRADE 
1999-2005 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from WTO 
 
 
                                                 
3 The member states are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
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By contrast, ASEAN shows relatively poor trade integration among members4 
accounting only for 22% of inter-bloc trade while more than 76% of total trade is 
dealt with ROW as shown in Figure 1.5. This is apparently the opposite of the EU 
trading composition.  
 
Knowing that ASEAN does trade more with outside countries, does it mean having an 
FTA with an ASEAN country is more advantages for a third party country rather than 
being connected to EU through an FTA? Not necessarily. Sometimes, it may be the 
case that 76% from ASEAN could be even smaller than 22% from EU.  The answer 
needs a proper estimate comparable referring to a single bench mark. We will do this 
later referring to the natural level of trade predicted by trade Gravity model. 
Nevertheless, both EU and ASEAN share one common feature as long as their intra 
and extra trade composition has continued to be stable for the seven years observed.  




































































ASEAN Intra-Exports as % of Total 
ASEAN Exports
ASEAN Extra-Exports as % of Total 
ASEAN Exports
ASEAN Intra-Imports as % of Total ASEAN 
Imports
ASEAN Extra-Imports as % of Total 
ASEAN Imports
ASEAN INTRA AND EXTRA TRADE AS A PERCENTAGE OF ASEAN TOTAL TRADE 
1999-2005 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from WTO 
 
                                                 
4 ASEAN was established by the five original member countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand in August 1967 in Bangkok.  Brunei Darussalam joined in 
January 1984, Vietnam in July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar in July 1997, and Cambodia in April 
1999. 
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While EU and ASEAN found their positions in two extremes, and also rather 
stationary, NAFTA has shown a moderate and dynamic picture as depicted in Figure 
1.6. (Demonstrations for other selected RTBs were omitted for brevity)  
 
The most interesting observation here is that NAFTA has dramatically changed its 
composition of imports while continued to keep composition of exports unchanged 
during the period concerned. In other words, NFTA has opened up avenues for the 
countries in ROW to expand their export markets well into NAFTA while other RTBs 
have been unable get rid of the originally default position or else have not been 
flexible to do so for seven years. 


































































NAFTA Intra-Exports as % of Total NAFTA 
Exports
NAFTA Extra-Exports as % of Total 
NAFTA Exports
NAFTA Intra-Imports as % of Total NAFTA 
Imports
NAFTA Extra-Imports as % of Total 
NAFTA Imports
NAFTA INTRA AND EXTRA TRADE AS A PERCENTAGE OF NAFTA TOTAL TRADE 
1999-2005 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from WTO 
 
This scenario gives birth to our next research question. Having observed the average 
picture of the trading relationship between the selected blocs and the ROW we can 
now raise a question that requires an empirical solution. What could be the situation if 
a country in ROW is connected to such a RTB through an FTA? i.e. whether a 
bilateral FTA between a member and a non-member country of RTB improves 
welfare of the non-member or exploit the non-member for the benefit of RTB itself.  
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For clarity, we can summarize the research questions as,  
a. What is the average treatment effect of FTA?  
b. Are Regional Trading Blocs (RTBs) in general trade creating or diverting?  
c. Does an FTA between an outsider and insider country of a RTB create trade 
for both parties equally or unequally or does it at least help outsider 
countries to overcome any trade diversionary effect caused by RTA? 
In answering the above questions, we will consider seven RTBs namely EU, NAFTA, 
ASEAN, EFTA, DR-CAFTA, SAARC and CARICOM linked to 79 insider-outsider 
FTAs. 
  
1.4 METHODOLOGY  
As the major analytical tool, this study effectively uses Augmented Gravity Model, 
which has been extensively used in trade literature for policy analysis. We consider 
pair-wise annual trade flows among 184 countries for 9 years from 1997 to 2005 so 
that FTA proliferation era is covered. We estimate the Gravity Model with adequate 
controls to account for natural level of trade expected from any random country pair 
and then will employ dummy variables to capture abnormal trade arising from trading 
blocs, FTAs and their interactive effects. Model will be estimated by Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS), Estimated Generalized Least Square (EGLS) techniques in both Cross-
sectional and Panel Data settings. Necessary treatment will be done, depending on the 
case, to address the econometrics issues such as heteroskedasticity, serial 
autocorrelation, endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity etc. Key results will be 
summarized in the body while detailed outputs are made available in the statistical 
appendix. 
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1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE REST OF THE THESIS 
The rest of the work will be organized as follows. The Chapter-II is fully devoted for 
relevant theory and literature review.  Chapter-III presents the model development 
followed by the conceptual framework where we propose a few innovations to the 
conventional Gravity Model. In Chapter-IV we discuss the implications of novelties 
introduced to the model and compare them with historical findings. Having developed 
well tuned methodological tools, we explicitly address our research questions 
regarding RTB and FTA overlapping effect and the Average Treatment Effect of FTA 
in Chapter-V and Chapter-VI respectively. Finally, in Chapter-VII after a number of 
sensitivity analyses, we summarize findings and concluding remarks, also discuss 




The gravity equation is a widely used formulation for statistical analyses of bilateral 
flows such as merchandise trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), migration, 
tourism between different geographical entities. In this Chapter, we provide an 
overview of the origin, evolution and many different applications of the gravity 
equation, and finally show the research gap in the existing literature.  
============================================================ 
2.1 ORIGINS OF GRAVITY - NEWTON’S APPLE 
In 1687 Sir Isaac Newton proposed the “Law of Universal Gravitation.” It held 
every single point mass attracts every other point mass by a force pointing along the 
line combining the two. The force is proportional to the product of the two masses and 






GF =           (2.1) 
where,  
ijF  Attractive force between i and j  
iM  Mass of i 
jM  Mass of j 
ijD  Distance between i and j 
G Gravitational constant depending on the units of measurement of the masses 
distance and the attractive force  
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As the gravitational force is directly proportional to the mass of both interacting 
objects it follows the idea that more massive objects will attract each other with a 
greater gravitational force. If the mass of one of the objects is doubled then the force 
of gravity between them is also doubled. If the mass of one of the objects is tripled, 
then the force of gravity between them is tripled, and so on. Since gravitational force 
is inversely proportional to the distance between the two objects, increasing distance 
makes the gravitational force weaker. So as two objects are separated from each other, 
the gravitational attraction between them also decreases. If the distance between two 
objects is doubled for example, then the gravitational attraction is decreased by a 
factor of 422 = . 
2.2 GRAVITY FROM PHYSICS TO ECONOMICS 
In 1962 in his masterpiece, Shaping the World Economy, Jan Tinbergen5 (1962) was 
the first to propose that roughly the same functional form could be applied to describe 










Atrade =        (2.2) 
where,  
ijtrade  Value of bilateral trade between i and j  
iGDP  Gross Domestic Product of i 
jGDP  Gross Domestic Product of j 
ijD  Distance between i and j 
                                                 
5 Jan Tinbergen (1903-1994) shared the Nobel Price in Economics in 1969 with Ragnar A.K. Frisch 
(1895-1973) for having developed and applied dynamic models for the analysis of economic processes.  
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 A constant term 
Taking natural logarithm of both sides, 
ijijjiij DGDPGDPAtrade εββ +++= )ln().ln()ln( 21     (2.3) 
where, 1β and 2β are the coefficients to be estimated with the expected signs of 
01 >β and 02 <β  
Eq.  (2.3) is the core gravity equation which has subsequently undergone enormous 
improvements to harness its empirical properties. From the original work of 
Tinbergen, the core gravity model has been remarkably successful in applied research 
but its micro foundation developed in a gradual process after few decades later.  
 
Anderson (1979) was the first to give the gravity model theoretical legitimacy. He 
uses the properties of expenditure systems with a maintained hypothesis of identical 
homothetic preferences across regions and products are differentiated by place of 
origin. Also he claims that “Unfortunately, as is widely recognized, its use for policy 
is severely hampered by its "unidentified" properties. (Anderson, 1979) 
 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) shows that a differentiated product framework with 
increasing returns to scale can provide a theoretical justification for the trade Gravity 
equation. Bergstrand (1989) develops a general equilibrium model with two 
differentiated-product and two factors to illustrate how the gravity equation, "fits in" 
with the Heckscher–Ohlin model (HO model) of inter-industry trade and also the 
study extends the microeconomic foundation of generalized gravity equation to 
incorporate relative factor-endowment differences and non-homothetic tastes. 
Deardorff (1995) shows that the simple frictionless gravity model can be derived from 
two extreme cases of the classic framework of the HO Model where (a) preferences 
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are identical and homothetic (b) and the countries produce distinct products with 
complete specialization.  
 
All above theoretical explanations attempt to justify the inclusion of the two key 
variables, namely distance and the product of GDPs. As against the early criticism of 
weak theoretical foundation, the handwork by the above researchers has made Gravity 
model theoretically so advanced that Frankel Stein and Wei write the gravity model 
has ‘gone from an embarrassing poverty of theoretical foundations to an 
embarrassment of riches!’ (Frankel, 1997:p53) In fact, such developments 
undoubtedly laid a solid theoretical foundation to the model, but equally lost the 
practical significance of the model.   
 
Despite of the compatibility with the theatrical Gravity model, when it is used for 
empirical studies dealing with the data collected from uncontrolled settings, it 
becomes necessary to include many more control variables, to estimate the desired 
outcome accurately. This necessity gave birth to “Augmented Gravity Equation” that 
we repeatedly use in our study.  Augmented Gravity Equation is nothing new but the 
outcome of releasing the assumptions governing the theoretical models.  Augmented 





kkijjiij ZDGDPGDPAtrade εβββ ++++= ∑
=3
21 ln)ln().ln()ln(   (2.4) 
There is no disagreement among researchers regarding the two explicit key variables 
in the Gravity model. Linnemann (1966) was the first to extend the gravity model of 
Tinbergen (1962) to include other explanatory variables such as population and 
complementary index reflecting how the commodity compositions would complement 
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each other or not. It also works as a proxy for relative resource endowment. 
Linnemann (1966) was the first to attempt linking the factor-proportions into the 
gravity model. Stating from Linnemann, many researchers continued to introduce 
verities of regressors, perhaps with less theoretical justifications, but strongly 
connected to their research objectives. Nevertheless, there is no unanimity among 
researchers regarding the additional variables to be included in the Gravity model. It 
is not surprising because inclusion or exclusion of additional variables necessarily 
depends on the objectives of the study and the evaluating techniques being used.  
Nonetheless, Table 2.1 presents a list of variables widely used in augmented models. 
The list may not be exhaustive but it shows the grey picture of the broad protocol of 
trade Gravity.  
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TABLE 2.1: COMMON VARIABLES USED IN AUGMENTED GRAVITY MODEL 
Table 2.1 
 
COMMON VARIABLES USED IN AUGMENTED GRAVITY MODEL 
 
Variable Research Paper 
Common Border  
Aitken (1973), Bergstrand (1985), Thursby and Thursby (1987) 
Frankel (1992), Frankel and Wei (1993), Frankel and Wei (1995), 
Frankel et al. (1995), Frankel and Wei (1996), Montenegro and 
Soto (1996), Freund (2000), Rose (2000a), Frankel and Rose 
(2002) Soloaga and Winters (2001), Feenstra et al. (2001) 
Frankel, J. Romer, D. (1999) 
North-South 
Distance Melitz (2007a) 
Output /per 
capita 
Rose A. K (2000a), Benjamin (2004), Tang, D (2005), 
Tang (2005) 
Difference in 
GDP per capita  Donny T, (2003) 
Sq area of the 
countries 
Montenegro and Soto (1996), Soloaga and Winters (2001), 
Rose (2000a), Frankel and Rose (2002), Rose (2004) Frankel,  
J. Romer, D. (1999) 
Island Status Montenegro and Soto (1996), Rose (2000a), Soloaga and Winters (2001), Frankel and Rose (2002)  
Remoteness Soloaga and Winters (2001),  Feenstra et al. (2001), Rose (2000b)  
Landlocked 
status 
Montenegro and Soto (1996) Rose (2000b), Frankel and Rose 
(2002) Frankel, J. Romer, D.(1999) 
Common 
Language 
Frankel and Wei (1995), Frankel and Wei (1996), Montenegro 
and Soto (1996), Rose (2000a), Soloaga and Winters (2001), 
Frankel and Rose (2002), Feenstra et al. (2001) 
Colonial 
Relationship 
Rose (2000a), Frankel and Rose (2002) 
Freund (2000)  
Common 
Currency Rose (2000a), Frankel and Rose (2002)  
population Frankel, J. Romer, D. (1999) 
Exchange 
Volatility  Donny Tang (2005), Rose (2000a),  Tang (2005) 
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2.3 EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS OF TRADE GRAVITY MODEL 
Trade literature provides evidence for numerous empirical applications of gravity 
model. From the view point of our study, they are of three folds. 
 Studies purely tested for empirical existence of Gravity 
 Studies extended Gravity model to measure the impact of other determinants 
of trade such as border effect, home market effect, common currency, 
common language, Regional Trading Blocs, Free Trading Agreements etc. 
 Studies used Gravity model to describe bilateral flows other than trade (for 
example; foreign direct investment, tourism, labor migration flows)  
Our prime interest lies with the studies falling into the second category. The first 
category will be of less interest to us but will be discussed very briefly. The third 
category falls totally out of the scope of this study and will not be discussed.  
 
2.3.1 Studies purely tested for empirical existence of Gravity 
The remarkable finding of the pure gravity model is that the coefficient for the 
Product of GDPs is equal to unity. This implies the countries of similar size trade 
more among them rather than countries of dissimilar sizes do. The studies that 
empirically tested this hypothesis fall under the first category.  
 
Helpman (1987) presents graphical evidence to support his prediction for OECD 
countries that more similar countries trade more. Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) 
confirm Helpman’s prediction through an econometric test. Symbolically, Helpman’s 









21Aregion in   tradeof volume     (2.5) 
where, iAs is GDP of country i over regional GDP. The term appearing in parenthesis 
is termed as “size dispersion index”. It measures how the volume of trade varies with 
the relative size of the countries. Helpman observed that both variables increasing 
over time leading to the conclusion that trade is growing when countries are becoming 
more similar in size. (Feenstra, 2004 p147)  
 
Debaere (2005) tested this hypothesis for two sets of countries: OECD versus Non-
OECD and concluds that Helpman’s (1987) prediction is true for OECD countries but 
is rejected for Non-OECDs. In Debaere’s words “…..I show that the increasing 
similarity in GDPs among OECD country pairs leads to higher bilateral trade to 
GDP ratios. This finding provides some support for the prediction of Helpman (1987) 
whose model explains intra-industry trade that is prevalent among developed 
countries. I also show that Helpman’s prediction is rejected for non-OECD countries, 
among which intra-industry trade is not critical”. Debaere (2005) Debaere’s finding 
contradicts Helpman (1987) results, and more generally, contradicts Gravity equation.  
 
As far as the present study is concerned, we get little guidance for the studies that 
tested pure existence of gravity. Indeed, knowing whether the coefficient for 
‘GDP.GDP’ is unity or “size dispersion index” is closer to unity, would only verify 
empirical existence/nonexistence of Gravity model, but it has almost nothing to do 




2.3.2 Studies extended Gravity model to measure the impact of other 
determinants of trade  
 Border Effect  
McCallum (1995) is a revolutionary paper in the sense that it stimulated a large 
amount of research on border effect. Using 1998 data for 30 U.S states and 10 
Canadian provinces, McCallum estimated Eq. (2.6) comparing intra-national trade 
between Canadian provinces with international trade between Canadian provinces 
and U.S. states. 
ijijijjiij ueDUMMYdcybyax +++++= dist               (2.6) 
where, ijx  is the logarithm of shipments of goods from region i to region j, iy and 
jy are the logarithms of gross domestic product in regions i and j, ijdist  is the 
logarithm of the distance from i to j and ijDUMMY  is a binary variable equal to 1 for 
interprovincial trade and 0 for province-to-state trade. More interestingly, McCallum 
found that 97.20]1)09.3exp[( =−=e which implies that, trade between two Canadian 
provinces is roughly 21 times larger than trade between a province and a state. 
Feenstra (2004) re-estimated Eq.  (2.6) using 1993 data and found border effect is 
15.7 times, which is little below to the former, but both still seemed unbelievably 
high. On contrary, using the same data the border effect for U.S. was found to be 1.5 
(Feenstra, 2004 p151) Feenstra explains the anatomy of this puzzle with a simple 
numerical example; nevertheless, the real solution to border puzzle comes from the 
recent work of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) where they asserted, in general, 
that border effect is asymmetric on countries of different sizes and is inherently large 
for small countries. In particular, Anderson and van Wincoop showed that 
McCallum’s border effect is exaggerated not only because of relatively small size of 
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Canadian economy but also due to omitted variable bias in Eq. (2.6) due to exclusion 
of multilateral resistances/barrios to trade. 
 
Okubo (2004) estimates border effect for Japanese market using McCallum’s model 
specification with data from 1960 to 1990 at five year intervals. Analogues to 
McCallum’s study, Okubo takes intra-trade among eight regions in Japan and the 
ROW countries aggregated into nine areas in the world. His findings suggest, 
significantly positive intra-national trade effect varying min of 2.1 to max of 10.3 
times of international trade exists supporting the idea that interregional trade is more 
active than international trade.  Also he concludes that (a) the border effect in Japan is 
apparently considerably lower than in Canada and resembles the effect in U.S. (b)  
border effect in Japan has declined remarkably between 1960-1990 due to trade 
liberalization. No need to mention that Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) critics 
about omitted variable bias in McCallum (1995) estimates will be equally applicable 
here. More specifically, the estimated border effect would not be pure effect of 
border; unluckily it would be a combination of all multilateral resistance terms other 
than distance. For example, Okubo (2004) ignored the fact that Japanese intraregional 
trade was done in the same currency whereas international trade was done in different 
currencies. If common currency matters for trade, the estimated border effect is 
biased. As long as we can reasonably assume there is no much difference in the mode 
of transport among Canadian provinces and Canadian provinces to U.S. sates, 
transport cost proxied by distance has no defect in McCallum's study. But Okubo 
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(2004) miserably forgets the fact that one km distance inside Japan is not equivalent 
to one km distance from Japan to another country in terms of transport cost involved6.  
 
Most recent application of Gravity model to estimate Border effect is Alessandro and 
Raimondi (2007) where the border effect from a gravity model is used to assess 
agricultural trade integration among 22 OECD countries for the 1994–2003 period. 
Estimated border effect shows that crossing a national border within the OECD 
induces an average trade-reduction effect of a factor 13. This average value is higher 
for intra-EU trade while being lower for the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs).  
 
 Currency Union effect 
Another renowned application of Gravity model is a series of studies by Rose 
(2000a), Rose (2000c), Frankel and Rose (2002), Glick and Rose (2002), and Rose 
and van Wincoop (2001) devoted to estimate currency union effect. We highlight 
some results from the first one, though the studies slightly differ from each other in 
technical aspects, the findings are more or less the same strongly supporting the 
notion that currency unions are tremendously promoting trade. The model was 
estimated using 33,903 bilateral observations spanning five different years 1970, 
1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 for 184 countries including small territories. It covered 
320 bilateral observations using a common currency. This study shows strong positive 
effect of currency union on bilateral trade. Pooled OLS estimate for marginal effect of 
currency union is %2351)21.1exp(*100 =−  meaning that a country pair having a 
                                                 
6 See Engel,C and John H Rogers (1996) ,How wide is the border , American Economic Review, 
December 1996; 86-5 p1112-1125 to see how cross Canada-U.S. national border affects commodity 
prices. We do not discuss this paper as their methodology has no relation with Gravity Equation. 
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common currency trade 2.4 times more than any other random pair does, given all 
other factors being equal. Baldwin and Taglioni, (2006) argues Rose’s (2000a) 
currency union effect is upward biased and true estimate boiled down to almost half 
%921)65.0exp(*100 =−  when methodological problems are corrected.  For us also it 
is unclear why Rose put “log product of GDPs” and “log product of per capita GDPs” 
in the same regression simultaneously. When one attempts to measure marginal effect 
of GDP, controlled for per capita income, with or without knowing he is measuring 
the change in population as well. 
 
A recent study by Michael (2006) argues that currency union effect (if any) should be 
reflected in the trade between historically dollarized countries and the United States. 
Using the same data set from Glick and Rose (2002), which includes annual 
observations on bilateral trade of 165 countries, Michael claims that there is no strong 
evidence that Western Hemisphere countries that dollarized during study period have 
shown an increase in trade with the U.S. as a result of common currency. There is also 
a lack of evidence that the U.S. trades more with dollarized non-industrial countries 
than it does with other non-industrialized countries. 
 
 WTO Impact 
Another remarkable application of Gravity model comes from Rose (2004) where he 
applies Gravity equation to estimate GATT/WTO impact on bilateral trade flows 
using a large panel data set covering 175 countries over 50 years from 1948 to 1999. 
Employing verities of techniques and number of sensitivity analysis he repeatedly 
confirms that GATT/WTO membership has negligible (often negative) effect with the 
only exception for South Asia, for which effect is economically large but statistically 
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marginal. Rose (2004) was challenging and mostly dominated empirical literature 
regarding GATT/WTO impact. However, the most recent study by Arvind and Jin 
Wei (2007) systematically challenges Rose’s findings furnishing robust evidences that 
the GATT/WTO has had a strong positive impact on trade, amounting to about 120% 
of additional world trade, but the trade promotional impact has been uneven. Using 
Rose’s dataset updated for year 2000 with a re-defined dependent variable followed 
by few improvements to the Gravity model, they found (a) industrial countries that 
participated more actively than developing countries in reciprocal trade negotiations 
witnessed a large increase in trade. (b) bilateral trade was greater when both partners 
undertook liberalization than when only one partner did. (c) sectors that did not 
witness liberalization did not achieve an increase in trade. 
 
 Distance Effect 
Estimating Gravity model, Melitz, J. (2007a) investigates the hypothesis that North–
South differences in distance promote international trade, controlled for distance in 
the ordinary sense. The underlining argument is that the North–South distances could 
reflect differences in factor endowment that provide opportunities for profitable trade 
as predicted in HO model. 
 
Rocco’s (2007) paper claims that not only transport costs but also unfamiliarity can 
explain the negative correlation between distances and bilateral trade volumes. A 
gravity model controlling as many natural causes as possible reveals that high 
uncertainty-aversion countries export disproportionately less to distant counties, and 
thus grow poorer in the long run, which suggests that cultural factors are as important 
as geographic ones in determining trade openness and prosperity.  
 26
 
Michele and Heejoon (2006) shows that statistically and economically significant 
heterogeneity exists in the distance elasticity in trade gravity model depending on 
whether trading partners belong to the OECD and whether they are Christian or Islam 
countries. 
 
Bernardo and Goldfarb (2006) shows that gravity holds in the case of digital goods 
consumed over the Internet that have no trading costs. Therefore, distance effect 
cannot be fully attributed to trade costs. They show that Americans are more likely to 
visit websites from nearby countries, for taste-dependent digital products, such as 
music, games, and pornography even after controlling for language, income, 
immigrant stock etc. Findings suggest 1% percent increase in physical distance 
reduces website visits by 3.25%.  
 
 Estimating RTA / RTB Impact  
After a brief discussion on many different applications of Gravity model now we 
move to the studies done on RTA/RTB and FTA impact. The term RTA is inherently 
vague in the sense WTO has used it to denote all type of regional agreements. 
Therefore, despite of the term used in the original papers by different authors, we use 
RTB to denote regional trading blocs. 
 
There are numerous attempts to measure trade creation (TC) and trade diversion (TD) 
effects of RTBs descending from Balassa (1967). Many former studies, Aitken (1973) 
and Pelzman (1977) for example, uses a single indicative binary variable to measure 
RTB impact. Using a sample of 63 countries Frankel (1992) and Frankel and Wei 
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(1993) estimate trade creation in European blocs and NAFTA, ASEAN and APEC 
during the 1980s. For the most part, Frankel and Wei use a single RTB dummy, which 
is incomplete. It measures only the gross trade creation effect but reveals nothing 
about non-member countries trade and therefore is an incomplete measure to identify 
real TC effect. The studies used RTB dummy as a control but not as the main target 
should be released from this criticism. 
 
However, later work by Frankel et al. (1995), Frankel and Wei (1995, 1996), and 
Frankel (1997) estimated the gravity model more acceptably using two dummies; 
intra-bloc dummy (1 if both belong to same RTB) and extra-bloc dummy (1 if only 
one belongs to RTB) to differentiate between TC and TD effects. They found trade 
creation in the EU, EFTA, APEC, ASEAN and NAFTA, and diversion in EU and 
NAFTA. Masahiro (1999) also shows the failure of a single RTB dummy and instead 
used intra-bloc dummy and extra-bloc dummy to differentiate between TC and TD 
effects of EEC7, LAFTA8 and CMEA9.  
 
Ghosh and Steven (2004) defines RTB in both ways and test for fragility of TC effect 
of 12 RTBs10 using extreme bound analysis. They found using a least squares 
estimator, where all weight is attached to the sampling distribution, eight or more of 
the twelve RTAs considered are trade creating but at the extreme bounds, when all 
weight is attached to the prior distribution, none of the RTAs are trade creating.  They 
ended with a challenging conclusion that the pervasive trade creation effect found in 
                                                 
7 European Economic Community 
8 Latin American Free Trade Association  
9 Council of Mutual Assistance 
10 Twelve RTB included; EU, EFTA, EEA, CACM, CARICOM, NAFTA, LAIA, ANDEAN, 
MERCOSUR, ASEAN, ANZCERA, APEC 
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the literature reflects not the information content of the data but rather the 
unacknowledged beliefs of the researchers. 
 
Benjamin (2004) uses Gravity Model to study the proposed China-ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (CAFTA) to be implemented by 2010. How would trade between the 
integrating area and the rest of the world be affected; will there be net trade creation 
or net trade diversion effects; are some of the issues being addressed. But we would 
say they never modeled TC and TD effects and therefore conclusions must have been 
based on prior beliefs rather than what data revealed.  
 
Using Gravity model, Tang (2005) examines whether NAFTA. ANZCER and 
ASEAN would result in TC among the member countries and TD with the non-
members during 1999 to 2000. He also establishes intra-bloc dummy and extra-bloc 
dummy to correctly capture the TC and TD effects. The results show that the TC 
among the member countries is higher, particularly the ANZCER and ASEAN but 
ANZCER has resulted in TC with non-member countries, whereas ASEAN has 
resulted in a trade increase with non-member countries. Surprisingly, the formation of 
NAFTA has no significant effect on trade with non-member countries as their trade 
flows remain quite low even before its implementation. We believe the conclusion 
regarding NAFTA severely suffers from extreme sampling bias because Tang (2005) 
derived this conclusion observing only 11 countries (7 European and 4 East Asian) 
trading with NAFTA.   
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Analogous pattern of dummy variables can be seen in Gravity model by Volker 
(2007) where he ascertains the impact of the G7/G8 countries11 on the trade among 
175 countries over the period from 1948 through 1999. Though G7/G8 is neither RTB 
nor FTA, Volker found G7/G8 is consistently associated with a strong positive effect 
on trade.  
 
Sucharita and Steven (2004) introduces a new measure of RTA membership into 
Gravity model based on the degree of implementation as well as type of RTA. i.e 
preferential trade agreement (PTA), free trade area (FTA), customs union (CU), 
common market (CM) and monetary union (MU). Their findings show that RTAs 
create intra-bloc trade regardless of their type and that more integrated RTAs generate 
greater total trade creation. Further, regarding the RTAs yet to be implemented, a 
proposed FTA, CU or MU raises the volume of intra-bloc trade, while a proposed CM 
lowers intra-bloc trade. Moreover, a proposed CM and MU raises the trade flow 
outside the bloc, while a proposed CU diverts trade from those countries outside the 
bloc.  
 
The studies so far discussed attempted to identify TC and TD effect of RTBs using 
utmost two dummies; intra-bloc dummy (1 if both belong to same RTB) and extra-
bloc dummy (1 if only one belongs to RTB). Carrere (2006) put forward a very logical 
argument that three dummies for one RTB are required to distinguish between TC and 
TD effect. The idea is simple but sounds amazing. The extra-bloc dummy hitherto 
used does not clearly indicate possible TD effect for non-member countries, and more 
seriously a positively significant estimate for extra-bloc dummy could lead to the 
                                                 
11 The G7 is a coalition of the major industrial countries: UK, USA, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
Canada. In 1998 G8 was created when of Russia joined G7  
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rather misleading conclusion that the selected RTB is trade creating for non-member 
countries whereas the real case may be, possibly, other way round.  Carrere (2006) 
uses gravity model to assess ex-post effect of EU, ANDEAN, CACM, NAFTA, 
LAIA, ASEAN and MERCOSUR. The study includes 130 countries and is estimated 
with panel data over the period 1962–1996. The correct number of dummy variables 
allows distinguishing between TC and TD effects realistically. In contrast to previous 
estimates, Carrere (2006) shows that RTBs have generated a significant increase in 
trade for members, often at the expense of the ROW. We also define RTB dummies 
exactly the same way Carrere (2006) did, but extend it one step further to capture 
RTB and FTA interactive effects, as we will discuss in Chapter V.  
 
Even though much ink has been spilled on the issue of RTA impacts in general, there 
is little work done on FTAs. On theoretical ground, Kennan and Riezman (1990) 
shows that countries may lower external tariffs against other countries after endorsing 
an FTA. Richardson (1993) shows that governments tend to reduce external tariffs to 
minimize the tariff revenue losses caused by the shift of imports from outsiders to 
FTA partners. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) asserts that changing terms of trade in 
presence of an FTA generates an extra force to lower external tariffs. On contrary, 
Cadot et al. (1999) argues that countries entering in FTA may also have reasons to 
raise their non-preferential tariffs. Using an oligopolistic-political-economy model in 
which the external tariffs of FTA members, and the decision to form FTAs, are 
endogenously determined Emanuel (2005) shows that FTAs are primarily beneficial 
to the multilateral trading system. Also FTAs encourage their member countries to 
lower their external tariffs, deeply enough to enhance trade even between FTA 
members and non-members. 
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On empirical ground, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) is the only published paper 
systematically analyzing Average Treatment Effect of FTA. We will widely discuss 
this paper in Chapter-VI. In a study considering ASEAN countries’ FTAs with 
U.S.A., Naya and Michael (2006) concludes that an important motivation for ASEAN 
countries in seeking FTAs with the United States regards the need to “reclaim” MFN 
status in the U.S. market, which has been eroded due to U.S. FTAs with other 
countries.  
 
2.4 KNOWLEDGE GAP AND OUR CONTRIBUTION  
In this literature review we attempted to show many different applications of Trade 
Gravity Model, and more relevant to our study, we showed how Gravity model has 
been applied to evaluate impact of RTBs and FTAs. However, one clear lapse in all 
literature referred (as well as in unpublished literature which are not referred) is  RTB 
and FTA interactive effect. RTB and FTA impact so far has been estimated in 
isolation without considering the fact that they have significant interactive effects on 
TC and TD. Our study attempts to bridge this knowledge gap in literature evaluating 
TC and TD effects of 6 BTAs overlapping with 79 FTAs. Also we will re-estimate 
ATE of FTA with the implicit hypothesis that ATF of FTA has been overestimated in 
literature. We will discuss more relevant literature in the body of the text when we 
compare our findings with seemingly related previous work. 
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CHAPTER -III 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND MODEL BUILDING 
 
In this chapter first we derive the “Simple Gravity Model” with its fundamentals 
being the primary tool that we are going to employ in our study. Then we will 
augment the model accommodating some indicative variables that would be useful for 
evaluating policy implications in applied research. In this exercise we will discuss the 
limitations of the historically tested gravity models and more importantly will suggest 
tenable improvements to the model as well as necessary adjustments to the key 
variables in use. Finally we describe the coverage and sources of data followed by the 
treatments done keeping the results and discussion for the next chapter. 
============================================================= 
3.1 SIMPLEST VERSION OF GRAVITY MODEL  
We start with the simplest version of gravity model under certain assumptions and 
wish to extend it to “Augmented Gravity Model”, which can be known as the 
resulting model when initial assumptions are released. In this simplest form, gravity 
equation states that bilateral trade between two countries is directly proportional to 
the product of two countries GDPs (Freenstra, 2004) 
In order to establish this relationship let us begin with the following assumptions, 
which we can release later on.  
1) No transport cost between countries 
2) Trade is free in the sense that no boarder tariffs (import duties) 
3) All countries are producing different products 
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4) All countries have identical prices 
5) Demand is identical and homothetic across countries 
6) Trade is balanced 
We can formalize this in a multi country (i,j = 1,2,……..C) and verities of products 
(k=1,2,…..N) framework as follows.  
Let yikt denote country i’s production (volume) of good k at time t. Under our 
assumption that prices are identical, we can normalize them to unity in such a way 
that yikt itself measures the value of production. Thus, GDP in each country at time t is 











  ………………………………………..……. (3.1) 
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Ys =   …………………………………………. (3.3) 
Under the above assumptions county j’s demand for country i’s goods (Exports from i 
to j) does not depend on price of goods, price of substitutes or consumers’ taste12. 
Following the notion of standard demand function, the demand for export from i to j 
should depend only on country j’s GDP. This immediately follows the idea that any 
commodity produced in country i will be distributed among the rest of the countries in 
proportionate to the importing countries’ GDPs. Thus, exports of product k from 
country i to country j at time t are given by    
 
                                                 







kt YsX =   …………………………………………. (3.4) 
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X 1=    ……………………………………. (3.6) 
Eq. (3.6) gives the simplest version of cross sectional gravity equation. 








X 1=  …………………………………………. (3.7) 
As Exports from country j to i ≡ Imports of country i from j 








M 1=  …………………………………………. (3.8) 




































=+ 2 ………………………………………. (3.9) 
If we replicate Eq. (3.9) for all possible country pairs in j,j=1,2……C, where i ≠ j , we 






2  is a constant for all country pairs for any given period t.  
Thus, Eq. (3.9) produces the amazing core idea of gravity model that the “The trade 
flow between two countries” is proportionately related to the product of their 
GDPs.”    
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However, for the reasons that will be discussed shortly in this chapter our prime 
interest lies in Eq. (3.6) that shows one directional trade flow; i.e. Exports. It also has 







1 is a constant for all county pairs at time t, and given all the initial assumptions 
hold, Eq. (3.6) suggests “Exports from country i to j is directly proportional to the 
product of GDPs of the two countries”. In simple words it implies that one percent 
change in the product of GDPs should result one percent change in Export from i to j 
towards the same direction. In short, the income elasticity is unity. In layman 
language countries of similar size trade more than those of dissimilar size do. In 






1 as the intercept and also taking 
natural log of both sides we can rewrite the Eq. (3.6) as follows for estimation 
purpose.  
( ) ijtjtitijt YYX εββ ++= lnln 10   …………………………………. (3.10) 
As the coefficient β1 of Y in logarithm directly produces elasticity, the essence of the 
gravity equation in nut cell is 11 =β  
 
Now that we have established the initial relationship between trade flow and GDP, it 
is time to release the assumption 1 to 6 stated at the beginning. Keeping all other 
assumptions unchanged, let us release only the first assumption regarding transport 
cost. If we interpret f.o.b value13 of export as the price at pickup point and c.i.f value14 
as the value at the destination, the difference between c.i.f  and f.o.b values will be a 
                                                 
13 f.o.b. value (coal) -- Free-on-board value. For example this is the value of coal at the coal mine 
without any insurance or freight transportation charges added. 
 
14 c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight) value represents the landed value at the first port of arrival. 
 
 36
satisfactory measure for the cost involved in transportation. Unlucky, this type of data 
is hardly available for a large number of countries15. Following the previous studies in 
gravity model we also use distance as a proxy for transport cost16.  It is rational to 
think that volume of export is inversely related to transport cost. Then the Eq. (3.6) 















= 1  ………………………………………. (3.11) 
It looks very similar to the Newton’s Universal Gravity Equation with the only 
exception that the distance term is not squired. It is interesting question to ask whether 
the distance term should necessarily be squired.  For us, the answer is No.  
The Universal Gravity Equation states a universal truth in the full sense of the word, 
which is absolutely true for ever. The relationship between the left-hand-side (RHS) 
variables and the right-hand-side (LHS) variables is defaulted and should not be 
changing from time to time17. On contrary, in the Trade Gravity Model the 
relationship between trade flow and the right-hand-side explanatory variables should 
not necessarily be fixed. For example, with technological advancement, rapid 
development in communication networks and transport systems, it is reasonable to 
expect distance would not matter for trade as much as it did many years ago.    This 
argument equally holds good for all other RHS variables in trade gravity model. Thus, 
the best thing is to leave it as an empirical issue that one can test for rather than 
fixing. 
                                                 
15 Baier and Bergstrand (2001) use the c.i.f and f.o.b ratio to model transport cost but their study deals 
with OECD countries that are rich in data quality and availability.  
 
16 We introduce a little adjustment to the distance variable in later part of this chapter. 
 
17 Since the sizes of both Moon and the Earth do not appear to change, its distance stays about the 
same, the Moon orbits around the Earth in a circular path for ever. 
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= ………………………………………. (3.12) 
As GDPs of the two countries stand for the economic masses, obviously this 
transformation is analogue to the Universal Gravity Equation discussed in literature 
review and one can expect β1= β2 = 1 and β3 = 2 if trade gravity is an identical 
representation of universal gravity.  
Now we remove our second assumption by explicitly introducing boarder tariffs on 
ij
tX by country j at time t denoted by 
j
tT which should have a negative impact on 
ij
tX  
( ) ( )






















=  ……………………………………. (3.13) 
Next we can remove assumption 3 and 4 allowing countries to produce close 
substitute goods for each other and differentiate price over products. This follows the 
idea that country j always compares importing countries price with its own price 
before goods being imported. In deed we are doing nothing new but applying the 
standard demand function for exports. Accordingly, ijtX should be a negative function 
of country i’s price level at time t (Own price) and a positive function of country j’s 
price level at time t (price of substitute goods) denoted by itP  and 
j
tP respectively. 
Thus, the Eq. (3.13) becomes,  

























= ……………………………………. (3.14) 
Last two assumptions regarding “identical demand” and “balanced trade” led us to the 
idea that any commodity produced in country i will be distributed among the rest of 
the world (ROW) in proportionate to the importing countries’ GDPs. Releasing these 
two assumptions we break the relationship hitherto established in Eq. (3.4) between   
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ij
ktX  and 
i






1 term in Eq. 







1 becomes a parameter to be estimated that we denote by β0. Thus 
equation (3.14) can be rewritten as, 


















PYYX =  ……………………………………. (3.15) 
 
3.2 AUGMENTED GRAVITY EQUATION  
As discussed at initial stage of literature survey, the prime interest of the first 
generation gravity models was to test whether β1= β2 = 1 in Eq. (3.15). Later on 
researchers found that gravity equation is a useful tool that could be effectively used 
for policy analysis. In doing so, they realized that there is a huge amount of variation 
in trade that cannot be explained by the existing gravity equation as it used to be. 
Most researchers tested for some other auxiliary variables with less theoretical 
justification, usually because of past experience or common sense. Nevertheless, most 
of such experiments were remarkably successful and they came out with better fit to 
the gravity model. This is not surprising because countries do not trade each other 
purely based on economic considerations. Many other factors of geographical, 
cultural, historical or political interest might divert trade from the frictionless path 
predicted by the theory.  The gravity equation augmented by such supplementary 
factors is known as “Augmented Gravity Model”  
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As our study is also aimed at ascertaining the implications of trade policy related 
issues, we also augment our initial model in Eq. (3.15) incorporating the following 
supplementary variables.  
 
i
tR  and 
j























































islandan  is jcountry for  1jIlande  
Accordingly, the augmented gravity model can be defined as, 



















3.3 MODIFICATIONS AND UNDERLINING CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK  
The definitions given to most of the above variables are standard self explanatory and 
have been used repeatedly in trade literature. However, we hereby elaborate the most 
important adjustments we have done in six selected variables. These adjustments will 
undoubtedly divert our work from the previous studies in a great deal and therefore 
results will be hardly comparable unless the reader bears these changes in mind  
A. Using single trade flow (Export) instead of aggregate trade flow (Export + 
import) 
The original gravity equation or subsequently developed theoretical gravity equation 
uses “Real trade flow” (real export + real import), “Average real trade flow” [(real 
export + real import)/2] or “GDP weighted real trade flow” [(real export + real 
import)/real GDP] as the dependent variable which is always a combination of export 
and import.  
 
In this study we purposively use one-way (Export) trade flow because any movement 
in “sum of export and import” will not explain which one of the two parties involved 
will benefit after forming a FTA. For example, suppose India and China form an FTA 
and as a result Chinese exports to India increased by US$10 billion while Indian 
export to China declined by US$5 billion at the same time. If one uses “sum of export 
and imports” he concludes that the two parties have benefited from FTAs and 
miserably fails to perceive the underlining reality that India was losing while China 
was gaining by the FTA. We can overcome this problem by using one-way ( ijtX ) 
trade flow rather than two-way aggregated trade flow ( ijt
ij
t MX + ). Throughout this 
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analysis we stick to the hypothesis that any gain from an FTA for a single country 
should be reflected in terms of an increase in bilateral export (volume) of that country 
than before. One might argue that an increase in imports also brings welfare gains as 
it provides opportunity to consume more goods in many verities and the local market 
becomes more competitive driven by the pleasure coming from imports. Our counter-
argument is that if this was the desired outcome of FTA, there is no need of bilateral 
negotiations at all. One country could have unilaterally removed its trade barriers 
enabling free entry for imports. Therefore, it makes sense to expect an increase in 
exports for FTA to be meaningful. Ascertaining the full welfare effect of FTA is 
beyond the gravity model and thus beyond the objectives of this study.  
 
B. Using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted GDP and Trade data 
As volumes of different goods are measured in different units, they cannot be summed 
together. Trade economists assume that export values are equivalent to volume 
subject to an assumption that price is equal to one18. In reality we have to deal with 













1  ……………………………………. (3.17) 
where,  
ij
tNX )(  Nominal value of export from i to j at time t 
ktQ  Volume of exports of good k at time t 
ktP  Price of k at time t 
)(tNe  Nominal exchange rate (domestic currency units per 1 US$)  
                                                 
18 Value = Volume * price.  Therefore   value=volume only if price =1 
 
 42
As nominal export values are subject to price inflation and exchange rate appreciation 
/ depreciation such data can be compared neither across countries nor over time. No 
need to mention that same is true for GDP values as well. However, many researchers 
seem to have been careless on this matter19. In a cross-sectional gravity model one can 
argue that converting nominal values into real values is nothing but scaling up (down) 
both sides by a certain number that has no implication on coefficients but the 
intercept. This argument is true only if both sides consist of dollar-valued variables 
like export, GDP, GDP per capita etc20. When the set of explanatory variables 
contains real variables like distance or indicative variables the above argument is 
deemed to be null and void.  An example will clear it further. Suppose that Singapore 
imports Soya bean from many countries, and as it could be a long list, only three 
countries are reported in the Table 3.1 
TABLE 3.1: HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE – IMPORTS OF SOYA BEAN TO SINGAPORE 
TABLE 3.1 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE – IMPORTS OF SOYA BEAN TO SINGAPORE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Country Pairs Volume of Imports kg 
Domestic 
Price Nomi Ex Rate





Sri Lanka to 
Singapore 50,000 Rs20 US$1= Rs110 US$   9,000 2,720 km 
India to 
Singapore 40,000 Rs10 US$1= Rs40 US$ 10,000 2,800 km 
USA to 
Singapore 15,000 US$1  US$ 15,000 15,572 km 
 
                                                 
19 Masahiro (1999) uses nominal values of export as well as GDP. Referring to Linnemann (1966) 
Masahiro states that using real GDP figure instead of nominal GDP caused only a small difference in 
the reading for the coefficients of determination. Nevertheless, for us this is a not a matter of goodness-
of-fit but a matter of economic insight. 
Carrere, C. (2006) uses nominal value for dependent variable (total bilateral imports) and real values 
for explanatory variables (real GDP), the logic behind is unclear.  
In Rocco’s (2007) paper yearly export volume (in nominal US dollar) it is ambiguous what he means  
Benjamin (2004) also uses nominal values for GDP 
 
20 Probably this could be the reason why unitary income elasticity (coefficient for GDP≈1) is 
guaranteed in gravity model even with improperly adjusted nominal data. 
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When the second and the last columns are examined, it can be clearly seen that 
Singapore has imported less from far away countries and more from closer countries. 
(Assuming we have sufficient number of observations, enough control on other 
variables) we can undoubtedly establish a negative relationship between imports and 
the distance. If we use nominal export values in column 5 being the only data we 
observe and derive the relationship between nominal exports and distance we 
miserably conclude the longer the distance is the higher the imports are! Very similar 
to this hypothetical case, the use of nominal values in empirical studies is likely to 
produce misleading conclusions. It is noteworthy there are commendable attempts to 
rule out this possibility using real trade flows and real GDP data in some recent 
studies21. However, it heals only a half of the cavity. 
For example consider the two questions below. 
1) Do countries trade more than before after forming a common currency? 
2) Do countries having a common currency trade more than others do? 
To answer the first question one needs data which are comparable over time 
dimension. On the other hand, one needs data comparable over cross-sectional units to 
answer the second question. Taking real trade flows and real GDP implies we remove 
the inflationary effect and the exchange rate effect enabling comparison over time. 
This transformation by no mean facilitates cross-sectional comparison. Unfortunately 
the cross-section wise incomparable data hitherto used in gravity models seems to 
have considerably underestimated the trade and GDP values of small countries.   
There is no logic for reporting 20 eggs from Malaysia as 2 Dollar while 20 eggs from 
Bangladesh as just 1Dollar in USA external trading account. Alternatively in this 
analysis we use purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted export values and GDP 
                                                 
21 For example See Rose (2004), Baier & Bergstrand (2007) 
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values, which can be reasonably compared both over time and across countries. 
Debaere (2005) is the only published paper in which PPP converted values are used. 
Feenstra shows PPP adjusted values must produce more reliable results (Feenstra, 
2004 p148). PPP convention helps to reduce heterogeneity among countries as well. 
One more advantage of PPP is that when nominal GDP or Export values are 
converted to PPP values, domestic inflationary effect embodied in the data is 
automatically removed and need not to be deflated by a domestic price index. Instead 
PPP transformation process itself injects USA inflation into domestic data. Therefore 
PPP adjusted time series data needs deflating against USA inflationary effect.  
 
C. Taking internal transport cost into account 
 
As discussed earlier for data feasibility great circle distance22 (GCD) is used as a 
proxy for transport cost. The underlining assumption is that goods are transported 
from country to country all the way along a straight line. This may be unrealistic even 
for air travels because they avoid North Pole, Bermuda triangle and Himalayas etc. 
Also we know that world’s nautical routes are not straight and shipping agents in most 
cases offer rates with less relation to the direct distance. On the other hand it is 
reasonable to think the overall cost (including transport, searching cost, transaction 
cost, insurance, the cost of delays and demurrages etc) is an increasing   function of 
the distance. Starting from the original work of Tinbergan (1962), the distance as a 
proxy for transport cost has been remarkably successful in almost all trade gravity 
studies, and perhaps, it has been the most robust estimator across different studies. 
                                                 
22 The great-circle distance is the shortest distance between any two points on the surface of a sphere 
measured along a path on the surface of the sphere (as opposed to going through the sphere's interior) 
 45
Our concern is not seeking how successfully the distance represents the transport cost. 
Given the distance is a good proxy for transport cost we attempt to adjust it a little bit 
to cover internal transport cost as well.  
 
For computational convenience GCD is measured between the two country capitals of 
the trading pair using geographical coordinates. The capital-to-capital distance will 
stand for the average distance between countries only if the capital city is located in 
the middle of the country, the county is approximately circular in shape and smaller in 
size. It is very natural to observe the most of the capital cities in the world are located 
closer to the border rather than in the middle and the countries very rarely take 
rounded shapes.  This implies that capital to capital distance becomes a poorer 
approximation for transport cost for the bigger countries in geographical size because 
it fails to cover most part of the inland transport cost.  For example a straight line 
connecting Beijing and Tokyo fails to spot most part of China and therefore may yield 
a poor approximation for transport cost between China and Japan.  
 
Given the distance is acceptable representation of transport cost we claim that GCD 
underestimates the transport cost for bigger countries compared to smaller countries.  
One technical adjustment we can do is to push the capital city hypothetically into the 
middle of the country and take the geographical coordinates of that point in 
calculating GCD. Though this is technically sound the available geographical 
information suggests that most of the world harbors and commercial hubs (in absence 
of maritime access) are clustered around the capital rather than in middle. Therefore 
we take the capital to capital distance, ijD to represent the country to country distance 
as it has so far been used, and elevate it by some additional component, γ to represent 
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inland transport cost. γ is the radius of a perfect circle equivalent to country’s 
geographical size in terms of square area. Accordingly our distance is GCD plus two 
partner’s radius.  
jiijij DDisrad γγ ++=   ………………………….. (3.18) 
( )ii Z
22
7=γ  where iZ  is the squire area of the country i.  
This is not a perfect measure. But it sizably captures the idea that the internal 
remoteness from the country border is more for exporters in bigger countries than for 
those in smaller countries23. Helliwell and Verdier (2001) developed a highly 
comprehensive measure to capture internal distance taking into account population 
density distribution as well. Such a sophisticated measure is beyond our scope 
because of the large sample size in our study.   
 
D. Alternative measure for remoteness  
There are two indexes historically used to measure remoteness. The first one is the 












i .     ………………………….. (3.19) 











YDR −= ∑≠= ,12    ………………………….. (3.20) 
iR1 is time-invariant meaning that a country once found to be remote will remain 
remote forever. Then it is nothing but only a different interpretation of distance itself.  
                                                 
23 See Melitz (2007a) for a similar measure used to construct remoteness.  
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Also it assumes that being closer to USA by 1km as equivalent as being closer to 
Kiribati by 1km, which is less conceivable. By contrast, itR2  concerns the time 
varying nature of remoteness and also suggests that the countries located in close 
proximity to economically bigger countries are always less remote than those located 
in the neighborhood of smaller countries. Therefore the second one is theoretically 
superior. Despite its theoretical soundness we are reluctant to use itR2  basically for 
two reasons. First, empirically it has failed to produce significant results or sometimes 
even against the expected sign.24 Second, theoretically it is wrong to compute 
i
tR2 dropping zero-trading partners
25. For example, assume USA has 190 non-zero-
trading partners and one takes all of them to compute itR2 for USA. Then he has to use 
same number of countries (190+USA-Gabon) to compute itR2 for Gabon regardless 
Gabon trade with all of them or not. A careful look into Eq. (3.20) will reveal that 
computing itR2 with the underlining sample of the study does not make sense and 
perhaps misleading. For example, assume there are only 7 countries in the world as is 
the case in Figure 3.1. The country A is trading with X, Y, Z, Q and B while the 
country B is trading with P, R and A. If we disregard the information of zero trade 
partners for A and B, and compute remoteness using Eq. (3.20) we are unlucky to end 
up with the misleading conclusion that AtR2 >
B
tR2  However, 
i
tR2 will show us the true 
picture of remoteness only if we consider all the countries including zero trading 
partners (for A all except A, and for B all except B, for Q all except Q…..) Once 
again we should emphasize that, in fact, there is nothing wrong with the formula. The 
problem is it may produce misleading results when we deal with a sample. 
                                                 
24 See Melitz (2007a) coefficient for itR2 is unacceptably positive and significant.  
 
25 Country with which no trade is reported 
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FIGURE 3.1: AN ILLUSTRATION OF COUNTRIES’ ECONOMIC REMOTENESS 
Figure 3.1 







In this study we simply itR2 to yield an alternative index for remoteness. There is no 
change in our basic preposition that countries having economically strong neighbors 


















 ………………………….. (3.21) 
In this index C denotes the number of neighboring countries included. It is an 
arbitrary number decided by the researcher. As long as C is a “common number” for 
all countries in the world and C includes the set of countries in the minimum distance 
from the country i, how C is decided is immaterial. itR produces an index number that 
measures the relative remoteness for country i at time t 
 
In other words we view countries in close proximity to each other as a cluster and 
assign a relative number to each individual county in the cluster depending on the 
distance and economic strength of the other countries standing in the same cluster.  
In this study we set 5=C . It means we take the distances and the GDPs of the five 
nearest neighboring countries to compute itR for each country. The index follows the 
logic that a country is less (more) remote as long as it is surrounded by economically 











it suggests the distance will decide the relative remoteness. This index by default 
assumes equal weights for both GDP and the distance. In other words a neighbor 
having GDP of US$100 billion in 1000km distance is equivalent to another neighbor 
having GDP US$50 billion appearing in 500km distance. To establish this property 
we make use of the historical evidence that the absolute value of both GDP and 
Distance coefficients in almost all well defined gravity models are approximately 
equal.  
E. Using f.o.b (free on board) values in place of c.i.f (cost insurance freight) 
values.  
It is pretty obvious that previous gravity studies do not much differentiate between 
f.o.b values and c.i.f values. The estimated results also do not seem considerably 
differ from each other. Then one might question as to why we should so worry about 
the difference. However, it can be shown that using c.i.f. values of export is 
contradictory with our early agreement that the distance is a good proxy for transport 
cost.  
 
The c.i.f value is the value of export at the destination point. By definition c.i.f value 
should increase as the transport cost increases. If one admits bilateral distance is a 
good proxy for transport cost he should also accept that the c.i.f export values become 
larger, the longer the bilateral distance is. This positive relationship spoils the 
expected inverse relationship between the transport cost and the real exports thus 
leading to downward bias in the distance estimator in gravity model. On contrary f.o.b 
values are free from this problem and help to produce unbiased estimator for the 
distance.       
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F. Introducing a proxy for international price term 
As discussed earlier the simple gravity model assumes prices are identical over all 
products and across all countries.  Therefore price can be normalized to unity and 
value of export (import) is equivalent to volume of export (import). Once we remove 
this assumption the price term should appear as an explanatory variable in the gravity 
model. However, until recent there had been hardly any study where the price term 
appeared explicitly or implicitly. The absence of price term may lead to omitted 
variable bias in the estimated model. In fact it a challenge to trade economists to find 
a unique price that represents the prices of millions of different verities traded. One 
possibility is to take the export (import) price index as an average value for price. One 
can argue that as export (import) price index is formed based on the prices of actually 
traded goods, it might be the case that the prices of mostly traded goods dominate the 
index value. Suppose a number of goods had not traded or less traded as the prices 
were prohibitively high. Though it could be a clear indication that volume responds to 
prices the export (import) price index does not contain that information. 
 
Alternatively, the consumer price index (CPI) of the exporting (importing) country 
can be used. One possible drawback is that in computation of CPI for any country 
relatively higher weights are applied to essential items, basic utilities, and some 
services which have less relation to exportable items.  GDP deflator (Implicit price 
index) is another potential candidate. Again one possible problem with GDP deflator 
is that it contains the prices of all the goods and services produced in the country 
including non-tradable goods. Hence GDP deflator may not be a good representation 
of the prices of external trading goods except for an abundantly open economy.     
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Nevertheless, in absence of any other choice some recent studies more or less seem to 
use such price indexes as a proxy for price term.  
 
However, our concern is none of the above problems. Given all of them are equally 
good, our question is whether any of those price indexes stands for relative price. 
In simple words is it possible for an importer to decide which country’s goods are 
relatively cheaper for him to import by comparing any of the above indexes taken 
from different countries. Absolutely not at all! For example, for the month November 
2004 the CIPs of Singapore and Philippines are 104.3 and 186.2 respectively26. Does 
it imply Philippines’ goods are as twice as (1.8 times) expensive than Singapore’s 
goods?  In fact it tells nothing about relative price.    
In this study our attempt is to introduce a proxy variable (index) that can stand for the 








PxRP =   ………………………….. (3.22) 
where,  
i
tRP     Relative price index of country i at time t 
)_( Curdomi
tPx   Price of x in country i at time t in domestic currency  
$1___( USperCurdomi
tNE  Nominal exchange rate of country i at time t in terms of 
domestic currency units per 1 US$ 
x  A bundle of goods from county i that worth 1 US$ if traded in 
USA market 
                                                 
26 Figures are from Monthly Asian Statistical Indicator - 
http://www.aseansec.org/macroeconomic/mt12.htm (cited 8/28/2007 9:46:09 PM) 
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A careful look into this index will reveal that it is nothing but PPP exchange rate over 








PPPERP =  
Without loss of generality, if we can assume for any given country there is a large set 
of countries supplying homogeneous or closely substitutable goods,   the above index 
will show the relative price guiding the decision from which country to import.  This 
index carries one more advantage. When this index is used to represent relative price, 
it does not require using real exchange rate as an explanatory variable in the gravity 
equation. 
 
 3.4 SOURCES AND COVERAGE OF DATA  
In this part we briefly describe the sources of original data and some of the 
adjustments done. Nominal values of export from Country i to j in US$ are from The 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (UN comtrade) database. This data series 
was converted to PPP values to be comparable across country pairs multiplying by 
Nominal Exchange Rates over PPP exchange rate28. As this transformation replaces 
domestic inflationary effect with USA inflationary effect then the series was deflated 
by USA inflation rate to be comparable over time. The data series for nominal 
exchange rates, implied PPP exchange rates and inflation rates required for the said 
                                                 
27 Both expressed in terms of domestic currency units per 1 US$ 
28 Both Nominal and PPP exchange rates were expressed in Indirect Method i.e. the domestic currency 
units per one unit of US$ 
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adjustment were taken from the IMF-World Economic Outlook Database for April 
2006.29  
 
PPP converted Annual GDP series taken from the IMF-World Economic Outlook 
Database for April 2006 was readjusted to remove USA inflationary effect embodied. 
Further to yield GDP per capita, GDP series was divided by each Country population 
taken from United State Census Bureau30 
 
Also we use CIA World Fact Book to obtain total land area of each country and the 
geographical coordinates (of capital cities) to compute Great Circle Distance between 
the two countries in a pair. Moreover, we used CIA Fact Book to obtain qualitative 
data to create dummy variables such as common boarder, common language, 
landlocked countries, island countries, common currency31 etc.  We established 
colonial relationship dummy using the qualitative information available in World 
Statesmen Organization website32. 
 
Information to establish FTA dummy and WTO membership was directly taken from 
the WTO official website33 .Tariff data is primarily based on UNCTAD TRAINS34 
database and then used WTO IDB data for filling gaps for missing observations. Also 
                                                 
29 Nominal exchange rate is not explicitly available in the said data base. Instead author calculated it 
using two available series as follows. Nominal Exchange Rate = (Gross domestic product per capita  










34 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) http://www.unctad.org/ 
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we used Penn World Tables35 to fill up missing data in PPP and GDP series (not more 
than 10-20 observations) for small island countries not appearing in above mentioned 
data sources.  
  
The dataset used in this study comprises of one way trade flows (Exports) among 184 
countries (See the Descriptive Appendix Table 3(A) for country list) over 9 years 
from 1997-2005. Though the number of maximum possible county pairs should be 
184(184-1)/2=16,110 in mathematical sense, all the country pairs are not potential for 
trade. For example we cannot expect Barbados to trade with all other 183 countries 
whereas USA does. This number boils roughly down to 3/4 when zero trade flows are 
excluded36. Moreover in latter part of our study, when any discontinued series was 
dropped in balancing the data panel, we have ended up with 9,832 country pairs37. 
Perhaps, this would be the largest number of cross-sections used in a balanced panel 
approach towards the gravity model38. Accordingly, our panel dimension is (9,832 x 
9) = 88,488 extended over 49 variables.  
                                                 
35 Maintained by the Center for International Comparisons of Pennsylvania university-Philadelphia 
accessible via http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
 
36 Zero trading partners issue is a concern in gravity model. Treatment for zero trading partners is a 
different issue beyond the scope of this study. Among hundreds of Gravity studies, there are only two 
published papers where zero trading partners are taken into account. [Rosaria, M. et al(2---) and 
Eichengreen, B and Douglas A. (1995) ] They also use very simple technique substituting a positive 
constant number for zero trade values just to facilitate double log transformation. Approach is practical 
only with a very small number of county pairs where the researcher can make sure zeros are necessarily 
because of “not trading” rather than “missing data”. Why other researchers do not account for zero 
trading partners is also a good idea to think about. As a result of few experiments done with our 
dataset, we found that treatment for zero trading partners has minimal effect of other estimates but does 
have a substantial effect on distance estimate. Nevertheless, we do not use the adjusted data as it was 
found that “doing treatment” brings numerous adverse implications rather than “not doing any 
treatment”, among which measurement errors are the most serious problem.  
 
37 No other important country has been dropped except Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates  
 
38 Carrere, C. (2006) use 14,387 country pairs but it is an unbalanced panel where many pair 
observations discontinued  
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CHAPTER IV 
REVISITING TRADE GRAVITY MODEL WITH ALTERNATIVE 
ESTIMATING TECHNIQUES 
Throughout the analysis we use the “Augmented Gravity Equation” developed in 
Chapter-III Firstly, we run the cross-sectional gravity model using Least Square 
techniques (OLS and FGLS) for each year in the study period. Secondly we combine 
cross-sectional and time series data in a panel data model to get a better estimation.  
Before launching discussion on the RTB and FTA effects, it would be a good starting 
point to discuss some econometrics issues related to the Augmented Gravity Equation 
used in this study. This discussion will shed light on,  
1) What types of estimating techniques would produce better estimates for the 
Augmented Gravity model? 
2) How far our findings of gravity comply with or contrast from the previous 
studies. If so why? 
3) What are the implications of the modifications we proposed in our conceptual 
framework on the estimated model? 
Therefore this chapter will focus on some kind of diagnosis work that will ensure the 
appropriateness of our model to address the topic in question.  
4.1 ECONOMETRICS MODEL  
Initially we transform the Augmented Gravity Model developed by Eq.  (3.16) in 
chapter-III into an econometric model. The multiplicative nature of the equation 

























































































tXln   -Log of PPP converted Export from i to j at time t 
)ln( jt
i
t gdpgdp  -Log of product of PPP adjusted GDP of country i and j at time t 
ijdisradln  -Log sum of distance between i and j and county radiuses  
i
tpriceln  -Log relative price index of i at time t 
j
tpriceln  -Log relative price index of j at time t 
j
ttax   -Average import tariff rate of importing country in percentage points 
i
tremo   -Remoteness index for exporting country 
j
tremo   -Remoteness index for importing country 
ijborder  -Common border dummy (1 for having a common border, 0 otherwise) 
ijcolony  -Colony dummy (1 if ever been in colonial relationship, 0 otherwise)  
ilb    -Landlocked dummy (1 if country i is landlocked, 0 otherwise) 
jlb    -Landlocked dummy (1 if country j is landlocked, 0 otherwise) 
ijCurr   -Currency dummy (1 for both having a common currency, 0 otherwise) 
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iiland   -Island dummy (1 if Exporter is an island country, 0 otherwise) 
jiland   -Island dummy (1 if Importer is an island country, 0 otherwise) 
ijFTA   -FTA dummy (1 for pair having an FTA, 0 otherwise) 
ij
tASEAN  -ASEAN dummy (1 if both countries ASEAN, 0 otherwise) 
ij
tDCAFTA  -D-CAFTA dummy (1 if both countries D-CAFTA, 0 otherwise) 
ij
tEC   -European Union dummy (1 if both countries EU, 0 otherwise) 
ij
tNAFTA  -NAFTA dummy (1 if both countries NAFTA, 0 otherwise)   
ij
tEFTA   -EFTA dummy (1 if both countries EFTA, 0 otherwise)   
ij
tSAARC   -SAARC dummy (1 if both countries SAARC, 0 otherwise)   
ij
tCRICOM  -CARICOM dummy (1 if both belong to CARICOM, 0 otherwise)   
ij
tu   -normally distributed error term where  0)( =ijtuE  
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4.2 ECONOMETRICS ISSUES – CROSS-SECTIONAL GRAVITY 
MODELS  
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show the empirical results of the defaulted gravity Eq.(4.1) 
for each year by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Feasible Generalized Least Square 
(FGLS) respectively. The values in italics are t-ratios based on heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation corrected standard errors.  
 
This study uses a sample consisting of 184 countries in different economic masses. 
Therefore one should expect higher degree of heterogeneity basically coming from 
the Cross-product of GDPs and more or less from the first six variables. The White 
General Heteroskedasticity Test39 did reject the null of no-heteroskedasticity in OLS 
residuals. (See Statistical Appendix-IV, Table 4(A) to 4(I) for heteroskedasticity test 
results) 
 
In presence of heteroskedasticity, though OLS estimates are still liner unbiased and 
consistent, they are no more efficient in the sense that they cannot guarantee the 
minimum variance and might lead to misleading statistical inferences for the 
population parameters. Taking heteroskedasticity consistent standard error would be 
one possible solution in such a situation. Nevertheless, the heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors in fact do not solve for heteroskedasticity, instead it resets OLS 
standard errors in such a way that correct statistical inferences could still be possible 
                                                 
39 White General Heteroskedasticity Test: Regress Squared OLS residuals on original regressesors, 
their squared terms and the cross-products. n times R2 taken from this auxiliary regression 
asymptotically follows the Chi-square distribution with k df. 22. χ≈Rn  If n.R2 > critical Chi-square 
values at a chosen significance level we reject the Ho= no heteroskedasticity  
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about true parameter values regardless of heteroskedasticity. In other wards they 
narrow down the confidence intervals to the extent that the sample estimates can 
predicts true population parameters accurately.     
 
Keeping heteroskedasticity robust standard errors as an extra guard, nothing prevents 
us attempting to remove or at least to mitigate heteroskedasticity as long as sufficient 
care is taken not to invite any additional problems into the model. The analysis will be 
extended one step ahead rather than interpreting our model based on OLS estimates. It 
is difficult to detect the exact source of heteroskedasticity in a multiple regression, 
and more likely it appears as a multi-sourced phenomenon. In the light of White 
Heteroskedasticity Test it was roughly concluded that all the variables more or less 
generate heteroskedasticity while the largest portion is coming from gdpgdp. This has 
a valid economic intuition very similar to the popular income and savings 
relationship40. Economically big countries usually can choose to trade less with some 
countries and more with some other depending on their interest. But small countries 
do not have such a flexibility to vary their trade as much as big countries do, even 
though they want to. This follows the idea that OLS error-variance could be 
increasing as gdpgdp increases. Therefore it was decided to transform the model into 
Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS or Estimated GLS), which is consistent 
and asymptotically more efficient than OLS. For large sample sizes, FGLS is an 
attractive alternative to OLS when there is evidence of heteroskedasticity41. 
(Wooldridge, 2006 p287)  
                                                 
40 Gujarati (2003) Basic Econometrics 388p 
 
41Following Wooldridge (2006, 285-287p) the test procedure we applied is as follows.  
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We continued to use double-log function in FGLS not only because we are interested 
in elasticity but also as it further reduces heteroskedasticity by compressing the scales 
of variable compared to those in level form42. From the results given in Table 4.2 it 
can be shown that FGLS transformation substantially improved 2R  from 0.53 (OLS) 
to 0.92(FGLS) keeping all individual coefficients highly significant with expected 
signs except for remojβˆ and currβˆ . In a way this suggests that heteroskedasticity would 
have been a severe problem in our original variables. Nevertheless 2R of the 
transformed model, while useful for computing F statistics, is not specifically 
informative as goodness-of-fit measure. It tells how much variation in the transformed 
dependent variable is explained by the transformed explanatory variables and this is 
seldom very meaningful. (Wooldridge, 2006 p286)  
 
Therefore the efficiency of the FGLS over OLS necessarily depends on the 
assumption we make regarding the correct functional form of the heteroskedasticity 
that we never know exactly. For our FGLS estimates, motivated by the scatter plot 
and also for mathematical convenience, we assumed that error-variance is an 





* ....... iiii uXXY +++= ββαβ  Note that the intercept term, ‘C’ in the original regression is a 
new variable now denoted by
hˆ
1=α  and the transformed model do not have an intercept. *iY and all 
other starred variables denote the corresponding original variables multiplied by 
h
w ˆ
1=  where 
)ˆexp(ˆ gh =  
gˆ denotes fitted values from an auxiliary regression where we regress log values of squared original 
OLS residuals on original variables  
   
42 Natural log transformation dramatically reduces the difference between small and large numbers. For 
example PPP adjusted GDP of USA and Singapore (2006) US$ Billion 12,939 and 132 respectively. 
USA GDP is 98 times bigger than that of Singapore. When converted to natural log the figures become 
9.47 and 4.88 only twofold difference! 
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exponential function of all explanatory variables43. Based on this assumption, weights 
were calculated from the exponated fitted values of an auxiliary regression; log of 
squared OLS residuals on original explanatory variables44. This procedure is less 
plausible unless nature of heteroskedasticity is exactly detected.  Therefore we couple 
FGLS with HAC-Standard errors to avoid any misleading inference due to inexact 
assumption on the functional form of heteroskedasticity.   
 
In a panel data context we can quite closely estimate error-variance and therefore it is 
possible to have better estimates using FGLS techniques not depending on user-
defined assumptions about the form of heteroskedasticity. We will extend our analysis 
up to that extent at the end of this chapter.  
 
As another diagnostic statistic Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic ranging from 1.2 to 1.3, 
signals about positive spatial autocorrelation among cross-sectional units. Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test45 did reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation favoring the alternative. (See Statistical Appendix IV, Table 4(J) to 
4(R) for full test results). It is noteworthy the autocorrelation in a cross-sectional 
regression is a contemporary issue that heavily depends on the chronological order the 
cross-sectional units are lined up rather than the true picture of their correlation. To be 
                                                 
43 )....................exp()( 210
2
kk xdisradgdpgdpXuVar δδδδσ +++=  Instead assuming this 
as a liner function may cause to loose a large number of observations. 
 
44 exdisradgdpgdpu kk ++++= δδδδ ....................)ˆln( 2102  
Moreover we tested replacing original variables with OLS fitted values and their squares, but results 
did not show much difference  
 
45 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: Regress OLS residuals on original regressesors plus 
lagged (p) residuals. (n-p) times R2 taken from this auxiliary regression follows the Chi-square 
distribution with p df. 22)( χ≈− Rpn  If (N-p) R2 > critical Chi-square values at chosen significance 
level we reject the Ho of no autocorrelation. 
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more concrete Table 4(S) in the statistical Appendix shows same regression run twice 
changing the chronological order of the observations. It can be shown that DW 
changed dramatically while no other value changed at all. This is a good example for 
spurious spatial autocorrelation in cross-sectional Gravity model. Therefore it can be 
ignored if the researcher is confident that cross-sections are independent by economic 
logic. Yet in the case of Gravity model it is too extreme to think one county’s 
macroeconomic variable set is totally independent from that of the other countries. 
Therefore, as a precautionary measure we use of Newey-West HAC standard errors & 
Covariance, (HAC-Standard errors) which are corrected for both heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation. Followed by this correction, in fact, the FGLS estimates should 
produce better results with our sample, which is adequately large in size. (N=9832). 
Therefore, we do not much rely on OLS estimates in the rest of our analysis.  
 
In this chapter we concentrate only on the Basic Gravity variables in keeping the RTB 
and FTA impact for the next, though they appear in the regression as control 
variables.   
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Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Coeff t -S t Coeff t -S t Coeff t -S t Coeff t -S t Coeff t-St Coeff t -St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t -S t
C -6.04 ** * -10.38 -5.67 ** * -9.65 -5.97 *** -10.61 -5.51 ** * -9.6 3 -5.89 *** -10 .21 -5.33 *** -9.24 -5.60 *** -9.62 -6.71 *** -1 1.04 -6.21 *** -10.2 1
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.72 ** * 29.02 0.71 ** * 28.54 0.71 *** 29.05 0.70 ** * 28.49 0.70 *** 28 .90 0.71 *** 28.94 0.72 *** 29.41 0.71 *** 2 9.73 0.72 *** 28.8 1
LOG(DISRAD) -0.93 ** * -17.34 -0.94 ** * -17.43 -0.94 *** -17.52 -0.95 ** * -18.0 2 -0.92 *** -17 .22 -0.97 *** -17.75 -0.97 *** -17.88 -0.84 *** -1 3.98 -0.88 *** -14.9 3
LOG(PRICEi) -0.87 ** * -10.00 -0.96 ** * -12.25 -0.94 *** -12.35 -0.96 ** * -13.2 8 -0.99 *** -13 .25 -0.95 *** -12.59 -0.98 *** -12.85 -1.03 *** -1 3.93 -0.99 *** -15.4 2
LOG(PRICEj) 0.08 ** * 3.50 0.11 ** * 4.87 0.09 *** 4.22 0.11 ** * 5.75 0.10 *** 5 .14 0.10 *** 5.51 0.10 *** 5.43 0.12 *** 6.01 0.12 *** 6.6 4
TAXj -0.02 ** * -5.72 -0.02 ** * -5.41 -0.02 *** -4.77 -0.02 ** * -5.0 6 -0.01 *** -4 .64 -0.02 *** -6.02 -0.02 *** -6.90 -0.02 *** -4.81 -0.02 *** -5.3 3
LOG(REMOi) -0.16 ** * -3.95 -0.14 ** * -3.28 -0.15 *** -3.54 -0.13 ** * -3.2 8 -0.15 *** -3 .82 -0.13 *** -3.34 -0.15 *** -3.63 -0.15 *** -3.52 -0.14 *** -3.5 4
LOG(REMOj) -0.03  -1.62 -0.03  -1.58 -0.04 ** -2.11 -0.02  -1.0 5 -0.03 * -1 .77 0.00  0.15 0.00  -0.08 0.01  0.38 0.00  -0.1 5
BORDERij 1.51 ** * 10.64 1.50 ** * 10.84 1.45 *** 10.64 1.53 ** * 12.11 1.52 *** 12 .56 1.52 *** 12.74 1.52 *** 12.41 1.60 *** 1 2.62 1.61 *** 13.1 5
COLONYij 1.09 ** * 8.82 1.08 ** * 9.06 1.08 *** 9.19 1.04 ** * 9.19 0.98 *** 8 .69 0.94 *** 8.10 0.93 *** 7.93 0.93 *** 8.38 0.87 *** 7.5 3
LBi -1.25 ** * -8.04 -1.21 ** * -7.94 -1.14 *** -7.67 -1.16 ** * -8.0 3 -1.20 *** -8 .42 -1.19 *** -8.34 -1.20 *** -8.23 -1.17 *** -8.26 -1.19 *** -8.7 9
LBj -0.76 ** * -10.79 -0.79 ** * -11.41 -0.82 *** -12.36 -0.92 ** * -14.1 8 -1.00 *** -15 .07 -0.93 *** -13.90 -0.86 *** -13.15 -0.85 *** -1 2.66 -0.84 *** -12.9 5
CURRij 0.33  1.55 0.27  1.22 0.20  0.81 0.24  1.00 0.33  1 .58 0.36 ** 1.97 0.61 *** 2.91 0.98 *** 6.10 0.85 *** 5.3 3
ILANDi 0.61 ** * 3.15 0.58 ** * 3.00 0.62 *** 3.34 0.63 ** * 3.45 0.56 *** 2 .99 0.53 *** 2.88 0.52 *** 2.83 0.46 ** 2.40 0.41 ** 2.1 7
ILANDj 0.26 ** * 3.26 0.22 ** * 2.66 0.35 *** 4.34 0.34 ** * 4.33 0.30 *** 3 .86 0.33 *** 4.28 0.38 *** 4.88 0.31 *** 3.88 0.35 *** 4.3 8
FTAij 1.03 ** * 7.12 1.17 ** * 9.04 1.20 *** 9.32 1.23 ** * 9.88 1.20 *** 10 .35 0.91 *** 7.27 1.04 *** 9.13 0.75 *** 6.87 0.70 *** 6.6 7
ASIANij 2.44 ** * 7.43 2.31 ** * 7.68 2.32 *** 7.51 2.20 ** * 6.99 2.26 *** 7 .31 2.07 *** 6.68 2.02 *** 6.36 2.22 *** 7.10 2.18 *** 7.2 0
DCAFTAij 1.49 ** * 3.96 1.58 ** * 4.49 1.53 *** 4.23 1.44 ** * 3.90 1.45 *** 3 .82 1.42 *** 4.06 1.34 *** 3.47 1.42 *** 4.13 1.39 *** 4.1 2
ECij 1.68 ** * 8.55 1.78 ** * 9.06 1.89 *** 9.13 1.84 ** * 9.09 1.76 *** 9 .25 1.65 *** 9.09 1.55 *** 7.97 1.31 *** 9.53 1.18 *** 8.9 2
NAFTAij 2.65 ** * 5.91 2.59 ** * 5.65 2.77 *** 5.88 2.79 ** * 5.87 2.82 *** 6 .07 2.71 *** 6.17 2.59 *** 5.88 2.61 *** 6.26 2.56 *** 6.3 6
EFTAij 1.24 ** * 5.33 1.46 ** * 6.51 1.27 *** 4.82 0.97 ** * 4.59 1.14 *** 5 .19 0.94 *** 5.98 0.99 *** 5.84 1.15 *** 5.24 0.99 *** 4.8 6
SAARCij 1.59 ** 2.41 1.25 * 1.81 1.08  1.58 0.95  1.33 1.07 * 1 .74 1.28 * 1.93 1.56 ** 2.47 1.44 ** 2.41 1.47 *** 2.7 1
CARICOMij 1.65 ** * 4.38 1.61 ** * 4.37 1.62 *** 4.53 1.22 ** * 4.64 1.24 *** 4 .83 0.93 *** 3.47 0.98 *** 3.41 1.13 *** 3.84 0.89 *** 3.0 4
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54
Ad R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.54
F-statistic 457     459     479     494     498     494     523     527     521     
Prob(F-st) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DW 1.23 1.21 1.22 1.21 1.21 1.23 1.20 1.19 1.22
N 9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
GRAVITY MODEL CONTROLLED for RTA IMPACT ESTIMATED by OLS  for EACH YEAR 1997-2005 
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TABLE 4.2: GRAVITY MODEL CONTROLLED FOR RTS IMPACT ESTIMATED BY FGLS FOR EACH YEAR 1997-2005 
Table 4.2  
Dependent Variable: W*LOG(X)
Method: Feasible Generalized Least Squares
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St
W* -4.95 *** -6.81 -4.90 *** -7.18 -5.30 *** -7.49 -5.14 *** -7.91 -5.19 *** -6.19 -4.93 *** -7.16 -5.69 *** -9.06 -6.49 *** -11.12 -5.86 *** -9.40
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.75 *** 26.78 0.74 *** 29.16 0.77 *** 29.15 0.75 *** 29.42 0.71 *** 23.60 0.74 *** 28.96 0.76 *** 32.61 0.77 *** 34.67 0.77 *** 32.75
LOG(DISRAD) -1.12 *** -22.54 -1.10 *** -21.55 -1.14 *** -22.15 -1.12 *** -23.26 -1.01 *** -15.35 -1.11 *** -20.46 -1.07 *** -21.50 -0.99 *** -18.26 -1.03 *** -16.99
LOG(PRICEi) -0.82 *** -10.40 -0.92 *** -13.39 -0.96 *** -13.86 -0.94 *** -12.76 -0.95 *** -13.09 -0.93 *** -12.80 -0.94 *** -11.88 -0.99 *** -15.84 -0.95 *** -18.56
LOG(PRICEj) 0.17 *** 5.15 0.13 *** 4.98 0.14 *** 6.03 0.11 *** 5.58 0.09 *** 4.28 0.09 *** 4.56 0.08 *** 4.45 0.09 *** 4.84 0.09 *** 4.42
TAXj -0.02 *** -6.34 -0.02 *** -7.90 -0.02 *** -6.29 -0.02 *** -6.17 -0.02 *** -6.83 -0.02 *** -6.84 -0.03 *** -8.46 -0.02 *** -6.76 -0.04 *** -3.22
LOG(REMOi) -0.16 *** -3.86 -0.15 *** -3.68 -0.20 *** -4.50 -0.17 *** -4.40 -0.23 *** -5.29 -0.14 *** -3.81 -0.15 *** -4.06 -0.08 ** -2.45 -0.07 ** -2.02
LOG(REMOj) 0.01  0.21 0.02  0.75 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.20 -0.02  -0.75 0.01  0.48 0.01  0.55 0.04 * 1.72 0.08 *** 2.78
BORDERij 0.72 *** 4.36 0.79 *** 4.98 0.77 *** 4.97 0.82 *** 6.24 0.63 *** 3.34 0.73 *** 4.39 0.80 *** 5.39 1.13 *** 10.13 1.06 *** 7.11
COLONYij 1.07 *** 4.39 0.78 *** 4.87 0.59 *** 4.82 0.65 *** 5.57 0.86 *** 4.63 0.99 *** 6.24 0.93 *** 6.20 0.94 *** 6.09 1.25 *** 5.16
LBi -1.20 *** -7.19 -1.12 *** -7.31 -1.18 *** -7.43 -1.22 *** -8.08 -1.39 *** -8.48 -1.20 *** -8.02 -1.15 *** -7.62 -0.81 *** -6.21 -0.83 *** -5.97
LBj -0.82 *** -8.26 -0.80 *** -8.62 -0.88 *** -8.86 -0.88 *** -11.20 -1.08 *** -10.58 -0.92 *** -10.95 -0.84 *** -10.88 -0.61 *** -8.43 -0.62 *** -8.16
CURRij -0.02  -0.12 0.03  0.21 0.09  0.63 0.07  0.49 0.02  0.11 -0.01  -0.05 0.06  0.45 0.53 *** 4.04 0.39 *** 2.89
ILANDi 0.69 *** 3.08 0.73 *** 3.21 0.56 *** 3.24 0.50 *** 3.11 0.78 *** 3.86 0.67 *** 4.59 0.67 *** 3.94 0.37 ** 1.98 0.31  1.17
ILANDj 0.35  1.62 0.45 *** 2.83 0.30 *** 2.73 0.32 *** 2.94 0.22  1.20 0.37 ** 2.59 0.47 *** 3.94 0.51 *** 4.24 0.78 *** 4.14
FTAij 0.93 *** 7.22 1.15 *** 10.10 1.09 *** 9.74 1.10 *** 10.31 1.17 *** 10.79 0.92 *** 8.98 1.03 *** 11.19 0.87 *** 8.76 0.80 *** 6.82
ASIANij 2.30 *** 10.10 2.13 *** 9.80 2.26 *** 9.76 2.14 *** 10.34 2.52 *** 10.55 2.04 *** 9.16 1.96 *** 8.92 1.81 *** 8.04 1.64 *** 6.33
DCAFTAij 1.12 ** 2.52 1.29 *** 3.20 1.15 *** 2.80 1.13 *** 2.79 1.39 *** 3.50 1.29 *** 3.72 1.18 *** 2.88 1.19 *** 3.24 1.17 *** 3.25
ECij 1.39 *** 8.88 1.55 *** 10.62 1.48 *** 10.79 1.53 *** 11.15 1.70 *** 10.84 1.54 *** 10.80 1.52 *** 10.69 1.33 *** 10.29 1.20 *** 6.42
NAFTAij 2.49 *** 8.94 2.40 *** 8.71 2.43 *** 8.22 2.42 *** 9.57 2.81 *** 8.79 2.70 *** 9.44 2.38 *** 8.04 2.33 *** 8.43 2.22 *** 8.56
EFTAij 0.76 *** 3.53 1.08 *** 4.52 0.95 *** 2.94 0.74 *** 2.96 0.77 *** 3.32 0.69 *** 4.57 0.72 *** 4.35 1.14 *** 4.82 0.72 *** 3.48
SAARCij 1.01 ** 2.07 0.56  1.13 0.70 ** 2.12 0.75 ** 2.11 1.15 *** 4.03 1.07 ** 2.46 1.23 *** 2.76 0.65  1.41 0.81 * 1.82
CARICOMij 1.27 ** 2.52 1.21 *** 2.66 1.65 *** 4.22 1.28 *** 4.34 0.95 *** 2.88 0.61 ** 2.02 0.81 ** 2.37 1.04 *** 3.44 0.60 * 1.70
R-squared 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.9059 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.98
Ad R-squared 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.9057 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.98
DW 1.31 1.28 1.29 1.2869 1.33 1.33 1.29 1.30 1.39
N 9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  9,832  
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
Weights are the exponated fitted values of an auxiliary regression; log of squared OLS residuals on original explanatory variables 
GRAVITY MODEL CONTROLLED for RTA IMPACT ESTIMATED by FGLS  for EACH YEAR 1997-2005 
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Figure 4.1 is a graphical presentation of the Table 4.2 truncated only for significant 
estimates and the estimated elasticities are plotted against the time. All coefficients 
except for remojβˆ and currβˆ are significant at 1% preceded by the expected sign.  
FIGURE 4. 1: EVALUATION OF ESTIMATES IN CROSS-SECTIONAL GRAVITY MODEL OVER THE STUDY PERIOD (1997-2005) 
Figure 4.1 














LOG(GDPGDP) 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.77
LOG(DISRAD) -1.12 -1.10 -1.14 -1.12 -1.01 -1.11 -1.07 -0.99 -1.03
LOG(PRICEi) -0.82 -0.92 -0.96 -0.94 -0.95 -0.93 -0.94 -0.99 -0.95
LOG(PRICEj) 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09
TAXj -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
LOG(REMOi) -0.16 -0.15 -0.20 -0.17 -0.23 -0.14 -0.15 -0.08 -0.07
BORDERij 0.72 0.79 0.77 0.82 0.63 0.73 0.80 1.13 1.06
COLONYij 1.07 0.78 0.59 0.65 0.86 0.99 0.93 0.94 1.25
LBi -1.20 -1.12 -1.18 -1.22 -1.39 -1.20 -1.15 -0.81 -0.83
LBj -0.82 -0.80 -0.88 -0.88 -1.08 -0.92 -0.84 -0.61 -0.62
CURRij -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.53 0.39
ILANDi 0.69 0.73 0.56 0.50 0.78 0.67 0.67 0.37 0.31
ILANDj 0.35 0.45 0.30 0.32 0.22 0.37 0.47 0.51 0.78
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
 
Despite the fact that the plotted estimates have been derived from nine different 
datasets, most of the key estimates are consistent in general over entire study period.  
However, it is would be an important question to discuss as to why other estimates are 
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so inconsistent over time. The question would be more exciting when it is modified as 
follows. 
 
Why do we find the estimates for time invariant factors ( borderβ , colonyβ , ilandβ , lbβ ) are 
so inconsistent while those for time varying factors ( gdpgdpβ , taxβ , priceiβ , pricejβ , remoiβ ) 
are pretty consistent over time? For clarity, we decompose the Table 4.2 and present 
in two diagrams. (See Figure 4.2 and 4.3) The answer is straightforward. Our 
dependant variable (export) and the second set of explanatory variables (gdpdgp, tax, 
price, remoteness) all are trending variables. When all of them contain similar time 
treads, the estimates taken from different time periods should be consistent as long as 
the original relationship holds. But this is not the case for time invariant variables like 
border, colonial relation, landlocked or island status. They may produce inconsistent 
estimates when dependant variable contains a natural time trend. This discloses one 
weakness hitherto hidden, perhaps, in every cross-sectional gravity model. The 
message is clear. The consistency of the gravity estimates cannot be assured over time 
by pure cross-sectional regressions. This opens avenue for more sophisticated panel 
data analysis, where cross-sectional and time series properties are combined together.  
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FIGURE 4.2: EVOLUTION OF ESTIMATES FOR TIME VARYING FACTORS IN CROSS-SECTIONAL GRAVITY MODEL OVER THE STUDY PERIOD (1997-2005) 
Figure 4.2 
EVOLUTION OF ESTIMATES for TIME VARYING FACTORS IN CROSS-SECTIONAL GRAVITY MODEL OVER 
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LOG(PRICEj) 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09
TAXj -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
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LOG(DISRAD) -1.12 -1.10 -1.14 -1.12 -1.01 -1.11 -1.07 -0.99 -1.03
BORDERij 0.72 0.79 0.77 0.82 0.63 0.73 0.80 1.13 1.06
COLONYij 1.07 0.78 0.59 0.65 0.86 0.99 0.93 0.94 1.25
LBi -1.20 -1.12 -1.18 -1.22 -1.39 -1.20 -1.15 -0.81 -0.83
LBj -0.82 -0.80 -0.88 -0.88 -1.08 -0.92 -0.84 -0.61 -0.62
CURRij -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.53 0.39
ILANDi 0.69 0.73 0.56 0.50 0.78 0.67 0.67 0.37 0.31
ILANDj 0.35 0.45 0.30 0.32 0.22 0.37 0.47 0.51 0.78
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
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4.3 ECONOMETRICS ISSUES – PANEL DATA GRAVITY MODELS 
Table 4.3 and 4.4 depict the results of gravity model Eq4.1 estimated using eight 
different panel data settings. Results are dissimilar as they ought to be. Regardless of 
the panel data method used, all the estimates are of the expected sign and highly 
significant at 1% level except for very few. This by no means suggests all the methods 
are equally good to estimates our model. Certainly some of them are totally out of the 
job.  We can consider their relative accuracy and stick to the best suited method for 
future analysis.  
 
The basic structure of the models that can be estimated with panel data can be written 
as,  
ittiititit XY εγδβα +++′+=        (4.2) 
where itY is the dependent variable, α is the parameter representing overall constant in 
the model, itX is a k-vector of regressors, itε are the error terms for Ni ,.......2,1=  
cross-sectional units over Tt ,.......2,1= periods. iδ are the unobserved cross-sectional 
effects (fixed or random) while tγ are the unobserved period effects (fixed or random). 
If we view the panel data settings as a set of N-cross-section specific regressions with   
TN × observations stacked one over the other we will have, 
iTTiitiTi IlXlY εγδβα +++′+=      (4.3) 
where, Tl is a T-element unit vector, TI is a T-element identity matrix, γ is a vector 
containing all the period effects )..........,( 21 Tγγγγ =′  
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Analogously, if we view same as a set of T-period specific regressions with   
TN × observations stacked one over the other  
tNtNittNt lIXlY εγδβα +++′+=      (4.4) 
where, Nl is a N-element unit vector, NI is a N-element identity matrix, δ is a vector 
containing all the cross-sectional effects ),......,( 21 Nδδδδ =′  
Eq. (4.2) can be estimated with or without time and period effects as the case may be.  
 
TABLE 4.3: GRAVITY MODEL ESTIMATIONS BY DIFFERENT PANEL DATA SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PERIOD 1997-2005 [ UN-WEIGHTED DATA] 
Table 4.3 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X) 
2 3 4
Method
SD errors & Cov method 
(d.f corrected)
Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St
C -5.83 *** -41.87 -4.53 *** -8.58 -5.90 *** -17.73 -4.52 *** -11.43
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.71 *** 323.24 0.66 *** 64.21 0.71 *** 68.29 0.66 *** 40.56
LOG(DISRAD) -0.93 *** -75.40 -0.95 *** -20.60 -0.93 *** -28.57 -0.95 *** -27.94
LOG(PRICEi) -0.96 *** -70.31 -1.01 *** -21.78 -0.96 *** -25.72 -1.01 *** -35.28
LOG(PRICEj) 0.11 *** 27.08 0.28 *** 7.09 0.11 *** 5.98 0.28 *** 14.19
TAXj -0.02 *** -16.66 -0.01 *** -3.83 -0.02 *** -6.71 -0.01 *** -4.39
LOG(REMOi) -0.15 *** -45.25 -0.16 *** -6.37 -0.15 *** -8.53 -0.16 *** -9.57
LOG(REMOj) -0.02 *** -3.02 -0.05 ** -2.27 -0.02  -1.07 -0.05 *** -3.27
BORDERij 1.53 *** 101.26 1.57 *** 19.84 1.53 *** 14.00 1.57 *** 14.18
COLONYij 1.00 *** 39.80 1.10 *** 5.97 1.00 *** 10.44 1.10 *** 11.06
LBi -1.19 *** -119.1 -1.28 *** -15.67 -1.19 *** -17.50 -1.28 *** -18.99
LBj -0.87 *** -38.20 -0.97 *** -6.34 -0.87 *** -14.89 -0.97 *** -15.97
CURRij 0.60 *** 5.42 1.29 *** 7.56 0.60 *** 4.28 1.29 *** 9.75
ILANDi 0.55 *** 24.41 0.48 *** 2.98 0.55 *** 6.90 0.48 *** 5.84
ILANDj 0.31 *** 19.75 0.15  1.49 0.31 *** 5.02 0.15 ** 2.17
FTAij 0.92 *** 11.24 0.09 ** 1.98 0.92 *** 12.39 0.09 *** 2.84
ASIANij 2.22 *** 53.36 2.48 *** 8.57 2.22 *** 8.58 2.48 *** 9.45
DCAFTAij 1.44 *** 61.53 0.59 *** 3.96 1.44 *** 5.00 0.59 *** 2.77
ECij 1.42 *** 12.80 0.24 *** 5.66 1.42 *** 14.77 0.24 *** 8.17
NAFTAij 2.70 *** 90.21 3.20 *** 10.10 2.70 *** 6.64 3.20 *** 7.97
EFTAij 1.12 *** 20.70 0.96 ** 2.25 1.12 *** 6.46 0.96 *** 5.79
SAARCij 1.31 *** 18.27 1.42 *** 3.48 1.31 ** 2.12 1.42 ** 2.36
CARICOMij 1.23 *** 12.78 0.37  0.83 1.23 *** 4.81 0.37  1.10
R-squared 0.53 0.16 0.53 0.16
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.16 0.53 0.16
F-statistic 3271 573 3271 573
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DW St 0.21 1.27 0.21 1.27
Cross-Obs 9832 9832 9832 9832
Total panel (balanced) obs 88488 88488 88488 88488
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
Estimates for period dummy variables are omitted for brevity : Full table is available in statistical Appendix
White cross-section White cross-section White period White period 
Gravity Model Estimations by Different Panel Data Specifications   for the Period 1997-2005      
[Un-weighted Data]
1
OLS              
EGLS (Cross-section 
random effects)
OLS (Period Fixed 
effect)
EGLS (Cross-se 





Panel Pooled OLS estimates without cross-sectional effects or period effects are given 
in Column-1. (Period dummies were included but not reported for brevity: see 
statistical Appendix Table 4(T) for the full output) Except for it has removed time 
trend in data the results are not much different from cross-sectional OLS estimate 
presented earlier. As there is no additional treatment for data the results should suffer 
from the heteroskedasticity problem we encountered previously. 53.02 =R and 
21.0=DW  both are not healthy enough. Sometimes Pooled Panel would have helped 
if we were short of sufficient number of observations for a single time period, which 
is not the case in our study. 
 
The column-2 contains EGLS estimates with cross-section random effects. Cross-
section random effect deems the unobserved effect as another parameter to be 
estimated46. As panel cross-section random effect uses quasi-demean data 
(subtracting only a fraction of time average from each observation) it helps gravity 
model to keep time invariant variables intact. Yet cross-section random effect method 
is possible only if the unobserved effectδ  is uncorrelated with explanatory variables 
(both time varying and time invariant) in all time periods. 
Symbolically,  
kjTtxCov iitj ,....2,1;,.....2,1,0),( ===δ                  (4.5) 
More precisely the underlining assumption is that there is an unobserved cross-section 
specific factor (technically known as individual heterogeneity) that affects bilateral 
exports but uncorrelated with the right-hand side variables such as country GDPs, 
distance, prices, taxes etc, which is less plausible in a macroeconomic setting. 
16.02 =R also indicates extremely poor fit of the estimated model.  
                                                 
46 Random Effect is not reported for brevity  
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Wooldridge writes “… in some applications of panel data methods, we cannot treat 
our sample as a random sample from a large population, especially when the unit of 
observation is a large geographical unit (say states or provinces) then it often makes 
sense to think of each  iδ   as a separate intercept to estimate for each cross-sectional 
unit. In this case, we use fixed effect: Using fixed effect is methodologically the same 
as allowing different intercepts for each cross-sectional unit.(Wooldridge, 2006 p498)  
 
The choice between fixed and random effects comes from Hausman (1978) test. Yet 
test will not be employed here because Cross-sectional Fixed Effect (known as 
Demean or within method) totally loose the ground in this case for the reason that it 
wipes out all the time-invariant dummy variables (Common currency, language, 
border, island, landlocked, colony) as well as much needed distance variable in 
gravity model47. This happens when data is demeaned (deduct the time average from 
each observation) to eliminate time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore   
demean method is not a viable application for pure Gravity model.  
 
Column-3 gives the panel period fixed effect (Sometimes known as Between 
estimator). The test procedure assumes unobserved effect is common for all cross-
sections for a given time period but differ across different time periods. When applied 
to our case, it assumes that any unobserved factor influencing trade must have equally 
affected all the country pairs for any given year. Thus the effect is said to be fixed to 
the period. Not surprisingly the results are equivalent to the Pooled OLS estimates (in 
Column-1) except for the intercept. This method would not be much useful when time 
periods are very close to each other as they are in our dataset. In fact, the Between 
                                                 
47 This method will be extensively used for another application later in chapter VI 
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Estimator reluctantly ignores valuable information on how variables change over 
time.  Furthermore the same reason (heteroskedasticity) we applied to the Pooled OLS 
the panel period fixed effect too disqualifies for our analysis.  
 
Column-4 presents the results for Eq. (4.1) when estimated with period fixed effect 
and cross-sectional random effects. As it is a combination of the second and the third 
methods no need to mention that its reliability is even poorer than that of 
independently estimated second and third methods.  
 
Having realized the failure of using un-weighted data, we now move onto weighted 
data regressions in panel context. Four of such methods were tested and results are 
given in Table 4.4. The weighted model would be, 
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where w* denotes the cross-sectional weights. Note that the value reported for ‘C’ in 
the Table 4.4 is the 0βˆ in Eq. (4.6) and should not be read as the overall intercept for 
GLS estimates. It is the intercept for the base year. (Period dummies for all except 
base year were included but not reported for brevity: see statistical Appendix        
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Table 4(U) for the full output) OLS intercept is converted to another variable by GLS 
transformation itself and hence intercept term ceases to exist in GLS/WLS/EGLS48.  
 
In Table 4.4 both Column-1 and 2 present EGLS results with cross-sectional weights. 
The only difference between them is that the latter is corrected for serial 
autocorrelation (Note 00.2=DW  ) while the former is not. The consistency of EGLS 
estimator is highly questionable when serial autocorrelation is present. While it is 
enough the current period error to be uncorrelated with the current explanatory 
variables for the OLS to be consistent, EGLS requires current error term to be 
uncorrelated with not only the current but also the lags and leads of the explanatory 
variables (Wooldrige,2006 p428) Symbolically,  
0),( =tt uxCov  for OLS  
0),( =tt uxCov and 0),( 11 =+ +− ttt uxxCov  for FGLS   (4.7) 
In the light of above argument, out of the two EGLS results (in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4.4) the latter should be superior to former as it has been manually corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrected for serial autocorrelation49. After all, there is one 
more issue associated with these results. The corresponding weights were estimated 
by exactly the same way as we did in FGLS method prior to panel data analyses. 
Once again the accuracy of the estimates depends on our previous assumption that 
error variance is an exponential function of all regressors failing which our results 
may be imprecise.  
                                                 






Y −−−−−−−++= βαβ  
49 For this correction we used period SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) option available with E-
views (this is usually known as Park estimator). This corrects both period heteroskedasticity (if any) 
and serial correlation within a given cross-section.   
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Therefore we shift to the column-3 of Table 4.4 where we report the same EGLS 
estimates resulted from a different computation of cross-sectional weights. The 
distinct feature of this specification is that it does not depend on researcher-defined 
functional form for heteroskedasticity. The test procedure is as follows. First, we 
performed preliminary (OLS) estimations to obtain cross-section specific residual 
vectors (for 9 different periods), and then used these residuals to form estimates of the 
cross-specific variances. The estimates for cross-sectional error variances were then 
used in a WLS procedure to yield the EGLS estimates. Though these results could be 
superior to those discussed before, it is worth moving one step forward because of 
two possible defects with the estimates. Firstly, 38.0=DW  suggests higher degree of 
positive serial correlation.  As emphasized before, in presence of serial correlation 
superiority of EGLS over OLS is seriously questionable. EGLS may be even worse 
than OLS. Secondly, we forgo the chance of testing whether covariance matrix has 
been accurately approximated to reduce heteroskedasticity by performing standard 
heteroskedasticity tests because the resulting GLS residuals are heteroskedastic by 
nature, as those in the original model. (Ben, 2005 p186) 
 
Alternatively, using exactly the same procedure the cross-specific variances were 
computed and then used these variances to weight each series manually. There 
weighted data were used in OLS regression to yield EGLS results and subsequently, it 
was corrected for serial autocorrelation using period SUR (seemingly uncorrelated 
regression) procedure. The results are reported in the last column of the Table 4.4 
This manipulation helps at least in two ways. It now produces OLS residuals (instead 
of GLS residuals) that could be tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity anymore 
and also it guarantees the efficiency of EGLS estimates removing the serial 
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autocorrelation (Note 999.1=DW now). After sequence of experiments we 
eventually claim that Panel EGLS estimates with cross-sectional weights and period 
SUR50specifications provide the best reliable results for the Gravity Model.  
TABLE 4.4: GRAVITY MODEL ESTIMATIONS BY DIFFERENT PANEL DATA SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PERIOD 1997-2005 [WEIGHTED DATA] 
Table 4.4 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X)*W 
1
Method
SD errors & Cov method (d.f 
corrected)
Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St
C -5.78 *** -23.01 -6.24 *** -26.82 -6.18 *** -79.77 -3.62 *** -18.51
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.78 *** 78.52 0.82 *** 125.15 0.75 *** 227.81 0.64 *** 137.88
LOG(DISRAD) -1.09 *** -146.3 -1.16 *** -51.64 -0.98 *** -193.9 -0.96 *** -36.73
LOG(PRICEi) -0.94 *** -84.86 -0.97 *** -75.46 -0.93 *** -132.5 -0.86 *** -147.2
LOG(PRICEj) 0.09 *** 26.96 0.16 *** 12.95 0.10 *** 38.48 0.31 *** 58.80
TAXj -0.02 *** -18.94 -0.01 *** -12.57 -0.02 *** -23.92 -0.01 *** -24.99
LOG(REMOi) -0.13 *** -38.68 -0.13 *** -10.62 -0.12 *** -43.67 -0.11 *** -17.02
LOG(REMOj) 0.01 * 1.83 0.01  0.83 -0.01 *** -4.58 -0.03 *** -3.77
BORDERij 1.00 *** 37.66 1.02 *** 19.96 1.50 *** 267.91 1.00 *** 19.89
COLONYij 0.95 *** 34.34 0.85 *** 20.94 0.88 *** 97.34 0.40 *** 10.89
LBi -0.99 *** -20.15 -0.75 *** -19.80 -1.06 *** -94.17 -1.10 *** -22.23
LBj -0.74 *** -24.78 -0.64 *** -17.11 -0.84 *** -69.04 -1.03 *** -17.74
CURRij 0.18 ** 2.46 0.75 *** 12.40 0.61 *** 8.22 0.14 *** 3.12
ILANDi 0.54 *** 16.66 0.50 *** 7.83 0.54 *** 22.15 0.71 *** 17.09
ILANDj 0.43 *** 15.26 0.47 *** 10.22 0.37 *** 33.48 0.23 *** 6.14
FTAij 0.94 *** 17.65 0.41 *** 18.24 0.75 *** 28.50 0.24 *** 13.37
ASIANij 1.92 *** 63.08 2.01 *** 13.47 2.02 *** 83.02 0.80 *** 9.88
DCAFTAij 1.15 *** 52.82 0.81 *** 3.71 1.41 *** 46.66 0.96 *** 10.30
ECij 1.31 *** 23.44 0.66 *** 22.89 1.23 *** 15.28 0.37 *** 12.78
NAFTAij 2.28 *** 35.45 2.48 *** 12.94 2.27 *** 41.20 1.98 *** 10.56
EFTAij 0.94 *** 18.19 0.96 *** 16.59 0.99 *** 21.28 -0.43 *** -4.41
SAARCij 0.64 *** 5.95 0.81 *** 2.95 1.18 *** 33.07 -1.00  -1.22
CARICOMij 1.16 *** 15.74 0.72 *** 5.05 1.29 *** 69.57 -1.00 *** -4.55
R-squared 0.86 0.62 0.93 0.84
Adjusted R-squared 0.86 0.62 0.93 0.84
DW St 0.20 2.00 0.38 1.99
Cross-Obs 9832 9832 9832 9832
Total panel (balanced) obs 88488 88488 88488 88488
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
Estimates for period dummy variables are omitted for brevity : Full table is available in statistical Appendix
^^^^Weights are the exponated fitted values of an auxiliary regression; log of squared OLS residuals on original 
explanatory variables 
^^Weights are time variances of OLS residuals for each Cross-unit taken from 9 period specific OLS regressions 
White cross-section Period SUR (PCSE) White cross-section Period SUR (PCSE) 
EGLS(Cross-
weights^^^^)




EGLS (Period SUR) 
cross-weights^^




                                                 
50 Cross-sectional weights and period SUR at the same time is usually not allowed in statistical 
software. Therefore one has to scarify one of them for the other. We feel the best thing is to do 
weighting manually and get serial correlation solved by the software.  
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4.4 ESTIMATED RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The set of secondary findings necessarily redeems our primary findings from cross-
sectional estimates. Indeed that is the purpose of making necessary improvements to 
the methodology up to this point. Eventually, using the last column of Table 4.4, the 
results for Gravity model can be interpreted as follows. The remoteness, being 
landlocked, distance and the import tariffs were found to be trade distracting factors 
while GDP, common currency, island status, colonial relationship and adjacency are 
trade attracting factors.   All the estimates are in expected sign with 1% significance 
level complying with historical findings.  
 
Accordingly, we assert that 1% increase (decrease) in product of country pair GDPs 
increases (decreases) bilateral exports by 0.6 % Ceteris Paribus. Undoubtedly this 
could be odd with traditional gravity models seeking unitary elasticity for the cross-
product of GDPs. The interpretation for so called unitary elasticity is that, controlled 
for all other variables, bilateral export is directly propositional to the cross-product of 
trading partners GDPs. The intuition is that big countries always tend to trade more 
with big countries while small countries tend to trade more with small countries. In 
short, the countries of similar economic size tend to trade more among them than the 
countries of dissimilar economic sizes do.  
 
As long as 0>gdpgdpβ the above notion is unbeaten. But the argument becomes 
sounder as the income elasticity gets closer to unity. Unitary elasticity had been a 
central issue in the first generation Gravity models. The second generation that used 
Gravity model to evaluate policy issues seems to have had little worry about unitary 
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elasticity51. Whether   gdpgdpβ   is equal to unity is a very old question. Even though 
many Gravity studies, somehow or other, have shown it is unity or at least very closer 
to unity it has nothing to do with trade policy. Sometimes researchers attempting to 
preserve unitary income elasticity might end up with inaccurate estimates for other 
variables when either necessary variables are omitted or unnecessary variables are 
included in the model.  
 
In our study, we do not establish unitary income elasticity in any of the reported 
estimates.  Without much effort we also can guarantee unitary elasticity for GDP by 
simply inserting “per capita GDP” (PCAP) among independent variables. (See the 
statistical Appendix Table 4(V), Table 4(W), and Table 4(X) where we have proven 
it). However, for several reasons shown below we do not include PCAP or POP 
simultaneously with GDP in the model.  
 Including GDP and PCAP in the same regression we estimate the marginal 
effect of neither correctly 
Firstly, PCAP is nothing but GDP/POP. Once we measure the marginal effect of GDP 
(elasticity in our case) controlled for PCAP, with or without knowing we are 
measuring the marginal effect of simultaneous change in population and GDP. That is 
because there is no other way to keep PCAP unchanged, when GDP is changed by 1% 
without allowing POP to change by 1% simultaneously. Therefore we are having an 
incorrect estimate for not only for GDP but also for PCAP that can be seen by the 
reverse of the argument.  
 
                                                 
51 For example, see (Donny T, 2003), Okubo T(2004), MacDermott  (2007) , Rose Andrew( 2000a) 
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Secondly, the expected sign for PCAP is ambiguous if included. Many studies expect 
PCAP to have a positive sign following the logic that higher PCAP should increase 
demand for imports (therefore trade). One can argue in the opposite direction that 
when PCAP is higher, firms can sell their products domestically rather than exporting 
and it gives fewer incentives to exports. Then the expected sign is negative. Once 
again when PCAP increases, firms can grow faster by first selling domestically, and 
secondly approaching export market easily as a result of scale of economies. Then the 
expected sign is positive. Situation is more complicated when we realize PCAP can 
react as a proxy variable for factor intensity. Controlled for GDP, relatively higher 
PCAP means lesser number of people is associated with a given GDP, and then 
production should be capital intensive. On the other hand relatively lower PCAP 
means large number of people is associated with the given GDP, and hence 
production should be labor intensive. If factor intensity differences cause trade, the 
expected sign for PCAP (unless absolute difference of PCAP is used) is not 
predicable in a cross-sectional setting where many country pairs are involved52.  It is 
easy for a researcher to define for what PCAP is being used but the real problem is 
that PCAP might more or less capture almost everything mentioned above unless 
properly controlled. 
 
Thirdly, as population growth rate is generally stable for many countries, it is very 
likely changing GDP produces corresponding changes in PCAP. That might result 
non-zero correlation between GDP and PCAP against the expected independency 
among explanatory variables. (See Correlation matrix in Table 4.5)  
 Including GDP and POP in the same regression is also less meaningful  
                                                 
52 It is predictable for a single country pair in a times series regression  
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Both GDP and POP stand for economic mass of a given county. They need to be used 
as substitutes for each other but not as complementary meaning that only one could be 
present at a time. It is true that POP is not a perfect substitute for GDP as long as there 
are countries having higher population with very low GDP. However, one has to 
accept that the correlation between these two is extremely high. For example, we 
regressed ln(GDPi) on ln(POPi) and ln(GDPj) on ln(POPj) where we found 
)756(83.0ˆ tpopi <=β and )1031(92.0ˆ tpopj <=β (See statistical Appendix 4(Y) for full 
test result) Also from the correlation matrix depicted in Table 4.5 it can be shown that 
GDP and POP (in levels) account for 0.6 correlation.  
TABLE 4.5: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR SELECTED VARIABLES 
Table 4.5 




GDPj 0.233 -0.044 1.000
[71.16375] [-13.12617] ----- 
POPi 0.132 0.609 -0.036 1.000
[39.60577] [228.4291] [-10.84401] ----- 
POPj 0.068 -0.031 0.626 -0.030 1.000
[20.18321] [-9.240905] [238.7426] [-8.986876] ----- 
PCAPi -0.007 0.038 0.039 -0.030 0.018 1.000
[-2.153594] [11.24595] [11.64366] [-9.00674] [5.468267] ----- 
PCAPj 0.137 -0.054 0.284 -0.045 -0.059 0.059 1.000
[41.03997] [-16.10523] [88.06136] [-13.26291] [-17.48824] [17.64679] ----- 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR SELECTED VARIABLES
t -St are in parentheses
Full matrix is available  in Statistical Appendix  
 
For the reasons shown above, we do not attempt to establish unitary elastically 
including POP and PCAP together with GDP, which seems to be a deliberate 
manipulation. Our research objectives are well beyond the unitary elasticity, which 
has nothing to do with trade policy analysis.  
 
Nevertheless, we have to explain as to why 1ˆ <gdpgdpβ  in our model. Theoretically, 
Gravity model is expected to produce unitary income elasticity under the assumption 
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that products are differentiated. In homogeneous products case, income elasticity is 
expected to be below unity. This is the topic of Feenstra et al (1998) where they 
theoretically and empirically prove that the gravity equation should have lower 
domestic income elasticity for exports of homogeneous goods than of differentiated 
goods, because of a ‘home market’ effect53 which depends on barriers to entry. When 
aggregated trade data is used, inevitably the data comes from a combination of 
differentiated and homogeneous products and then unitary income elasticity is not 
necessarily guaranteed unless one does some kind of manipulation we discussed 
above.  
 
Feenstra explains the contradiction as, 
“…Gravity equation was based on the assumption that countries are specialized in 
different goods. This may be a reasonable description of trade between industrialized 
countries, but it is a poor description of trade between developing countries that 
export basic agricultural goods or low-skilled commodities. In that case there is no 
reason at all for the gravity equation to hold” (Feenstra, 2004 p149) 
 
Taking into account the 1467 reported distance effects Anne and Head (2004) in a 
Meta analysis concluded that the “estimated negative impact of distance on trade rose 
around the middle of the century and has remained persistently high since then. They 
found a mean elasticity of -0.9 indicating that on average bilateral trade is nearly 
inversely proportionate to distance54. Our estimate of )7.36(96.0ˆ tdisrad <−−≅β  is 
                                                 
53 as country i becomes larger, the number of firms located there grows more rapidly than output, and 
country i becomes a net exporter of the good, despite the increase in domestic demand (Feenstra et al, 
1998) 
 
54 The reason why distance effect vary across studies can be theoretically explained by sampling errors 
(the chance of estimating a population parameter based on the extreme samples drawn from that 
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slightly above but very close to average. In fact, this is the most desired outcome for 
us. In the conceptual framework we firstly argued that c.i.f. values historically used 
underestimates the negative distance effect and more accurately f.o.b. values to be 
used. Secondly, we embedded inland transport cost proxied by country’s geographical 
radius into the distance variable. In fact we have now materialized the implications of 
the said two adjustments. It can be interpreted as, 1% increase (decrease) in transport 
cost will cause 0.96% decrease (increase) in bilateral exports on average given 
everything else being equal. Eight out of nine different panel data estimates report 
distance effects between 0.93-0.98 in our study. (See Table 5(A) in Statistical 
Appendix) Nonetheless, the validity of the interpretation heavily depends on the fact 
that how well distance approximates transport cost. Hence, it makes sense to attribute 
interpretation to the distance itself. The distance effect has little to do with trade 
policy so long as bilateral distance is unchangeably fixed. Nonetheless, the location of 
firm is movable even though countries are not movable. If the distance seems to be a 
grave barrier to enter the targeted market, the estimates suggest it is still sensible to 
locate the firm in a country nearer to the targeted market.  
 
Similarly, 1% increase (decrease) in the price of imports decreases (increases) volume 
of imports by 0.86% C&P thus demand for imports in most cases is inelastic meaning 
that the majority of the countries imports more essential goods than luxuries in 
general. 1% decrease (increase) in local price relative to the ROW discourages 
(encourages) imports only by 0.3% Ceteris Paribus meaning that domestic products 
are poor substitutes for their imports in general for many countries. This finding is not 
                                                                                                                                            
population), structural heterogeneity (differences in true population parameters across sub-populations 
of the data) or heterogeneity in methods (differences in statistical technique used, misspecification of 
model, measurement errors, omitted variable bias etc). 
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comparable with any historically dictated value as we are the first to introduce relative 
price proxy in terms of PPP exchange rate in to Gravity model.  
  
More interestingly, one percentage point reduction (increase) in import tariffs on 
average will improve (divert) import volume by 0.01% Ceteris Paribus. This follows 
the idea that if a country can persuade his trading partner to reduce current tariff rates 
against him by 10% (may be in terms of an FTA) it can expand bilateral export 
volume at least by 1% given all the other factors remain unchanged. Again we are the 
first to introduce import tariff variable explicitly into the trade Gravity model and the 
finding is very important for the rest of the analysis. If taxβ were found to be 
insignificant for some reason it would have been pointless to discus FTA impact 
beyond this point because the basic target of FTA, among many others, is to liberalize 
trade by removing or reducing existing import tariffs.    
 
Common border dummy in our model stands for the effect of adjacency. One might 
argue why adjacency matters when the bilateral distance is controlled for. One reason 
is that capital-to-capital distance does not show true picture of adjacency of two 
neighboring countries when they are too large in geographical size. Another reason is 
that it is likely landlocked effect to be underestimated in absence of adjacency dummy 
because neighboring countries are the obstacles that make a country to be landlocked 
 
The average adjacency estimate of )8.19(0.1ˆ tborder <≅β  in our study suggests that 
neighboring countries trade 170% above the average level of trade expected from any 
other country pair given all the other factors being equal55. It is not suppressing 
because adjoining countries are natural trading partners. Moreover, borderβ captures not 
                                                 
55 [100.exp(1.00)-1]=172% 
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only the effect of sharing a common demarcation line by two nations, but also it 
captures varieties of many other relationships between adjoined countries. For 
instance, input and output links of production, backward and forward links of trade, 
feasibility of information, political ties etc are important among them. Also some 
recent trends of foreign direct investment(FDI) show that there is a tendency for some 
industries to first land in the neighboring country instead of directly approaching the 
targeted market. For example, Mexico is such a transit point for the products entering 
huge USA market from the back door. All these relationships go into borderβ if not 
individually controlled for. As long as we understand these relationships are 
substantially high now and growing overtime it is not surprising we had a higher 
value for borderβ against the historically dictated mean in the vicinity of 0.7  
 
Also our findings suggests countries having a common currency trade 15% 
[ ]15.01)14.0exp( ≈− more than the average level of trade expected from any other 
pair of countries. According to our period wise cross-sectional estimates, common 
currency effect is positive but not significant at least for 1998-2003 period. This 
reflects the adjustment period for European currency union. The Euro was first 
introduced to world financial markets as an accounting currency in 1999 and launched 
as physical coins and notes in 2002 replacing the former European currencies. This 
indicates common currency had not been a motivation for trade during EU adjustment 
period but when all EU countries fully adjusted for Euro its impact has become 
significantly positive.  This results need to be interpreted with a bit of causation. One 
can estimate and show highly exaggerated effect for common currency without 
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controlling for EU and other RTB effects. We avoid extending our argument in that 
direction as it is none of our major concerns56 
 
The present study disregards common language dummy for two reasons. Firstly, we 
do not see any logical reason (except for data feasibility) for using the official 
languages of the countries to construct common currency dummy as have been done 
historically. Many countries tend to use a commercially viable language for 
international transactions keeping their official language for national heritage or 
cultural identity. Though many studies reported common language impact is 
significantly positive using official languages, we do not believe the common 
language dummy purely stands for language. More certainly, we do believe it captures 
the unobserved historical cultural and political anatomy of the two nations that caused 
them to have a common language. Secondly, common language dummy was found to 
be insignificant when estimated using a broader definition as any language spoken by 
more than 30% country’s population commonly with similar of larger portion of the 
total population of another country. This is mainly because language dummy tends to 
overlap with regional bloc dummies creating higher degree of co-linearity. We do not 
mean to imply language has nothing to do with trade. This only means we drop 
unimportant language dummy in order to keep more important set of RTB dummies, 
which is a prime target of our study57.  
 
Though we do not have a historically accepted bench mark to compare with, all the 
other variables we tested in default model are highly significant, consistent and more 
importantly bear valid interpretations about the properties of standard economic 
                                                 
56 For detail discussion, See Rose Andrew (2000a) and Rose Andrew (2000b)  
57 For a comprehensive study on impact of language on trade see Melitz, J.(2007) 
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theories. For example, it can be shown that income elasticity is positive 
0>gdpgdpβ price elasticity is always negative 0<priceiβ , the cross-price elasticity for 
substitute goods is always positive 0>pricejβ and elasticity of import tax is negative 
0<taxβ  meaning that higher import taxes reduce the quantity being imported. Also 
priceipricej ββ <  implies buyers are more responsive to good’s own price than to the 
prices of substitute goods.  
 
As we used an index number to measure remoteness, it does not make much sense to 
talk about elasticity. Nevertheless significantly negative estimates for remoteness 
index suggest that countries located far away from economically strong countries 
participate less in trade. (Both export and import) As the location of the country will 
never change it follows the idea that economic prosperity in the neighborhood will 
boost trade for the country being encircled.   
 
As countries cannot change their island status or landlocked status these coefficient do 
not much helpful for economic policy. Yet those variables are much needed to be 
present in the model as controls to have unbiased estimates for others.   
 
Before winding up this chapter, one final comment is due. Ours is the second study58 
where PPP adjusted trade and GDP data is used in Gravity Model. Also the present 
study uses f.0.b trade data instead of c.i.f.  Therefore, one-to-one comparison with 
previous studies is less meaningful, but findings would be comparable within a 
limited range, knowing the implications of these adjustments. 
****************
                                                 
58 Debaere (2005) is the only published paper in which PPP converted values are used.  
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CHAPTER –V 
ROLE OF FTA IN PRESENCE OF TRADE CREATION OR 
DIVERSION BY RTB 
In this chapter we attempt to examine the impact of six selected RTBs on bilateral 
trade flows and their interactive effect with FTAs. The selected RTBs are ASEAN, 
NAFTA, EFTA, DR-CAFTA, EU, CARICOM and SAARC. In the light of our findings 
we attempt to answer the following three questions. These RTBs were selected 
depending on the highest number of extra-block FTAs observed.  
1. What is the gross trade effect of the selected RTBs for their member 
countries? 
2. Do RTBs really create trade for the world or just divert trade from non-
members to members? 
3. Can a FTA improve such trade creation or reverse trade diversion? 
In the first question our focus is to see whether the intra-trade of a selected RTB is 
significantly positive. In other words whether two members belonging to a particular 
RTB trade more among themselves than the average level of trade expected from any 
other country pair in ROW. The underlining null hypothesis is that the coefficient for 
any RTB dummy is non-negative.  
 
In general, trade diversion takes place when a RTB diverts trade, away from a more 
efficient country outside the RTB, towards a less efficient country within the RTB 
merely to exploit the benefit from abolition of tariff or other trade barriers. The 
second question attempts to examine the issue whether RTBs are actually creating 
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trade or just diverting trade flows from non-members to members eventually not 
making a noticeable contribution to the world trade.  
 
The third question is novel in the sense that we are the first to raise this question 
regarding the RTBs and FTAs interactive effect. Here we focus on the performance of 
RTB outsider countries entering into FTAs with RTB insider countries. It is 
interesting to see whether an outsider gains from FTA or at least FTA helps to reverse 
any trade diversionary effect resulting from RTB itself. Sometimes FTA may be 
undesirable to the outsider when insider expands its market beyond the RTB and 
exploits the outsiders’ market for his own benefit rather than sharing mutual benefits 
equally.   
============================================================= 
5.1 EXTENDING GRAVITY MODEL TO CAPTURE FTA AND RTB 
IMPACT  
In the previous chapter we concluded that Panel FGLS estimator with cross-sectional 
weights and period SUR specification will produce the best results for the gravity 
model. Hence we will employ the same technique here except we slightly modify the 
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Definitions for the explanatory variables will remain as they were before except for 
the superscript stars denote they are transformed variables weighted by cross-sectional 
weights as discussed in the Chapter IV.  No change in expected signs.  
 
At the very outset a few comments are due regarding the threefold RTB dummies 
representing each RTB. Given the sample is unbiased the estimated gravity model 
suggests the “natural level of trade” for the sample, which could infer to the 
underling population at a chosen significance level. Then the dummy variables will 
capture any “abnormality” above (or below) the natural level suggesting the impact 
of the RTB concerned.  
 
As shown in the literature review, Aitken (1973) Pelzman (1977) and Frankel and 
Wei (1993) used a single indicative binary variable to measure RTB gross trade 
creation effect, which is incomplete for the reasons we discuss shortly. The results 
derived from a similar exercise are given in bottom part of Table 4.1, Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.3 in the Chapter IV. The estimated values for the selected RTB dummies 
simply answers the following question 
 Do the countries in the RTB concern (NFTA for example) trade among the 
member countries more intensively than other countries do? 
According to our findings reported in column 8 of Table 4.3, the answer to the 
question is as follows. Controlled for all other factors affecting trade, ASEAN 
countries trade among members 122% above the average level while NAFTA intra-
block trade (not controlling for US-Canada FTA) is 624% and EU intra-block trade is 
44% above the average level of trade expected from any other country pair. 
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On the other hand EFTA inter-trade is 53% and CARICOM inter-trade 171% below 
the average level while SAARC inter-trade is not significantly different from the 
expected level of trade between any other country pair.  
 
In fact, the above results show only the gross trade creation effect of RTBs. To make 
it more comprehensive, we use three dummy variables to represent one RTB 
following Carrere (2006) together with two interactive dummies to capture the RTB 
and FTA overlapping effects. It is worth elaborating as to why three dummy variables 
are required to differentiate between trade creation (TC) trade diversion (TD) and net 
trade creation (NTC) effects of RTB. Using a single dummy (similar to ijtD1 above) 
one might conclude that the economic integration, perhaps, trade intensity within 
RTB is above the average when it is found to be significantly positive. The dilemma 
is that it reveals nothing about what is happening to the non-member countries as a 
result of so-called integration. Sometimes, it might be the case that RTB members 
gain at a cost to ROW. Thus, two additional dummy variables will help to 
differentiate among TC, TD and NTC.  As there are four possible scenarios we use 
three dummies ( )1−n as follows, 
ij
tD1   =1 if both countries belong to same RTB, 0 otherwise 
i
tD2   =1 if only exporter belongs to RTB, 0 otherwise 
j
tD3   =1 if only importer belongs to RTB, 0 otherwise 
Keeping the last scenario where neither exporter nor importer belongs to same RTB 
as the default case (see Figure 5.1). Also we define two interactive dummies as 
FTAD it *2  =1 if insider exporting to outsider under a FTA, 0 otherwise 
FTAD jt *3  =1 if insider importing from outsider under FTA, 0 otherwise  
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FIGURE 5.1: CONFIGURATION OF RTB AND FTA INTERACTION 
Figure 5.1- 




The estimated values for the proposed dummies in a cross sectional model will 
indicate the ‘abnormality’ of trade flow at a given time compared to the bench mark 
of “natural level of trade”.  
 
Even though later work by Frankel et al. (1995), Frankel and Wei (1995, 1996), and 
Frankel (1997) used two dummies; intra-bloc dummy (1 if both belong to same RTB) 
and extra-bloc dummy (1 if only one belongs to RTB) we do not believe they could 
estimate TC and TD effects correctly. For example, in a cross-sectional regression, 
when extra-bloc dummy is found to be significantly negative, it indicates that bloc 
members trade with outside countries below the natural level. We argue it is wrong to 
interpret this scenario as trade diversion. That is simply because in a cross-sectional 
analysis we do not know whether extra-bloc had been below the natural level even 
before the formation of trading bloc concerned. Therefore we have to have at least 












FTAD jt *3  
i
tD2  
FTAD it *2  
X, Y countries belong to RTB whereas A1, B1 belong to ROW. Arrows show the 
direction of trade while shaded ellipses show FTAs. 
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effect is not a cross-sectional phenomena but a time series phenomena. It is fine if 
one can take two time periods before and after the formation of RTB. If it is not 
possible in terms of data feasibility, two time periods with a reasonable gap 
subsequent to the RTB formation will serve the purpose. Precisely, that is method we 
use here.   
 
Despite we have nine periods in our panel data set we select only two periods, namely 
1997 and 2005 in order to observe the impact very clearly.  We believe the RTB 
impact between two consecutive years is marginal and we need at least 5 year gap to 
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Again the stars denote the variable is weighted. *ijv is the composite error term. This 
time our main interest lies with tail end dummy variables. For example controlled for 
all the other factors ftaβ  is the return to FTA in 1997 and ftafta δβ +  is the return to 
FTA in 2005. Therefore ftaδ is the change in return to FTA between two periods. 
Similarly 1β is the intra-block RTB effect in 1997 and 11 δβ + is the intra-block RTB 
effect in 2005. Thus 1δ  change in the intra-block RTB effect between two periods. 
Other coefficients need to be analogously defined. 
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Estimating above model in a two period panel data analysis will help us to identify the 
TC, TD and NTC effect of RTB over the eight year period concerned. Recall that our 
dependant variable is not total bilateral trade but bilateral exports and also our 
concern is not pure cross-sectional. Therefore our definition for TC and TD may 
necessarily differ from any other previous study. For clarity let us define, 
0,0,0 321 >>> δδδ  Pure Trade Creation (Intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade 
growing over time)  
0,0,0 321 <<> δδδ   Pure Trade Diversion (Intra-bloc trade increases but 
extra-bloc trade decreases over time)  
The other possible scenarios need to be relatively defined depending on sign and the 
magnitudes of 321 ,, δδδ . 
 
For example, given all the other factors being equal, if ( ) 021 >+δδ   
( ) 0321 <++ δδδ it suggests that RTB has created trade for members but has diverted 
trade from ROW more than they created thus on average NTC for the world is 
negative. It should be re-emphasized that this type of analysis will show TC and TD 
effects only for the period concerned. If the researcher wants to verify whether a 
selected RTA is trade creating or diverting or displacing in general, he has to make 





5.2 TWO PERIOD PANEL DATA ANALYSIS: TRADE CREATION (TC) 
TRADE DIVERSION (TD) AND NET TRADE CREATION (NTC) BY 
SELECTED REGIONAL TRADING BLOCKS (RTBs)  
The Table 5.1 shows the estimated results for Eq. (5.2) where the columns provide 
two period panel data estimates for each RTB. Table is truncated for 12 estimates that 
need to compute TC/TD effects and more importantly FTA and RTB interactive 
effects. Point estimates for 34 variables are not presented for brevity. (See the 
Statistical Appendix Table 5(A) for the full Table) The interpretations will be based 
on the significant estimates only.  
 
5.2.1 Trade creation, trade diversion, and FTA interactive effect of European 
Union  
The European Union (EU) is a union of twenty-seven independent European 
Communities formerly known as European Community (EC) or European Economic 
Community (EEC), which was originally formed in 1957 and grew up to the current 
status after five enlargements. Available statistics show higher degree of economic 
integration within EU. For instance for the period 1999-2005 on average EU intra 
exports are 67% of their total exports while EU intra imports are 66% of their total 
imports59. Can we infer the observed higher integration as EU impact as a RTB? 
Absolutely not! Statistics are misleading about EU impact unless we isolate EU effect 
controlling for other factors influencing EU intra and extra trade.    
                                                 
59 Calculated with WTO statistics  
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TABLE 5.1: TRADE CREATION (TC) TRADE DIVERSION (TD) AND NET TRADE CREATION (NTC) BY SELECTED REGIONAL TRADING BLOCKS(RTBs) 
Table 5.1 
Dependent Variable: W*LOG(X)
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)
Periods included: 9 (1997-2005)
Cross-sections included: 9832
Total panel (balanced) observations: 88488
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
EC t-st NAFTA t-st ASEAN t-st EFTA t-st DCAFTA t-st SAARC t-st CARICOM t-st WTO t-st
FTAij 0.33 *** 8.38 0.24 *** 12.86 0.27 *** 14.07 0.33 *** 15.47 0.25 *** 13.51 0.27 *** 14.92 0.26 *** 14.48 0.26 *** 14.37
FTAij*YD05 -0.07 *** -3.66 0.00  -0.24 -0.02 ** -2.23 0.01  0.49 0.00  0.07 -0.02  -1.36 -0.01  -1.08 -0.02  -1.54
D1 0.43 *** 18.48 1.64 *** 8.49 1.28 *** 15.99 -0.88 *** -9.00 0.88 *** 9.31 -1.16  -1.37 0.28  1.11 0.05 *** 3.24
D1*YD05 -0.05 *** -12.71 0.00  0.17 0.02 * 1.87 -0.02 ** -2.23 -0.08 *** -8.47 0.04  0.45 -0.18 *** -6.51 0.10 *** 3.88
D2 0.10 *** 8.05 -0.10 * -1.87 1.26 *** 26.87 -0.08  -1.10 -0.04  -0.49 -0.49 *** -8.15 -1.87 *** -13.96 0.06 *** 4.61
D2*YD05 -0.02 *** -4.20 0.00  -0.21 0.07 *** 13.01 0.01  1.42 -0.03 *** -3.84 0.01 * 1.87 0.03 ** 2.20 0.09 *** 3.38
D3 -0.09 *** -7.75 -0.46 *** -6.80 0.74 *** 9.09 -1.23 *** -7.87 -0.02  -0.87 -0.08  -1.23 0.02 ** 2.14 -0.04 ** -2.30
D3*YD05 0.00  0.69 -0.01  -1.12 -0.05 *** -6.06 -0.01  -0.28 -0.01  -1.07 0.09 *** 12.51 -0.02 ** -2.59 0.09 *** 2.99
D2*FTA -0.14 *** -2.91 0.29 ** 2.09 -0.09  -1.01 -0.27 *** -4.82 0.84 *** 3.68    
D2*FTA*YD05 0.13 *** 4.76 -0.07 ** -2.20 0.09  0.99 -0.13 *** -4.97 -0.08 ** -2.40    
D3*FTA -0.17 *** -2.72 0.14 * 1.69 -0.08  -0.69 -0.16 *** -2.93 0.05  0.29    
D3*FTA*YD05 -0.05 * -1.73 0.04  0.70 0.16  1.42 0.04  1.02 -0.02  -0.39    
R-squared 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Adjusted R-squared 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Durbin-Watson stat 2.01 2.02 2.01 2.01 2.02 2.01 2.02 2.01
All the variables are weighted by cross-sectional weights;  time variances of OLS residuals for each Cross-unit taken from 9 period specific OLS regressions 
Table is truncated: estimates for 34 variables are not presented  for brevity. Full table is available in statistical appendix
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
TRADE CREATION (TC) TRADE DIVERSION (TD) and NET TRADE CREATION (NTC) by SELECTED REGIONAL TRADING BLOCKS (RTBs) 
TWO PERIOD PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
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In this analysis we have taken into account 17 outsider countries having FTA with 27 EU 
countries in multilateral form. (EU being a custom union possibility of bilateral FTA is 
ruled out).  
FIGURE 5.2 : INSIDER-OUTSIDER FTA CONFIGURATION OF EU 
Figure 5.2 

























Netherlands (1957) Luxembourg 
(1957) Italy (1957) France (1957) 
Belgium (1957) Germany (1957) 
Denmark (1973) Ireland (1973) 
United Kingdom (1973) Greece 
(1981) Portugal, Spain (1986) 
Austria (1995) Finland (1995) 
Sweden (1995) 
Cyprus(2004) Czech 
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FIGURE 5.3: FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF EU 
Figure 5.3  
FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF EU 
 
 
We have reproduced the column 2 of Table 5.1 in Figure 5.3 in a more precise way. Let 
µ denote the “natural level of trade expected from any country pair for the base year 
(1997)” Then we can derive following conclusions from the results.  
 
Controlled for all other factors (such as income, distance, common currency, common 
border ..etc) a pair of EU countries (X, Y) presently trade among themselves around 46% 
above the natural level of trade ( µ ) expected from any country pair indicating a higher 
degree of integration. However EU exports to outsider countries (X, B1) are just 8% 
above µ while EU imports from outsider countries (B2, X) are noticeably below by 9% 
from µ when the pair of countries is not tied up by an FTA.   
 
More interestingly, when the pair of countries is bound by an FTA, EU exports to 
outsider countries are 39% above µ and EU imports from outsider countries are only 5% 






A1 %3314.033.01.0)1997( +=−++ µµ %3913.007.02.014.033.01.0)2005( +=+−−−++ µµ
%101.0)1997( +=+ µµ
%802.01.0)2005( +=−+ µµ  
%717.033.009.0)1997( +=−+− µµ  
%505.007.017.033.009.0)2005( −=−−−+− µµ
%909.0)1997( −=− µµ
%909.0)2005( −=− µµ  %5343.0)1997( +=+ µµ  
%4605.043.0)2005( +=−+ µµ
 97
FTA benefits are not equally distributed. It can be shown that the non-member countries 
have been able to reverse their relative adverse position just by 4% (from -9% to -5%) as 
a result of FTA whereas FTA has remarkably improved the favorable position of EU 
exports towards non-members (from 8% to 39%).  
 
Next question is whether this boost can be known as NTC to the world. To answer the 
question we now look into the TC and TD effects of EU over the study period. On the 
one hand our findings show that EU intra-export intensity fell by 7% (from 53% to 46% 
against the average level) and insider-outsider (X, B1) export intensity also fell by 2% 
(from 10% to 8% against the base line average level ) while insider-outsider (X, B2) 
import intensity remained unchanged over the period from 1997-2005. Then overall 9% 
decline without FTA impact. 
On the other hand, it shows that insider-outsider export intensity under FTA (X, A1) 
improved by 6% (from 33% to 39%) while insider-outsider import intensity under FTA 
(X, A2) declined by 12% (from +7% to -5%). Then overall 6% decline under FTA.  
 
Considering all above it can be concluded that during 1997-2005 FTA has provided 
enough incentives for EU countries to divert their exports from members to non-member 
without NTC for the world. Furthermore EU has deprived outsider countries off their 
favorable position they maintained in 1997 in terms of insider-outsider imports under 




5.2.2 Trade creation, trade diversion, and FTA interactive effect of NAFTA 
 
In January 1994, USA, Mexico Canada, formed the world's largest free trade area known 
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These three countries alone 
dominate over 18%-20% of world trade. The degree of integration is so high that intra 
block exports are 56% the total exports while intra block imports are 38% of the total 
imports on average for the period 1999-200560. In this study 18 outsider countries having 
FTA bilaterally with NFTA countries were taken into account. We have reproduced the 
column 3 of Table 5.1 in Figure 5.5 assuming all insignificant estimates to be zero. 
FIGURE 5.4: INSIDER-OUTSIDER FTA CONFIGURATION OF NAFTA 
Figure 5.4 
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FIGURE 5.5: FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF NAFTA 
Figure 5.5  
FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF NAFTA 
 
 
Being the largest RTB in the world it is not surprising to see NAFTA intra-trade intensity 
is 415% above µ , controlled for all other factors affecting trade. The number remains 
unchanged for the corresponding two years basically because we have removed the 
Canada-USA FTA (1998) effect from NAFTA intra-trade as we need to isolate NAFTA 
impact.  
 
Following the higher level of NAFTA intra-trade integration, its Export to and imports 
from the ROW is well below µ  unless trade takes place under an FTA. Our findings 
show that NAFTA exports to ROW is 10% below the average in absence of an FTA but 
around 48% above in presence of an FTA connecting the trading pair. Similarly, NAFTA 
imports from ROW unsecured by an FTA are 58% below µ but only 8% below in 
presence of a FTA. This follows the idea that having an FTA with a NAFTA country 






A1 %5329.024.01.0)1997( +=++− µµ
%4307.029.024.01.0)2005( +=−+++ µµ  
%101.0)1997( −=− µµ
%101.0)2005( −=− µµ  
%814.024.046.0)1997( −=++− µµ  
%814.024.046.0)2005( −=++− µµ  
%5846.0)1997( −=− µµ
%5846.0)2005( −=− µµ  %41564.1)1997( +=+ µµ
%41564.1)2005( +=+ µµ  
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Analogous to the computation of TC and TD effect of EU, we can observe marginally 
negative net trade creation by NAFTA during 1997-2005. That conclusion is for the 
scenario where we have removed USA-Canada FTA effect. Once USA-Canada FTA 
effect is in place we would find that NAFTA has been a trade creating RTB for the period 
concerned.  
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5.2.3 Trade creation, trade diversion, and FTA interactive effect of ASEAN 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises of ten member 
countries. For the period 1999-2005 ASEAN intra-block exports are 24% of their total 
exports while ASEAN intra block imports are 23% of their total imports61. This study 
covers 09 bilateral FTA62 with 3 ASEAN countries namely Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand.  
FIGURE 5.6: INSIDER-OUTSIDER FTA CONFIGURATION OF ASEAN 
Figure 5.6 





 Malaysia (1967) 
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Vietnam 1995 
Lao PDR 1997  
Myanmar 1997  
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Australia (2005)  
 
Again Figure 5.7 is a visual presentation of the column 4 of Table 5.1 where only the 
significant estimates are present.  
 
                                                 
61 Calculated with WTO statistics  
 
62 There are more than 9 FTAs presently in progress but fall beyond the study period.  
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According to our findings, every other factor being equal, ASEAN intra-block exports are 
on average 2.6 times above µ and the ASEAN exports to ROW undefended by FTA is 
also 2.6 times above the expected level of bilateral exports between any other county 
pair. In other words ASEAN countries do trade among members exactly as the same way 
they do with non-members. This follows the idea that ASEAN trade integration has not 
so far been materialized.  
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FIGURE 5.7: FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF ASEAN 
Figure 5.7   
FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF ASEAN 
 
 
ASEAN export to ROW without FTA is almost 2.6 above µ whereas it is 3.7 times above 
µ under FTA. Similarly, ASEAN imports from ROW without FTA are approximately 
double the natural level. But the Figure is nearly1.6 times above the natural level 
(+165%) under FTA. This suggests that trading with ASEAN countries secured by an 
FTA is beneficial for both insider and outsider. Nevertheless, FTA interactive effect 
cannot be generalized to all 10 ASEAN members because Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei 
Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Cambodia do not have a single FTA 
while Singapore alone deals with 7 FTAs (in progress during study period).  Therefore, 
this finding could be specific to Singapore rather than being general to ASEAN. 
 
It can be seen that all most all trade flows have been improving during 1997-2005 and 
there is no evidence of any offsetting effect. We can reasonably conclude that ASEAN 






A1 %36127.026.1)1997( +=++ µµ
%38502.007.027.026.1)2005( +=−+++ µµ  
%25226.1)1997( +=+ µµ
%27807.026.1)2005( +=++ µµ  
%15308.027.074.0)1997( +=−++ µµ  
%17716.002.005.008.027.074.0)2005( +=+−−−++ µµ
%10074.0)1997( +=+ µµ
%9905.074)2005( +=−+ µµ  %25928.1)1997( +=+ µµ
%26602.028.1)2005( +=++ µµ
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5.2.4 Trade creation, trade diversion, and FTA interactive effect of EFTA 
 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA)63 was established in 1960 originally with 
six-member states but presently it is a four-member RTB having Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland inside. Though the RTB seems to be small in terms of the 
number of states, it is pretty much relevant to us because they have 19 FTAs out of which 
16 going into our study. FTA configuration of EFTA is quite similar to that of EU 
because outsider countries maintain FTA with the whole block instead of individual 
countries.  
FIGURE 5.8: INSIDER-OUTSIDER FTA CONFIGURATION OF EFTA 
Figure 5.8 





















                                                 
63 There should not be any confusion with similar abbreviation EFTA standing for the European Fair Trade 
Association, which is a joint body of eleven Fair Trade importers in nine European countries  namely Austria, 
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Analogues to the previous work we reproduce below in Figure 5.9 the results coming 
from column 5 of Table 5.1  
 
According to our findings EFTA intra-block exports are around 140% below µ and 
during the study period it has been further declining. On face of it is unbelievable! But it 
should be reminded that we are talking about the bilateral exports arising due to the fact 
that both countries are EFTA members. We have already controlled for the exports 
arising from all other factors in gravity model. (Income, distance, prices, tariff.etc) 
FIGURE 5.9: FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF EFTA 
Figure 5.9  
FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF EFTA 
 
 
EFTA imports from ROW undefended by FTA are around 242% below µ  and the 
imports defended by FTA are also 188% belowµ . EFTA exports to ROW without FTA 
do not show any significant difference from the level of export maintained by any other 
country pair whereas EFTA exports covered by FTA is also very closer to natural level 
on average. These findings suggest FTA has been helpful only for the outsider countries 






A1 %627.033.0)1997( +=−+ µµ
%713.027.033.0)2005( −=−−+ µµ  
µµ =)1997(
µµ =)2005(  
%18816.033.023.1)1997( −=−+− µµ  
%18816.033.023.1)2005( −=−+− µµ  
%24223.1)1997( −=− µµ
%24223.1)2005( −=− µµ  %14088.0)1997( −=− µµ
%14502.088.0)2005( −=−− µµ
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shows neither TC nor TD effects. However it is noteworthy the 16 FTA we considered 
are not matured enough to see the full TC/TD effects. And therefore these results, 
perhaps, might not be robust for the future when included FTAs become matured.  
 
5.2.5 Trade creation, trade diversion, and FTA interactive effect of DR-CAFTA 
 
DRCAFTA, sometimes know as doctor cafta, is the agreement under which the 
Dominican Republic joined the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) that 
USA signed earlier with El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. 
Upon entry into force they agreed to eliminate 80% of the tariffs immediately creating the 
second-largest free trade zone in Latin America.  
FIGURE 5.10: INSIDER-OUTSIDER FTA CONFIGURATION OF DRCAFTA 
Figure 5.10 




















FIGURE 5.11: FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF DCAFTA 
Figure 5.11  
FTA INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF DCAFTA 
 
 
All else being equal, DRCAFTA intra-block trade is approximately 140% above µ in 
1997 and 122% above µ  in 2005. It can be shown that DRCAFTA exports to or imports 
from ROW in absence of FTAs are not significantly different from the average level of 
trade maintained by any other random pair.   
 
More interestingly, the DRCAFTA imports from ROW are 28% above µ  and the exports 
to ROW is in the region of 166% to197% above the average level in presence of FTAs. 
This suggests FTAs are beneficial in principle to the both insider and outsider but has 
been more beneficial to RTB members in expanding their export market beyond RTB. 
However, during the period 1997-2005 figures suggest NTC effect of DRCAPTA is 
negative because TD effect for member countries are high (56%) though there is no 
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%16608.003.084.025.0)2005( +=−−++ µµ  
µµ =)1997(
%303.0)2005( −=− µµ  
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5.2.6 Trade creation, trade diversion effect of SAARC 
 
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 
December 8, 1985 by the States of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, India 
and Sri Lanka.  
 
South Asian Preferential Agreement (SAPTA) was envisaged in 1995 as the first step 
towards trade liberalization. Despite the poor achievements in SAPTA the agreement for 
the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was signed in January 2004 under which 
regional trade is projected to be fully liberalized by year 2016.  
In our study we attempt to capture the degree of regional integration of SAARC but left 
out FTA interactive effect because SAARC does not have FTAs with ROW except for 3 
FTAs India having with Singapore (2005), Thailand (2003) and Chile (2005) which we 
feel inadequate for studying FTA interactive effect.  
 
The results from the column 7 of Table 5.1 suggest, all other factors being equal, 
controlled for Sri Lanka-India FTA(1998) as well, SAARC intra-block trade is not 
significantly different from the average level of trade expected from any other pair of 
countries. SAARC imports from ROW were not different from the natural level in 1997 
but show a slight improvement (9% above the natural level) in 1995. Also we found 
SAARC exports to ROW are at least 60% below the natural level. Results are not 
surprising because, except for India, all six other nations are naturally small players in the 
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world market SAARC has not so far taken any collective effort to improve their 
competitive edge. Estimating a Gravity model using 1996-97 data Hassan (2001) also 
shows the insignificancy of SAARC as a RTB.   
 
5.2.7 Trade creation, trade diversion effect of CARICOM 
 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas 
that came into effect on August 1, 1973 transforming the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA) into a Common Market. Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana and 
Trinidad & Tobago were the initial signatories and the other eight Caribbean territories 
joined CARICOM subsequently. The Bahamas (1983) the British Virgin Islands and the 
Turks and Caicos (1991) Anguilla (1999) The Cayman Islands (2002) Bermuda (2003) 
Suriname (1995) Haiti (2002) are also among CARICOM member states now. 
 
CARICOM common Market is intended to benefit the region by providing more and 
better opportunities to attract investment and trade in a more liberalized environment. 
According to WTO sources no FTA are reported between CARICOM and ROW. 
Therefore our analysis is limited to effect of CARICOM as a RTB. From the findings 
reported in column 8 of Table 5.1, CARICOM intra-block trade is not significantly 
different from natural level of trade throughout the eight years concerned. However, 
CARICOM exports to ROW unexplained by other variables, are around 60% below the 
expected level from any other random country pair while imports are more or less 
equivalent to the average level predicted by gravity model.  
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5.2.8 Trade creation, trade diversion effect of WTO 
 
Now that we have discussed the RTB effect with the help of six selected RTBs. Our main 
contribution was to differentiate RTB and FTA effect and quantify the RTB-FTA 
interactive effect.  Having done that, finally we are going to have a glance into WTO 
effect though it is not a RTB, rather a global FTA. As a matter of fact we all agree that 
WTO has been behind FTA formation encouraging trade liberalization for a long time. 
Unfortunately, that kind of indirect influence is hardly measurable and often been 
neglected in quantitative researches.  
 
According to our findings reported in column 9 of Table 5.1, controlled for all other 
factors, trade between two WTO members was only 5% above compared to the natural 
level of trade between any random two non-members in 1997. For the corresponding year 
WTO members’ exports to non-members were only 6% above the average but WTO 
members’ imports from non-members are 4% below the natural level predicted by the 
model. Nevertheless, there is a progress in trade intensity in 2005 after eight years from 
the first result. WTO intra trade was found to be 16% above the average while WTO 
exports to non-members were 15% above the average and WTO imports from non-
members were 5% above the average. Following the definition we used for other RTBs, 
WTO seems to be net trade creating. These findings contradict with Rose (2004) who 
concluded “we do not have strong empirical evidence supporting the idea that 
GATT/WTO has systematically played a role in encouraging trade”. 
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However, our results as well as interpretations are not free from errors. Firstly, The WTO 
membership increased to 149 by 2005 as against 132 in 1997. Transferring 17 countries 
from non-member group to member group make the two groups to defer from each other 
by 34 memberships. To be more concrete in our sample of 184 countries WTO 
member/non-member ratio was 132/52 in 1997 and 149/35 in 2005. So, interpreting 
results without proper adjustment for membership changes is misleading. Secondly, the 
question whether WTO member countries do trade significantly above the non-member 
countries do itself is a meaningless question once we realize 151 countries in the world 
are now WTO members. Alternatively, it would be meaningful to ask whether WTO 
countries have improved trade after having WTO status.   In fact, WTO impact is a by-
product of our estimates, which is not our target. Re-estimating the model with necessary 





AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT OF FTA 
In the previous chapter we estimated Gravity model including FTA dummy both in cross-
sectional and panel data contexts. Results were quite promising suggesting there is a 
highly positive impact of FTA on trade flows even though the magnitude of the impact 
differed depending on the estimating techniques used. Table 6.1 summarizes the FTA 
impact hitherto measured under different methods previously depicted in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3 and 4.4. In chapter IV we have shown most of those methods disqualified to produce 
efficient estimates for the Gravity model for many different reasons. No need to repeat 
that for the same reasons the FTA impacts measured by such methods should be 
unreliable. In fact, in Chapter IV we included FTA dummy as control to have unbiased 
estimates for other key variables in Gravity model rather than measuring FTA impact 
itself. In this chapter our focus is to produce a defendable estimate for FTA impact. 
Accordingly we will raise and attempt to answer the following questions   
 
1. Why do Cross-sectional Gravity models fail to estimate FTA impact correctly? 
2. Endogenous FTAs; Do FTAs create trade or trade creates FTAs 
3. What could be the Average Treatment Effect of FTA when estimated by 
convincing alternative methods? 
=============================================================== 
In this chapter we attempt to evaluate the average treatment effect (ATE) of FTA. The 
idea is to measure the effect of the FTA (treatment) on the average outcome of trade, 
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more precisely the effect on exports. AFE is a phenomenon descending from natural 
experiments.  
 
A natural experiment occurs when an exogenous event (may be a policy change) happens 
in an uncontrolled setting.  In a natural experiment we have two groups known as control 
group (CG) and the treatment group (TG). The CG is the group which is not affected by 
the event and TG is the group which is thought to be affected by the event. Unlike a fully 
controlled true laboratory experiment, in a natural experiment we cannot simply take the 
observed difference between the CG and the TG as the effect of the event. This is 
because we have no information whether the observed difference existed even before the 
event took place. Therefore one has to observe both CG and TG before and after the 
event. Thus we have four groups in a natural experiment. i.e. the CG before event, the CG 
after event, the TG before event, and the TG after event.  
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6.1 FAILURE OF CROSS-SECTIONAL GRAVITY MODELS TO 
ESTIMATE ATE OF FTA 
 
Applying the above line of argument to an event of forming an FTA, it can be easily 
shown why cross-sectional Gravity models fail in estimating FTA impact properly.  For 
example, referring to the column 1 of the Table 6.1, FTA coefficient can be interpreted as 
“a country pair having an FTA on average trade 180% [Exp (1.3)-1=1.8] above the level 
of trade expected from those who not having an FTA, every other factor being equal”.  
The danger is that we really do not know whether FTA holding countries had been 
trading well above the Non-FFTA holding countries even before the FTA formation. If 
that is the case FTA may have lesser impact or no impact at all! For this reason, even a 
well defined cross-sectional Gravity model could fail in estimating FTA impact whereas 
it may not be the case for other variables.  
 
The above argument regarding ATE can be presented in a more formal way using the 
Gravity model, which is the key workhorse in this study. Let Z denote all the explanatory 
variables except FTA dummy in Gravity model in Eq.  (4.1). Omitting pair specific 
subscripts for convenience ATE can be written as, 
),( 01 FTAZXXEATE −=  ……………………………………… (6.1) 
Where, 1X  and 0X are the export flows in presence and in absence of FTA respectively.  
At any given time in relation to a particular country pair either 1X  or 0X is observable but 
not both. Thus the observed outcome is  
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01 )1()( XFTAXFTAX −+=  ……………………………………… (6.2) 
where, 1=FTA if the pair is having an FTA, 0 otherwise. Thus the Gravity models 
corresponding to the two scenarios would be,  
000 εβα +′+= ZX   ……………………………………… (6.3) 
111 εβα +′+= ZX   ……………………………………… (6.4) 
Substituting Eq.  (6.3) and Eq.  (6.4) into Eq.  (6.2) yields 
))(1()( 0011 εβαεβα +′+−++′+= ZFTAZFTAX  
000011 εβαεβαεβα FTAZFTAFTAZFTAZFTAFTAX −′−−+′+++′+=  
FTAFTAZX )()( 010010 εεεααβα −++−+′+=  
Define )( 01 ααγ −=  
FTAFTAZX )( 0100 εεεγβα −+++′+= ……………………………… (6.5) 
The problem associated with cross-sectional Gravity models in estimating FTA impact is 
that we estimateγ but reluctantly ignore )( 01 εε −  the difference between the country 
pairs having FTA versus the country pairs not having FTA in spite of the fact that they do 
have or do not have an FTA, which is technically known as unobserved heterogeneity. It 
is very likely that cross-sectional Gravity models would produce biased estimates for 
FTA impact unless 0)( 01 =− εε . Possibility of 00 ≠ε or 01 ≠ε is associated with omitted 
variable bias. Possibility of 0)( 01 ≠−εε is associated with selection bias. This follows the 
idea that cross-sectional Gravity models fail to estimate FTA impact unless all the 
relevant explanatory variables are included in the model that we never know exactly or 
never observe.    
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Fortunately, using more sophisticated panel data techniques unobserved heterogeneity 
can effectively be removed and unbiased estimate for ATE can be obtained. 
Alternatively, one can use “Propensity Matching” techniques to estimate the ATE. 
These two techniques are different in methodology but are equivalent in terms of 
outcome. More precisely, in panel cross-sectional fixed effect method we remove 
“unobserved effect” and compare TG against CG to see implications resulted from the 
treatment (FTA). Alternatively, in “Propensity Matching” techniques we remove 
“observed effect” and compare TG against CG by matching pairs (cross-sectional units) 
which are similar in all the observed characteristics. Both methods produce the same 
outcome for ATE and which supersedes the other depends on the estimation background. 
For example, if the functional form between the dependent and independent variables are 
unclear/not known to the researcher, it is always advisable to use “Propensity Matching” 
techniques to measure ATE rather than using regression techniques64.  
 
                                                 
64 For an application of ATE using “Propensity Matching techniques” see Chang Pao, L. and Jae, L. 
Myoung (2007) The WTO Trade Effect ETSG 2007 Athens Ninth Annual Conference 13-15 September 
2007 Athens University of Economics and Business 
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Dependent Variable: LOG(X) for 1-6 regressions
Dependent Variable: LOG(X)*W for 7-10 regressions
Cross-Obs 9832
Panel (balanced) obs 9832 x 9 = 88488
2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Method
SD errors & Cov method 
(d.f corrected)
Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St
FTAij 1.03 1.01 0.92 *** 11.24 0.09 ** 1.98 0.92 *** 12.39 0.09 *** 2.84 0.94 *** 17.65 0.41 *** 18.24 0.75 *** 28.50 0.24 *** 13.37
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.16 0.53 0.16 0.86 0.62 0.93 0.84
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
^^^^Weights are the exponated fitted values of an auxiliary regression; log of squared OLS residuals on original explanatory variables 
^^Weights are time variances of OLS residuals for each Cross-unit taken from 9 period specific OLS regressions 
Results in columns 1,2 are from Table 4.1 and 4.2 respectively
Results in columns 3,4,5,and 6 are from Table 4.3
Results in columns 7,8,9, and 10 are from Table 4.4
1 3
FTA Impact Estimated by Different Gravity Model Specifications for the Period 1997-2005
Average of 9 Cross-
Sectional OLS
Average of 9 Cross-




Panel OLS (Period 
Fixed effect)
Panel EGLS (Cross-






















6.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES ESTIMATING FTA IMPACT 
Literature provides evidences that many researchers using Gravity model to evaluate 
policy issues, FTA dummy has been used as an addition control rather than the targeted 
variable of their interest. For the same reason most of the studies do not distinguish 
between FTA and RTB and instead use a common binary variable interchangeably for 
both.   
 
For example Rose (2000a) estimating Gravity model to evaluate currency union effect 
and Rose (2004) using Gravity model to evaluate WTO impact introduces FTA dummy 
into the model as a control but not the main variable of interest65. In such cases any 
attempt to find pitfalls in their findings in relation to FTA impact is a deliberate 
misinterpretation of literature.   
 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) is the only published paper that systematically addresses the 
issue and estimates ATE of FTA with a reasonably large panel dataset taken with five 
year intervals. According to their findings ATE estimate is 0.685 suggesting that an FTA 
will on average increase two members countries’ trade about 100% after ten 
years )98.1( 685.0 =e . If we assume a steady growth rate of trade for ten years this implies 
that the annual growth rate of bilateral trade should be 8% for a country pair having an 
                                                 
65 Rose (2000a) estimated  FTA impact with pooled regression  as  Exp(0.99)-1=169%  
   Rose (2004) estimated FTA impact in Panel with county effects as Exp(0.94)-1= 156% In these two 
studies Rose used FTA to represent Regional FTAs rather than bilateral FTAs (FTA=1, if country pair 
belongs to the same Regional Trading Agreement,0 otherwise) 
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FTA66. Notwithstanding the well tuned econometric techniques they used, we have a little 
doubt that the figure is somewhat exaggerated!  
 
A preliminary experiment with the available statistics will help to clear the doubt at the 
very outset. We got 148 country pairs who had FTA by year 1997 isolated from our 
dataset. This set includes at least 90% of the true number of FTAs that were in existence 
by 1997.  Knowing for sure that the selected pairs had been trading under FTA for 8 
years by 2005, and assuming a steady growth of export for all pairs, annual export growth 
rate was calculated for each pair.  
 
The Figure 6.1 shows the results. (The numbers in X-axis indicate the country pairs)  To 
our surprise, the average annual growth rate of real exports is only 4.2% and 81 pairs 
(more than 1/2) are below the average and 101 out of 148 country pairs are below 8% 
predicted by Baier and Bergstrand (2007)! The result is still crude as we have not 
controlled any other factor affecting trade. In fact, only a faction of the observed growth 
could be attributed to FTA once the other factors are taken into account. So FTA impact 
might be even below 4.2% 
 
This is the motivation behind our attempt to re-estimate the FTA impact regardless of the 
excellent work by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Thus the present study does not differ 
from the former in terms of methodology. However, we increase the size of both TG and 
                                                 
66 Assuming aT =1 , 910 arT = ,doubled the trade within 10 year means aarT 2910 ==  
then 08.129 ==r  
 
 120
CG including 79 FTAs67 as against the 52 FTAs included in the said study, and 184 
countries the 96 countries used in Baier and Bergstrand’s (2007) and takes into account 
the subsequent period which is not covered by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Also we 
introduced average tariff, relative price term and economic remoteness as three other 
time varying explanatory variables into the model. Therefore our study is complementary 
to the former rather than substitute.   
FIGURE 6.1: ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF REAL EXPORTS FOR 148 COUNTRY PAIRS TRADED UNDER FTA 1997-2005 
Figure 6.1 
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF REAL EXPORTS FOR 148 COUNTRY 
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67 79 FTA is equivalent to  714 bilateral FTAs 
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6.3 ESTIMATION BACKGROUND 
6.3.1 Fixed effect Estimation (FE)  
 
The Gravity model denoted by Eq. (4.1) will be repeatedly used in this analysis subject to 
necessary adjustments for panel context. For notational convenience let Z  denote all the 
explanatory variables present in the model and Z  to denote their time averages. iδ is the 
unobserved effect or unobserved heterogeneity. It is also known as cross-sectional fixed 
effect in the sense that it is fixed to the cross-section and does not vary with time. As our 
cross-sections are country pairs, it would be more appropriate to name iδ as bilateral 
fixed effect. Thus omitting i & j superscripts for convenience the Eq.  (4.1) can be 
rewritten as, 
itiitit uZX ++′= δβ   ……………………………………… (6.6) 
Taking the mean values of both LHS and RHS variables yields  
itiitit uZX ++′= δβ   ……………………………………… (6.7) 
Deducting Eq. (6.7) from Eq. (6.6)  
iitiitiit uuZZXX −+−′=− )(β   
ititit uZX &&&&&& +′= β   ……………………………………… (6.8) 
where )( iitit XXX −=&& , )( iitit ZZZ −=&& and  )( iitit uuu −=&&  Eq. (6.8) is know as demean 
method or within transformation. The beauty of the transformation is that iδ has now 
disappeared. It follows the notion that the unobserved heterogeneity can effectively be 
removed using time demean data in our model. The Table 6.2 shows estimated results for 
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Eq.  (6.8). FE transformation leads to a change in interpretation thus far attributed to FTA 
in Gravity model. Previously coefficient for FTA measured how far above  (below) FTA 
bounded country pair trades among them as compared to the natural level of trade 
predicted by the model for any other pair not bounded by FTA given all other factors 
being equal.  Demean or FE transformation captures the abnormality of trade above 
(below) its mean value both before and after FTA formation. So the FTA coefficient 
measures the causal effect of FTA and deserves the interpretation as the percentage 
change in trade (exports) resulting from the presence of FTA, ceteris paribus, as the 
model is in double log form.  
 
The findings reported in column 1 of Table 6.2 suggest having an FTA results in 2.3% 
increase in the bilateral export of country pair, ceteris paribus. However, 
33.1=DW suggests there could be positive autocorrelation in Eq.  (6.8). As FE estimator 
is generated by OLS techniques it requires idiosyncratic errors itu  (time varying errors) 
to be homoskedastic and serially uncorrelated. i.e. 0),,( 1 =− iiitit ZuuCov δ  
(Wooldridge,2006 p508) Since cross-weights have already been in place to make errors 
homoskedastic, the model was re-estimated adding a lag dependent variable, )ln( 1−tX to 
the RHS to solve for autocorrelation. As a result DW improved to the desired level of 
01.2=DW  and FTA impact is now estimated to be 3.1%, which could be more reliable, 
ceteris paribus. (See column 2 of Table 6.2) Introducing a lag dependent variable as 
regressor makes sense because current year imports68 may depend on previous year 
                                                 
68 Recall the country i’s exports are imports for country j 
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imports as well. Also this can be used to compute long run elasticity, which will be done 
at the end of the chapter.   
 
The average import tariff rate (TAX) also provides an additional control to have unbiased 
estimate for FTA impact. TAX is the average tariff rate applicable to all the countries in 
common whether or not they have FTA. Theoretically, trade volumes should be 
increasing as TAX goes down even in absence of FTA and empirically it is proven 
throughout our study. It follows the notion that the estimated FTA impact is subject to 
omitted variable bias in absence of TAX that has so far been neglected in the literature.  
According to our findings, one percentage point decrease (increase) in TAX increases 
(decrease) bilateral exports by 0.4% ceteris paribus. This would be a promising 
indication for further trade liberalization through FTAs or any other arrangements. This 
follows the idea that bilateral exports would be doubled in ten years time, if a country can 
persuade its trading partner to reduce imports tariffs by 20 percentage points now. Note 
that this is the average tariff rate on imports from all countries but not the rate on bilateral 
imports. (FTA impact cannot be correctly measured if bilateral tariff rate is controlled 
because FTA itself a process of bilateral tariff reduction/removal, while it may include 
many other things)  
 
The fixed effect estimator (FE) allows for any arbitrary correlation between explanatory 
variables and iδ for any time period and therefore any time invariant explanatory variable 
is swept away. For this reason, many variables in the Gravity model (common language, 
common currency, island, landlocked, adjacency) including much needed distance 
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variable disappear. The message is clear. The FE method is good for estimating FTA 
effect and is equally bad for estimating Gravity69. That is the reason we denied using FE 
in chapter IV where our objective was to estimate purely Gravity Model.  
TABLE 6.2: PANEL ESTIMATES FOR AVERAGE TRADE TREATMENT EFFECT OF FTA: FIXED EFFECTS AND RANDOM EFFECT 
Table 6.2 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X)
1 2 3 4
Method
Effects Cross-Fixed Cross-Fixed Cross-Fixed Cross-Random
Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St
CC -15.567 *** -20.72  -  -  -12.286 *** -33.45
YD98 -0.015 *** -6.04 -10.788 *** -13.31 5.775  1.49 0.001  0.48
YD99 -0.080 *** -17.38 -0.078 *** -76.11 -0.062 *** -28.73 -0.074 *** -18.08
YD00 -0.073 *** -10.85 -0.041 *** -7.35 0.003  0.60 -0.031 *** -4.74
YD01 -0.085 *** -9.19 -0.090 *** -17.95 -0.033 *** -6.58 -0.032 *** -3.28
YD02 -0.105 *** -8.42 -0.123 *** -27.21 -0.052 *** -5.01 -0.041 *** -3.62
YD03 -0.069 *** -3.80 -0.098 *** -9.14 -0.009  -0.43 0.008  0.58
YD04 -0.030  -1.22 -0.057 *** -3.19 0.060 * 1.96 0.105 *** 5.89
YD05 -0.003  -0.11 -0.052 ** -2.49 0.080 ** 2.23 0.177 *** 8.13
LOG(GDPi) 1.049 *** 15.35 0.679 *** 11.56  -  - 0.672 *** 21.35
LOG(GDPj) 0.430 *** 14.13 0.303 *** 7.79  -  - 0.585 *** 50.20
LOG(POPi)  -  -  -  - -0.447 *** -3.37  -  -
LOG(POPj)  -  -  -  - 0.104  0.90  -  -
LOG(PRICEi) -1.012 *** -23.68 -0.759 *** -12.47 -0.748 *** -11.96 -0.978 *** -23.80
LOG(PRICEj) 0.573 *** 18.43 0.379 *** 11.38 0.386 *** 10.54 0.341 *** 6.67
TAX -0.004 *** -3.71 -0.004 *** -6.57 -0.005 *** -6.09 -0.008 *** -3.49
LOG(REMOi) -0.183 *** -4.51 -0.225 *** -10.01 -0.404 *** -6.98 -0.130 *** -3.70
LOG(REMOj) -0.470 *** -8.21 -0.452 *** -9.00 -0.564 *** -9.04 -0.141 *** -4.93
FTA 0.023 *** 2.81 0.031 *** 3.91 0.035 *** 4.37 0.111 * 1.82
LOG(X(-1))  - 0.370 *** 7.49 0.380 *** 7.57  -
Adjusted R-sq 0.99 0.99 0.9941 0.12
F-statistic 1196 1409 1346 780
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DW 1.332 2.017 2.022 1.268
T 9 8 8 9
N 9832 9832 9832 9832
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
^^Degrees of freedom corrected
CC   should not be read as overall intercept for FE. It is the intercept for base year











                                                 
69 Time demeaning consumes degrees of freedom, one df  for each cross-section. df=NT-k is not correct in 
FE transformation. Correct df=NT-k-N (As no intercept term is present in FE method  k=num of 
explanatory variables) 
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6.3.1.1 Treatment for Endogenous Variables in Gravity Model 
 
Another issue to address is that one could question the reliability of FTA estimates if any 
of explanatory variables is viewed as endogenous.  The most suspected is the GDPi. If 
there is any feedback effects coming from exports to GDP our estimates are likely to be 
biased. There is no argument that export (more certainly net export) is a part of GDP and 
there prevails an accounting relationship as expressed in terms of well-known GDP 
identity.  
)( MXGICGDP −+++≡  ……………………………………. (6.9) 
 
Nevertheless, X in Eq. (6.9) in the total export whereas the dependent variable in our 







and if the country concerned 
trade with a large number of countries, we can argue that there should not be any 
systematic relationship between ijX  and X . Indeed, ijX  and GDP could have 
accounting relationship only when the country concerned exports to only one country and 
imports from none. All what we know about ijX , X and GDP is that GDPXX ij <≤ in 
magnitude which has nothing to do with the issue being discussed. However, for the 
countries whose net export forms a bigger portion of GDP, and trade with a lesser 
number of countries or highly concentrated on few countries though trade with many, 
there is a possibility of GDP in Gravity model being endogenously determined.   
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Another issue is that FTA dummy itself could be endogenously determined if the two 
countries’ decision to form an FTA is dependent on past trade between them or correlated 
with any other variable present in the model. In fact FTA between two countries is not a 
random occurrence. It should necessarily be related to the macroeconomic variables of 
the two countries. It is too subjective to believe FTA is exogenously determined.  The 
focal question here is whether FTA creating trade or trade creating FTA. 
 
Baier & Bergstrand (2004) shows four major determinates that improves likelihood of an 
FTA for a country pair. Namely (i) bilateral distance (ii) remoteness (iii) similarity in 
economic masses and (iv) difference in capital–labor endowment. As FE transformation 
has already wiped out the distance variable from Eq.  (6.8) we have to care about only 
few other variables. However, our concern is not to see what determines FTA but to see 
whether FTA encounters any endogeneity with variables already present in our model. 
 
Instrument Variable (IV) method which is also known as Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) is the typical econometric solution to endogeneity problem.  On the one hand it is 
very difficult to find good IVs particularly in a macroeconomic setting and on the other 
hand 2SLS is less efficient than OLS when the explanatory variables are indeed 
exogenous. (Wooldridge,2006 p532) Literature provides evidence for failure of 2SLS in 
Gravity models (Frankel, 1997) Rather than using 2SLS method arbitrarily it is important 
to conduct a test for endogeneity to see whether 2SLS is even necessary. Hausman (1978) 
suggested to estimate OLS and 2SLS and to see whether estimates are statistically 
significantly different. The logic behind the Hausman test is that both OLS and 2SLS 
 127
should be consistent if all variables are exogenous. Following Wooldridge (2006) 
procedure we conduct Hausman Test for three endogeneity suspected variables in a 
slightly different manner, whereas the out come would be the same. The structural 
equation denoted by Eq. (6.8) is  




























lnlnlnlnln 0  (6.10) 
In the light of the above discussion GDPi was suspected to be endogenous and was 
written in its reduced from taking all other explanatory variables and two other 
exogenous variables, POPi and Sqareai which are not appearing in Eq. (6.10)   


























lnlnlnln 0  (6.11) 
where POPi and Sqareai are population and the total land area of country i respectively. 
Since each explanatory variable in Eq. (6.11) is uncorrelated with the error term of the 
structural equation ijtu , it can be shown that
i
tGDP can be exogenous if and only if 
ij
tv is   
uncorrelated with ijtu . As we observe neither 
ij
tu  nor 
ij
tv their estimated values would help 
to proceed. Then regressing ijtuˆ on 
ij
tvˆ we tested the null 0=λ in Eq. (6.12) against 
alternative 0≠λ  
ελ += ijtijt vu ˆˆ          (6.12)  
Results strongly rejected the null and GDPi was proved to be endogenously determined. 
)4.94(28.0ˆ −=−= tλ . Following these results GDPi in Eq. (6.11) was replaced with POPi 
(Population of country i) for the second test of endogeneity in FTA. Same test procedure 
was repeated except for the fact that the POPi in the reduced form equation were changed 
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to POPDj (population density of the country j). From the second testλ  was found to be 
not significantly different from zero and hence it was concluded FTA is not endogenous. 
)11.0(01.0ˆ == tλ In fact, this is the expected results because our structural equation does 
not contain factors so far identified as FTA determinants in the literature. 
 
Finally, we tested for endogeneity of POPi (Population of the country i) because of our 
desire to use population as a proxy to get red of GDPi in Eq. (6.8),which is now found to 
be endogenous. The square areas of the two countries were used as the two additional 
exogenous regressors for the third test in the reduced form equation. Testing the 
null 0:0 =λH , POPi was found to be exogenous enabling us to use as a proxy for GDPi 
in Eq. (6.8) )6.0(004.0ˆ == tλ  The full results are not reported for brevity in the body.  
(See Statistical Appendix Table 6(E), 6(F) and 6(G) for the detailed outputs) 
 
According to the Hausman test for endogeneity FTA was decided to be exogenously 
determined.  However, it does not reveal anything about the feedback effect coming from 
the past trade towards FTA. So it is good idea to test whether the past trade of the country 
pair endues them to form an FTA. We created FTA dummy in such a way that all FTAs 
actually signed after the 2nd quarter of the year were allotted to the immediately following 
year. By doing so, any contemporaneous causality between current exports and current 
FTA was ruled out. Thus our concern is whether formation of FTA is dependent on past 
trade. To examine the issue we estimated a Vector Autoregressive [VAR (3)] model 
assuming that FTA, GDPi and X were endogenous while all others variables were 









































































































t XXX 321 ,, −−− based on F 
test (Wooldridge,2006 p660) The results are presented in Table 6.3. As expected the 
findings suggest X does not Granger cause FTA, but FTA Granger causes X. Simply it 
implies, controlled for past FTA, export does not contain valuable information to predict 
the occurrence of an FTA. This finding solves our dilemma concluding FTA leads trade 
but not the past trade leads to FTA. 
 
Regarding bilateral exports, it shows past X is not determining GDPi but the causality 
runs other way round. However this does not help us to understand the contemporaneous 
causality between present X and present GDPi at all. (Wooldridge,2006 p660) Therefore 
the question whether X and GDPi are tenable together is not answered by VAR model 
but we have already concluded that GDPi is endogenous by Hausman test.  Furthermore, 
VAR results show the correlation between both country GDPs and FTA is very close to 
zero but not statistically zero. Consequently, it violates OLS assumption of exogenous 
explanatory variables and the estimate for FTA, which is of our prime interest, is likely to 
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be biased. Taking these two drawbacks in GDPi into account we re-estimated the Eq.  
(6.8) replacing GDP variable with country’s population (POP), which has been 
repeatedly used in literature as a proxy for each country’s economic mass. While POP 
should be highly correlated with GDP, as shown by Hausman test above there is hardly 
any chance POP to be correlated with exports, prices, tax remoteness and other 
explanatory variables. Results are depicted in column 3 of Table 6.2. No surprisingly, 
results are much similar to those in column 3, except for Remoi and Remoj. Even though 
it seems that the previous estimate for FTA impact had not been seriously affected by 
endogenous GDP we rely much on the new result where we estimate ATE of FTA is 
3.5%, which is free from endogeneity bias and slightly improved in significance level as 
well.  




FTA(-1) 0.984 [ 231.824] 0.119 [ 2.68616] -0.004 [-3.70463]
FTA(-2) 0.000 [ 0.06358] -0.092 [-1.25005] 0.003 [ 1.47273]
FTA(-3) -0.001 [-0.16346] 0.050 [ 0.78147] -0.002 [-1.12260]
LOG(X(-1)) 0.000 [ 0.44519] 0.576 [ 139.879] 0.000 [ 0.81642]
LOG(X(-2)) 0.000 [-0.13629] 0.196 [ 41.5984] 0.000 [ 1.56955]
LOG(X(-3)) 0.001 [ 2.52863] 0.165 [ 39.8550] -0.001 [-6.87626]
LOG(GDPi(-1)) 0.023 [ 1.57966] 0.716 [ 4.77725] 1.371 [ 370.510]
LOG(GDPi(-2)) -0.018 [-0.76923] -0.664 [-2.77013] -0.238 [-40.2116]
LOG(GDPi(-3)) -0.006 [-0.45811] -0.003 [-0.02048] -0.134 [-39.3866]
C 0.005 [ 1.15442] -0.867 [-19.5860] 0.019 [ 17.1668]
LOG(GDPj) 0.001 [ 2.54866] 0.046 [ 20.1525] 0.001 [ 9.79304]
LOG(PR IC Ei) 0.002 [ 5.58412] -0.079 [-17.4843] -0.003 [-22.5216]
LOG(PR IC Ej) 0.000 [-0.49247] 0.012 [ 3.20582] 0.000 [ 1.41004]
LOG(REMOi) -0.002 [-6.00720] -0.009 [-3.24850] 0.001 [ 11.0393]
LOG(REMOj) -0.003 [-10.8099] -0.002 [-0.56127] 0.000 [-5.24171]
TAX 0.000 [ 0.43380] -0.002 [-2.95990] 0.000 [-2.40104]
 Adj. R-squared 0.797 0.911 0.990
 Sum sq. resids 524.9 57513.2 35.0
 S.E. equation 0.094 0.988 0.024
 F-statistic 15395.8 40108.5 26648888
 Sample (adjusted): 2000 2005, observations: 58992 
Given within parentheses are t ratios
 Vector Auto regression [VAR(3)] Estimates
Testing  for Causality in Gravity Variables
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6.3.2 Random effect Estimation (RE)  
 
Unlike FE model, Random effect (RE) transformation allows us to keep all time invariant 
variables in the Gravity model. RE estimates for selected variables in our model are given 
in the column 4 of Table 6.2 Yet it is pointless to interpret the results because RE model 
entirely looses the ground in estimating FTA impact for the following reasons. Our initial 
argument that cross-sectional Gravity models fail to estimate FTA impact properly was 
based on the belief that FTA dummy itself is correlated with unobserved heterogeneity. 
In other words we suspected there would be some unobserved factors that concurrently 
affect bilateral trade as well as the two countries’ aspiration to form an FTA.  
 
By default RE requires  iδ  to be uncorrelated with each explanatory variable for all time 
periods. Symbolically, 0),( =iitZCov δ  (Wooldridge, 2006 p494) While all the other 
assumptions are common, this is the crucial assumption that differentiates FE from RE. 
Choice between FE and RE is guided by the Hausman Test (1978) where we test for the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between iδ  and the repressors. 0)(:0 =iti ZEH δ  If 
there is no correlation, in fact, both FE and RE estimates should be equivalent. Hence test 
for the null 0ˆˆ:0 =− REFEH ββ  would be an alternative way. The Hausman Test for Eq.  
(4.1) estimated with RE rejected the null that there is no misspecification. (See the test 
results in Table 6(E) of Statistical Appendix) Hence we cease to interpret the RE 




6.3.3 Panel First Difference 
 
The first difference (FD) approach helps us to look at the same issue in a different angle. 
When FD approach is applied to a double log function it will answer the question what is 
the expected growth rate of trade as a results of a country pair changes its status from 
“without FTA” position to “with FTA” position. Simply, our target is to ascertain how 
the growth rate of bilateral trade is influenced by a formation of FTA.  
 
Analogues to FE method once again let Z to denote all explanatory variables in Gravity 
model (given in Eq.  4.1) and iδ to denote unobserved bilateral fixed effect. As our 
number of periods (T) is relatively small we explicitly introduce time dummies and 
rewrite Eq.  (6.6) as, 
itiitTit uZydydX ++′++++= δβααα 2005..........199821 ……………… (6.14) 
The intercept would be 1α  for the first period, 21 αα + for the second and so on. As 
pointed out before, if δ is correlated with any of the explanatory variables in Z our 
estimates for kββ ....1 would be biased and inconsistent for the reason that Z is going to be 
correlated with the composite error term, )( itiit u+= δυ .As δ is time invariant the first 
differencing over adjacent periods will eliminate δ . The resulting equation would be Eq. 
(6.15) where ∆ is the FD operator and no intercept is present.  
ititTit uZydydX ∆+∆′+∆++∆=∆ βαα 2005..........19982 ………………… (6.15) 
FD transformation causes loosing the very first period and now the time dimension is 
( )1−T .  
 133
As )2005..........1998( 2 ydyd T∆++∆ αα is equivalent to )2005..........1998( 2 ydyd Tαα ++  
Thus Eq. (6.15) can be rewritten as,  
ititTit uZydydX ∆+∆′+++=∆ βαα 2005..........19982 …………………… (6.16) 
However for many reasons, including computation of 2R , it will be important to have an 
intercept term70. (Wooldridge, 2006 p471) Thus letting the second most period dummy to 
take the role of intercept, the Eq. (6.16) can be rewritten for estimation purposes as, 
ititTit uZydydX ∆+∆′++++=∆ βααα 2005..........199920  ………………(6.17) 
Results for Eq.  (6.17) are given in the Table 6.4. For the reasons we discussed above the 
model has been estimated twice replacing GDP with POP, which are reported in column 
1 and 2 respectively. Recall that time invariant Gravity variables once again get vanished 
with FD process. It is impressive to note that FTA impact by FD approach is almost 
equivalent to the previous estimate by FE method. From the FD approach also we arrived 
at the conclusion that, given all other factors remains the same, FTA on average will 
cause bilateral export to grow at 3% to 4% per annum.  
Nevertheless, in Eq.  (6.14) as itu is white noise, FD transformation should create a serial 
correlation in its residuals. Symbolically,  
1−= itit uu λ and itu is white noise if 0=λ  
As 1)1( −−=∆ itit uu λ , the FD error term follows MA(1) process when 0=λ , However 
DW statistics does not show the said serial correlation is so serious to the extent the 
results are invalidated. Even though FD estimate is established to show the results are 
robust in the same way as Baier & Bergstrand (2007) did, it is not even necessary. As this 
is a co-integration regression, our previous results from FE estimate is more reliable than 
                                                 
70 This requirement is a must in certain econometric software 
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FD. As we got same results from both FE and FD, it is so strong that we have no choice 
problem at all!  
TABLE 6.4: PANEL ESTIMATES FOR AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT OF FTA FIRST DIFFERENCE 
Table 6.4 
1 2 3
Coeff t-St Coeff t-St Coeff t-St
CC -0.009 * -1.84 0.017 3.03
YD99 -0.054 *** -38.58 -0.054 *** -37.65
YD00 0.028 *** 16.61 0.040 *** 13.16
YD01 -0.006 *** -5.43 -0.008 *** -12.73
YD02 -0.005  -1.16 -0.005 * -1.74
YD03 0.053 *** 6.53 0.048 *** 7.98 -0.044 *** -9.73
YD04 0.065 *** 8.87 0.078 *** 15.27 0.024 *** 15.92
YD05 0.047 *** 12.94 0.045 *** 21.21 0.042 *** 21.98
∆LOG(GDPi) 0.583 *** 4.36  -  - 1.692 *** 52.39
∆LOG(GDPj) 0.564 *** 2.98  -  - 0.637 *** 19.40
∆LOG(POPi)  -  - -0.129 -0.35  -  -
∆LOG(POPj)  -  - -0.242 -0.72  -  -
∆LOG(PRICEi) -0.950 *** -17.63 -0.897 *** -17.17 -0.651 *** -61.99
∆LOG(PRICEj) 0.440 *** 12.84 0.455 *** 12.73 0.331 *** 12.79
∆LOG(TAX) -0.002 *** -4.44 -0.003 *** -4.70 -0.408 *** -5.01
∆LOG(REMOi) -0.260 *** -3.24 -0.306 *** -3.17 -0.712 *** -26.05
∆LOG(REMOj) -0.367 *** -5.40 -0.467 *** -7.11 -0.009 *** -6.80
∆FTA 0.031 *** 3.04 0.037 *** 3.70  -  -
∆FTA(-5)  -  -  -  - 0.013 *** 3.66
Adjusted R-sq 0.141 0.128 0.38
F-statistic 860.8 770.7 1778.4
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.0000
Durbin-Watson stat 2.3 2.3 2.17
T 8 8 3
N 9832 9832 9832
*** Significant at 1 ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Dependent Variable: ∆LOG(X)





There are many factors contributing to the slow progress of FTA. Firstly, FTA 
implementation process may follow a sluggish growth in many cases due to institutional 
inefficiencies, conflicts in interests and changes in political environment or leadership of 
the participating countries, and numerous other factors which are hardly controllable in a 
quantitative analysis. Secondly, the countries forming FTAs without proper assessment 
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on potential level of trade and comparative advantage of trade are accountable for 
relatively low ATE. This could happen when decision to form an FTA is driven by mere 
political desires rather than much important economic considerations.  
 
More importantly, forming an FTA itself is a critical exercise that needs many 
considerations. FTA could be both welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing for any 
individual country. For example, the sum of the revenue gains from increased market 
access for export for domestic producers, technological improvements, the welfare gains 
to the domestic consumers in terms of the reduced commodity prices and wider access to 
verities of imported products sometimes could be less than the disadvantages arising from 
devastated domestic industries, loosing employments, social welfare facilities curtailed 
due to loss of government tax revenue etc. More importantly, if FTA goes beyond trade 
and investment touching upon country’s more sensitive areas such as environment, 
natural resources, biodiversity, intellectual property rights, research & development, 
culture and health etc, that might result irreversible  and far-reaching negative effects on 
community as a whole for generations if not handled carefully.  
 
For the above reasons no country agrees upon initiating an FTA straight away in one 
shot. Instead FTAs are usually phrased out for 5 to 10 years, or perhaps more than that.  
If that is the case FD estimates for FTA impact is questionable because taking ∆FTA is 
equivalent to introduce a new dummy, which is 1 for the year of entry into FTA, 0 for all 
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other years. In short, under FD method we evaluate the very first year “with FTA” 
against the previous year “without FTA”71.   
 
It is reasonable to argue the initial year impact does not show the true average impact 
because the FTA is not matured enough. Averaging over to maturity (up to the point fully 
phrased out) would be a good idea if individual FTAs are evaluated, which is not tenable 
in our study. Alternatively, we differentiate FTA dummy at its fifth lag straightaway to 
see the impact of five year old FTA. Results are reported in the column 3 of Table 6.4. 
By contrast to our expectation that a five-year-old FTA should be contributing to the 
export growth more than just one-year-old FTA does, the results show that controlled for 
other factors a five year old FTA on average causes only 1.3% growth in bilateral exports 
per annum.  In terms of methodology how we arrived at this figure would be fine. But the 
problem is that these results are based on just 30 FTAs. (See the list of FTAs given in 
Table 1(B) in Descriptive Appendix, 49/79 FTA are below 5 year in age) Further, 
suppose we wanted to assess the FTAs, which are fully phased out, for example 10 year 
old. We will be left with only 16 FTAs. This data deficiency problem cannot be 
overcome unless the present study is delayed for another 10 year. Alternatively we can 
use the estimated short-run elasticity and the lag effect of export to compute long-run 
elasticity and predict the future subject to some certain assumptions. 
 
                                                 
71 This may be not the case when trade data is taken with 2 year or 5 year intervals. From theoretical point 
of view taking 5 year intervals would be a better approach to evaluate FTA impact as we want to see the 
variation in trade clear enough. However, when all FTA formed within 5 year interval is bunched together 
and assigned to the immediately following year, we really do not know the estimated impact actually 
coming all the way from 5 year old FTAs or just 1 year old FTAs. 
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With reference to the column 3 of Table 6.2, giving the most reliable estimates for the 
reasons discussed throughout this chapter, the short run elasticity for FTA is 
035.0=η and the lag effect of export is 38.0=λ   
Accordingly the long-run elasticity is 05645.0
38.01
035.0 =−=LRβ  
Controlled for other factors,  
εηλ ++= − FTAXX tt 1  
εηλ +=− − FTAXX tt 1  
εηλ +=− FTAXL t)1(  
εηλ +−= − FTALXt 1)1(  
εηλλλ +++= FTALLLX nnt ).....1( 22  
where, L is the lag operator , 035.0=η and 38.0=λ it yields, 
εληληληη +++= nnt LFTALFTALFTAFTAX ....... 22  
ε+++= nnt LLLX )38.00(035.0.....)38.0(035.0)38.0(035.0035.0 22  
ε+++= −−− ntnttt XXXX )38.00(035.0.....)38.0(035.0)38.0(035.0035.0 221  
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FIGURE 6.2: LONG RUN ELASTICITY OF FTA 
Figure 6.2 
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LONG RUN ELASTICITY OF FTA
 
 
It can be shown that the shot-run elasticity of 035.0=η is the immediate impact of FTA 
on exports while long run elasticity computed above 05645.0=LRβ in the cumulative 
effect of FTA up to 9 years, which dies away thereafter. This does not mean the 
maximum gain resulted from FTA is 5.6% increase in export after 9 years against the 
status quo. We could have made that conclusion only if all the FTA included in the study 
had been fully phased-out within first year of implementation, which is not true. It only 
shows the average picture of the increase in export due to a country pair switching from 
“without FTA position” to “with FTA position”.  
 
Among the 715 FTAs included in this study, the initial stage trade liberalization for many 
FTAs was found to be not more than 10%-15% of the total liberalization they agreed 
upon. If we reasonably assume only 1/10 of liberalization was implemented in the first 
stage, the FTA dummy (1, 0) would have captured, possibly, only 1/10 of the full impact. 
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Based on this argument, some kind of simulation is possible subject to the assumptions 
that,  
(a) Above elasticities were computed based on the first stage linearization of 10 
year equally phased out FTAs 
(b) Remaining 9 stages will be implemented with annual frequencies 
(c) All other factors are controlled  
Figure 6.3 simulates growth of export volume, for example staring from 100 prior to 
FTA, which could have increased roughly by 72% after all phases are implemented and 
long-run effect fully absorbed after 19 years.  
 
It is even meaningless to ask in how many years it would take trade to be doubled 
without knowing within how many years FTA will be fully phased out and the time lag 
from one phase to the other. Nevertheless, if a country pair committed to liberalize trade 
in such a way that they maintain initial year trade growth (4%) constant, and then we can 
conclude the bilateral export will be doubled only after18-19 years for a country pair 
forming an FTA now, given all else unchanged.  
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Y-1 Y-2 Y-3 Y-4 Y-5 Y-6 Y-7 Y-8 Y-9 Y-10 Y-11 Y-12 Y-13 Y-14 Y-15 Y-16 Y-17 Y-18 Y-19 Y-20 Y-21 Y-22
Phase-1 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Phase-2 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Phase-3 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Phase-4 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Phase-5 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Phase-6 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Phase-7 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Phase-8 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Phase-9 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Phase-10 0.03500 0.01330 0.00505 0.00192 0.00073 0.00028 0.00011 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Total 0.03500 0.04830 0.05335 0.05527 0.05600 0.05628 0.05639 0.05643 0.05644 0.05645 0.02145 0.00815 0.00310 0.00118 0.00045 0.00017 0.00006 0.00002 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000





















SIMULATION OF EXPORT GROWTH FOR A COUNTRY ENTERING INTO TEN YEAR PHASED-OUT FTA 





In the previous chapter we concluded that ATE of FTA is 3%-4% per annum meaning 
that controlled for other factors and assuming a constant growth rate, the bilateral 
export will be doubled only after18-19 years for a country pair forming an FTA now. 
In this chapter we conduct a number of sensitivity analyses in order to assure the 
robustness of our ATE estimate.   
============================================================= 
7.1 SENSITIVITY TEST-1 
Until now our analysis was based on bilateral exports, which is a one way trade flow. 
It is a good idea to see whether ATE is different when tested for total bilateral trade, 
(X+M) where exports and imports summed together. There is no change in the testing 
procedure except for now we change the dependent variable in Eq.  (6.8) and Eq. 
(6.17) as follows to have panel FE and FD estimates as follows.  
ititit uZT &&&&&& +′= β           (7.1) 
ititTit uZydydT ∆+∆′++++=∆ βααα 2005..........199920   (7.2) 




The expected signs for the coefficients should remain same as before with only one 
exception to the relative price terms. The expected signs for prices are 0<priceiβ  and 
0>pricejβ  when X is the dependent variable because the export volume should be 
negatively related to own price and positively related to the prices of substitute goods. 
By contrast X+M should depend negatively on the both country prices.  
 
Column 1 and 2 of the Table7.1 shows the FE and FD estimates respectively. Column 
3 presents FD estimates for a supplementary regression replacing GDP with POP. It is 
not even necessary in the present scenario because there is hardly any chance for 
(X+M) to be correlated with individual country’s GDP. It is amazing to note that 
ATE of FTA is 3%-4% which is exactly the same estimate we received earlier taking 
exports alone into account.   
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TABLE 7.1: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT OF FTA ON TOTAL BILATERAL TRADE 
Table 7.1 
Dependent Variable: Model (1) LOG(X+M)
Dependent Variable: Model (2) and (3) ∆LOG(X+M)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights) FE & FD
1 2 3
Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St
C -23.55 *** -19.59 C -0.01 ** -2.11 C 0.03 *** 4.95
YD98 -0.02 *** -10.14   
YD99 -0.09 *** -23.05 YD99 -0.05 *** -29.39 YD99 -0.05 *** -23.04
YD00 -0.10 *** -15.14 YD00 0.02 *** 3.49 YD00 0.04 *** 7.98
YD01 -0.15 *** -17.52 YD01 -0.03 *** -22.24 YD01 -0.04 *** -42.20
YD02 -0.19 *** -16.61 YD02 -0.01  -1.63 YD02 -0.02 *** -2.82
YD03 -0.18 *** -10.54 YD03 0.06 *** 3.50 YD03 0.05 *** 3.56
YD04 -0.16 *** -6.90 YD04 0.06 *** 4.48 YD04 0.08 *** 8.11
YD05 -0.15 *** -5.54 YD05 0.04 *** 6.09 YD05 0.04 *** 6.91
LOG(GDPi) 1.07 *** 20.04 ∆LOG(GDPi) 0.87 *** 7.13 ∆LOG(POPi) -0.45 * -1.76
LOG(GDPj) 1.26 *** 26.31 ∆LOG(GDPj) 0.96 *** 7.43 ∆LOG(POPj) -0.54 ** -2.25
LOG(PRICEi) -0.22 *** -12.87 ∆LOG(PRICEi) -0.29 *** -6.34 ∆LOG(PRICEi) -0.24 *** -6.00
LOG(PRICEj) -0.24 *** -12.63 ∆LOG(PRICEj) -0.31 *** -5.76 ∆LOG(PRICEj) -0.24 *** -5.78
TAX -0.01 *** -9.00 ∆TAX 0.00 *** -2.94 ∆TAX 0.00 *** -2.73
LOG(REMOi) -0.26 *** -17.18 ∆LOG(REMOi) -0.28 *** -5.10 ∆LOG(REMOi) -0.36 *** -5.20
LOG(REMOj) -0.18 *** -10.79 ∆LOG(REMOj) -0.23 *** -3.05 ∆LOG(REMOj) -0.34 *** -4.92
FTA 0.03 *** 2.66 ∆FTA 0.03 *** 2.80 ∆FTA 0.04 *** 3.28
Adj R-squared 0.99 0.11 0.07
F-statistic 1585 322 208
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Durbin-W 1.23 2.20 2.17
T 9 8 8
N 4936 4936 4936
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
White cross-section standard  errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT OF FTA ON TOTAL BILATERAL TRADE
 
 
7.2 SENSITIVITY TEST-2 
We may carry out another sensitivity test replacing the PPP adjusted GDP and Trade 
data so far used with constant price data. Nevertheless we still stick to our initial 
argument that constant price valued data are not appropriate to ascertain FTA impact 
in a cross-sectional Gravity model.   On contrary Panel cross-sectional FE or FD 
approach should produce consistent estimates for FTA impact regardless of the fact 
that data is PPP adjusted or constant price valued. The reason is that both differentiate 
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data along its time dimension72.  There is no change either in model or estimating 
techniques except for including a lag dependant variable in the FE model to eliminate 
serial autocorrelation. The lag dependant variable was removed from the FD estimate 
as it may lead to violate strict exogeneity condition.   
TABLE 7.2: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT OF FTA WITH CONSTANT PRICED DATA 
Table 7.2 
Dependent Variable: Model (1) LOG(CONX)
Dependent Variable: Model (2) ∆(LOG(CONX)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights) FE & FD
1 2
Coef t-St Coef t-St
C -5.51 -10.51 C 0.00 -1.19
YD99 -0.06 -21.44 YD99 -0.06 -38.50
YD00 -0.01 -0.92 YD00 0.03 8.08
YD01 -0.03 -3.15 YD01 0.00 -2.15
YD02 -0.04 -3.41 YD02 0.00 -0.67
YD03 0.01 0.36 YD03 0.06 5.85
YD04 0.03 1.45 YD04 0.08 9.93
YD05 0.01 0.69 YD05 0.05 11.72
LOG(CONGDPi) 0.48 9.58 ∆LOG(CONGDPi) 0.79 25.81
LOG(CONGDPj) 0.02 1.54 ∆LOG(CONGDPj) 0.14 5.03
LOG(PRICEi) -0.39 -6.17 ∆LOG(PRICEi) -0.74 -10.30
LOG(PRICEj) 0.36 8.97 ∆LOG(PRICEj) 0.33 14.98
TAX 0.00 -6.74 ∆TAX 0.00 -5.18
LOG(REMOi) -0.33 -4.62 ∆LOG(REMOi) -0.19 -2.05
LOG(REMOj) -0.54 -8.88 ∆LOG(REMOj) -0.44 -7.42
FTA 0.03 3.82 ∆FTA 0.04 4.09
LOG(CONX(-1)) 0.39 7.39






White cross-section standard  errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)




                                                 
72 If the between method is used in place of within method, the  results based on constant price valued 
data would be less meaningful     
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As per the results depicted in the Table 7.2 it can be shown once again that ATE of 
FTA is between 3%-4% as estimated by FE and FD methods respectively regardless 
of the fact the PPP or constant price data used.  
 
7.3 SENSITIVITY TEAST-3  
We have systematically shown that FTA impact so far has not generated 
overwhelming impact of participating countries’ bilateral trade either in terms of 
exports or total trade with two different sets of data based on PPP and constant price. 
We hereby show very similar results that will further ensure the robustness of our 
previous findings in terms of average bilateral trade [(X+M)/2)]. Keeping all else 
unchanged, the dependent variables of Eq.  (7.1) and Eq.  (7.2) need to be adjusted 
accordingly. No need to mention that expected signs for price terms should be 
negative for the reasons we explain in the first paragraph.  
ititit uZTA &&&&&& +′= β           (7.3) 
ititTit uZydydAT ∆+∆′++++=∆ βααα 2005..........199920  (7.4) 
where, 
( ) 2/MXAT += , which is average bilateral trade and TA && is demeaned 
average bilateral trade. 
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TABLE 7.3: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT OF FTA ON AVERAGE BILATERAL TRADE 
Table 7.3 
Dependent Variable: Model (1) LOG((X+M)/2)
Dependent Variable: Model (2) ∆LOG(X+M)/2
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights) FE & FD
1 2
Coef t-St Coef t-St
C -15.14 -9.61 C -0.01 -2.11
YD99 -0.08 -42.01 YD99 -0.05 -29.39
YD00 -0.05 -5.69 YD00 0.02 3.49
YD01 -0.13 -15.96 YD01 -0.03 -22.24
YD02 -0.16 -18.83 YD02 -0.01 -1.63
YD03 -0.14 -16.36 YD03 0.06 3.50
YD04 -0.11 -8.39 YD04 0.06 4.48
YD05 -0.12 -8.55 YD05 0.04 6.09
LOG(GDPi) 0.65 9.01 ∆LOG(GDPi) 0.87 7.13
LOG(GDPj) 0.75 9.76 ∆LOG(GDPj) 0.96 7.43
LOG(PRICEi) -0.18 -6.83 ∆LOG(PRICEi) -0.29 -6.34
LOG(PRICEj) -0.18 -6.92 ∆LOG(PRICEj) -0.31 -5.76
TAX 0.00 -7.01 ∆TAX 0.00 -2.94
LOG(REMOi) -0.24 -21.72 ∆LOG(REMOi) -0.28 -5.10
LOG(REMOj) -0.19 -18.34 ∆LOG(REMOj) -0.23 -3.05
FTA 0.02 2.13 ∆FTA 0.03 2.80
LOG((X(-1)+M(-1))/2) 0.46 8.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.996 Adjusted R-squared 0.109
F-statistic 1907 F-statistic 322




White cross-section standard  errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)




7.4 SENSITIVITY TEST-4 
Nevertheless, once again there could be a concern of endogeneity of GDPi appearing 
in the RHS. Therefore it is would be a good idea to move GDPi to the LHS. Now the 
dependent variable carries a different meaning as the bilateral exports as a 
percentage of GDP when only exports are taken into account [X/GDPi]. Similarly, 
nothing prevents us taking total trade as a percentage of GDP as [(X+M)/GDPi). A 
lag dependant variable was added FE model to eliminate serial correlation. The 
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results arising from both approaches are given in Table 7.4 Not surprisingly ATE of 
FTA is not overwhelming. It is only 3% supporting our previous findings.  
TABLE 7.4: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT OF FTA ON THE FLOW OF EXPORT DEFINED AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
Table 7.4 
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights) Cross FE (Demean)
1 2
Coef t-St Coef t-St
C -10.24 -13.97 -13.49 -10.46
YD99 -0.08 -58.51 -0.07 -43.89
YD00 -0.04 -6.06 -0.04 -5.35
YD01 -0.08 -12.49 -0.12 -14.49
YD02 -0.12 -24.74 -0.15 -19.55
YD03 -0.09 -10.48 -0.13 -20.84
YD04 -0.05 -3.58 -0.10 -10.58
YD05 -0.04 -2.32 -0.10 -9.75
LOG(GDPj) 0.30 7.87 0.75 9.93
LOG(PRICEi) -0.76 -11.72 -0.16 -5.74
LOG(PRICEj) 0.38 11.87 -0.18 -6.84
TAX 0.00 -6.41 0.00 -6.90
LOG(REMOi) -0.21 -7.27 -0.24 -19.16
LOG(REMOj) -0.45 -8.95 -0.18 -18.34
FTA 0.03 3.98 0.03 2.27
LOG(X(-1)/(GDPi(-1)) 0.36 7.57           -           -
LOG(X(-1)+M(-1))/(GDPi(-1))          -          - 0.46 8.14






White cross-section standard  errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Dependent Variable:Model (1)=LOG(X/GDPi)
Dependent Variable:Model (2)=LOG((X+M)/GDPi)
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT OF FTA ON THE FLOW OF 




7.5 SENSITIVITY TEST-5 
Notwithstanding our attempt to have a reasonable estimate for the ATE of FTA, still 
one criticism is possible. As both FE and FD methods wipe out all time-invariant 
variables it can be immediately seen that any FTA that has been in existence 
throughout the study period is also wiped out. This is unfortunate because they are the 
oldest and most matured FTAs, which should have the highest impact on trade 
theoretically. Of course one can claim we have deliberately underestimated ATE of 
FTA tactically removing the most matured FTAs from the study. To get rid of the 
criticism one more test is due. 
 
Now we reduce the sample removing all country pairs that formed FTAs subsequent 
to the initial year of the study. Then the resulting sample contains 9275 pairs 
differentiable into two kinds. One is those who traded under FTA throughout the 
study period. The other is those who never had FTA throughout the study period. To 
see the impact clearly we consider two time periods (1997 and 2005), which are 
adequately far away from each other. With two period panel data the Difference-in-
Difference Estimator (Wooldridge, 2006 pxxxx) can be employed as the estimating 
techniques. To make Difference-in-Difference method possible we need redefine 






years 8last for  FTA an  havingpair  if 1
FTA  
Once FTA dummy is redefined in that way, we recap all FTAs which had been 
previously wiped out by FD and FE transformation except for six FTAs which are too 
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old descending from 1960s. Moving back we rewrite the equation Eq.  (6.6) for 1997 
and 2005 as 
199719971997 iiii uZcX ++′+= δβ      (7.5) 
200520052005 05 iiii uZydcX ++′++= δβρ     (7.6) 
where, Z denotes all explanatory variables as in the Gravity model Eq. (4.1) including 
redefined FTA dummy. Note that variables are in logarithms though Ln notation is 
omitted.  
Subtracting Eq. (6.18) from Eq. (6.19) yields, 
iii uZydX ∆+∆′+=∆ βρ 05       (7.7) 
The bilateral heterogeneity, iδ  is now removed. ρ  in Eq.  (7.7) measures the natural 
increase in trade for all countries between the two time periods  despite the  fact that 
they had FTAs or not. Then controlled for other factors the coefficient for FTA 
dummy included in Z should measure the impact of eight years FTA on bilateral 
exports. The results obtained by estimating Eq.  (7.7) by OLS are reported in Table 
7.5. For the reasons we discussed regarding endogeneity in the previous chapter GDP 
was replaced by POP to have a secondary estimate. It can be shown that in both cases 
ftaβ is not significantly different from zero at any significance level up to 9% while 
all other variables appear in the expected sign and are highly significant. This finding 
helps us to assert there is no significant contribution from the 8 years old FTAs to the 
growth of export of the current period and therefore evaporating them out in the 
previous FE and FD methods has not undermined true value of ATE. In short there is 
no manipulation in our ATE estimate for FTA. 
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Coef t-St Coef t-St
yd05 0.02 0.30 0.19 3.50
∆logGDPi 1.36 11.70   -   -
∆logGDPj 0.20 1.90   -   -
∆logPOPi   -   - 0.35 1.15
∆logPOPj   -   - 0.48 2.12
∆logPricei -1.17 -14.67 -1.02 -11.67
∆logPricej 0.91 10.77 0.97 11.42
∆logRemoi -0.38 -3.73 -0.68 -6.82
∆logRemoj -0.30 -2.31 -0.43 -3.21
∆TAX -0.01 -2.91 -0.01 -2.25
∆FTA -0.06 -1.00 -0.10 -1.64





Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance 
ATE of FTA   Difference in Difference Estimator for Two 





After a number of sensitivity tests we robustly conclude that ATE of FTA is 3%-4% 
per annum meaning that controlled for other factors and assuming a constant growth 
rate, the bilateral export will be doubled only after18-19 years for a country pair 
forming an FTA now. This is roughly half the rate and almost double the period 
predicted by Baier and Bergstrand (2007).  
 
However, there is a hidden possibility of accelerating this rate a bit further. All our 
findings showed that the coefficient for average tax rate is significantly negative and 
varies from 0.004 to 0.01 in magnitude. This implies a percentage point decline in 
import tariff rate is expected to yield 0.4 % to 1% growth in Trade. The prediction is 
that FTA impact could be magnified if trade negotiations are directed to have 
considerably large reductions in existing import tariffs.   
 
In connection to TC and TD effects of RTB we find mixed results where the intra-
bloc trade of NAFTA and ASEAN is overwhelming while that of EU and DR-
CAFTA is moderate. On the other hand, the intra-bloc trade of EFTA is negative 
whereas the effects are insignificant for SAARC and CARICOM. These findings go 




Although these findings show most of RTBs are gross trade-creating, only NAFTA 
and ASEAN were found to be net creating for the world. All the other examined blocs 
show no evidence for either TC or TD with only exception that EU is marginally 
trade diverting. These findings are not much different from the literature and if there 
is any difference it is not more than what can be explained by the differences in time 
periods concerned.   
 
As this study being the first to address the RTBs and FTAs interactive effect on 
bilateral trade flows, findings are not comparable with any pervious study. In Capter-
V we considered whether an outsider entering into a RTB through an FTA, gains 
from the FTA or at least FTA helps to recover any trade diversionary effect resulting 
from RTB’ efforts to  exploit the outsiders’ market for his own benefits. RTB and 
FTA interactive effects suggest that trading “with an FTA” is always more beneficial 
for both parties than trading “without an FTA”, though the benefits are not equally 
distributed.  
 
Countries trading with EU were found to be adversely exploited by EU countries for 
their own benefits, rather than mutual, in absence of FTA. But it was found that such 
countries can effectively reverse their adverse position if they form an FTA with EU, 
even though bigger portion of benefits are still going to EU itself.  A very similar 
observation can be made regarding the countries trading with NAFTA though 
different in magnitude of effects. NAFTA being a highly integrated trading bloc, FTA 
has been a must not to loose from trading with NAFTA. On contrast, ASEAN shows 
 153
that the bloc is open for more trade with outsider countries with or without FTA but 
both parties can gain more benefits if connected by an FTA. However, the impact of 
ASEAN is mostly dominated by Singapore contribution to trade and trade 
liberalization process rather than showing the overall picture of ASEAN.    
 
The gain from an FTA with EFTA is marginal for both parties but better compared to 
the doing without. Finally, DR-CAFTA countries substantially gain from FTA with 
outsider countries, while outsider countries also mutually, but unequally, benefited 
from FTA with DR-CAFTA.  
 
The bottom line is that trading “with an FTA” is always more beneficial for both 
parties than trading “without an FTA”, though the mutual benefits are unequal.  
 
7.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND SCOPE FOR FUTURE WORK 
Major limitation of the study comes from the binary dummy assigned to FTA, which 
gives equal weight to all FTAs despite of the level of progress of each FTA. To 
minimize this drawback we experimented with age of the FTA but the attempt was 
not successful. It is good idea for future work to evaluate individual country / area 
specific FTAs, rather than all in common. Also the FTAs we used in our study are not 
matured enough to see the full impact. Therefore we were compelled to interpret the 




Further, it is difficult to differentiate FTA impact precisely when bilateral trade data 
are highly aggregated. For a micro level study, it would be a good starting point to 
collect data in terms of commodities and categorize trade flows as those covered by 
FTA and not covered by FTAs.     
 
In both cases where we estimated ATE of FTA and FTA interactive effect with RTB, 
we referred to “increase in export or generally trade’’ as impact of FTA, which is 
incomplete. Another consideration left for future work is welfare effect of FTA, 
which is different from pure trade effect.  
 
Finally, we worked on the assumption that FTA itself is exogenously given. Even 
though the econometrics tests confirmed exogeneity of FTA, it only means that FTA 
is exogenous to the variables present in the model. By no means had it implied FTAs 
are exogenous to the economy. Therefore, it would be a good idea to incorporate FTA 
as an endogenously determined variable to a system of equation, and estimate FTA 
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Heteroskedasticity Test: White 1997
F-statistic 15.0586     Prob. F(43,9788) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 610.0724     Prob. Chi-Square(43) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:21
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 5.5779 1.0357 5.3856 0.0000
(LOG(GDPGDP))^2 -0.0077 0.0012 -6.4506 0.0000
(LOG(DISRAD))^2 0.0692 0.0089 7.7862 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEX))^2 0.2440 0.0748 3.2627 0.0011
(LOG(PRICEY))^2 0.0451 0.0209 2.1554 0.0312
(LOG(TAX))^2 -0.0740 0.0375 -1.9736 0.0485
(LOG(REMOX))^2 0.0236 0.0339 0.6960 0.4864
(LOG(REMOY))^2 -0.0182 0.0194 -0.9387 0.3479
FTA^2 -4.3533 0.9491 -4.5866 0.0000
BORDER^2 0.4067 0.5328 0.7634 0.4453
COLONY^2 -0.0697 0.4855 -0.1437 0.8858
LANGUE^2 0.2719 0.4005 0.6788 0.4973
LBX^2 -0.5260 0.4194 -1.2540 0.2099
LBY^2 -0.0862 0.2711 -0.3182 0.7504
ASIAN^2 -1.1833 0.7813 -1.5145 0.1299
DCAFTA^2 -1.4744 1.1484 -1.2839 0.1992
EC^2 0.2556 0.4809 0.5315 0.5951
NAFTA^2 1.0573 1.3053 0.8100 0.4180
EFTA^2 -2.1360 0.5224 -4.0890 0.0000
SAARC^2 0.1382 1.8098 0.0763 0.9392
WTO^2 -1.4435 0.6390 -2.2591 0.0239
R-squared 0.0621     Mean dependent var 4.6314
Adjusted R-squared 0.0579     S.D. dependent var 8.7338
S.E. of regression 8.4771    Akaike info criterion 7.1171
Sum squared resid 703377.3000    Schwarz criterion 7.1493
Log likelihood -34943.5600    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.1280
F-statistic 15.0586    Durbin-Watson stat 1.8391




Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –IV 
Table 4(B) 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White 1998
F-statistic 17.2244     Prob. F(43,9788) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 691.6417     Prob. Chi-Square(43) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:19
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.4620 1.0542 4.2326 0.0000
(LOG(GDPGDP))^2 -0.0071 0.0012 -5.8259 0.0000
(LOG(DISRAD))^2 0.0718 0.0087 8.2185 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEX))^2 0.2979 0.0717 4.1543 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEY))^2 0.0338 0.0263 1.2838 0.1993
(LOG(TAX))^2 -0.0324 0.0354 -0.9150 0.3602
(LOG(REMOX))^2 0.0504 0.0342 1.4729 0.1408
(LOG(REMOY))^2 -0.0196 0.0192 -1.0242 0.3058
FTA^2 -3.8188 0.9186 -4.1572 0.0000
BORDER^2 0.4439 0.5469 0.8118 0.4169
COLONY^2 -0.2865 0.3648 -0.7854 0.4322
LANGUE^2 -0.1345 0.3974 -0.3383 0.7351
LBX^2 -0.6335 0.4204 -1.5069 0.1319
LBY^2 0.0734 0.2689 0.2729 0.7849
ASIAN^2 -1.9569 0.6351 -3.0814 0.0021
DCAFTA^2 -1.5150 0.8959 -1.6910 0.0909
EC^2 0.2488 0.4625 0.5380 0.5906
NAFTA^2 0.8932 1.3026 0.6857 0.4929
EFTA^2 -1.9310 0.5868 -3.2906 0.0010
SAARC^2 0.4491 2.1514 0.2088 0.8346
WTO^2 -1.0720 0.6392 -1.6772 0.0935
R-squared 0.0703     Mean dependent var 4.6212
Adjusted R-squared 0.0663     S.D. dependent var 8.9577
S.E. of regression 8.6558    Akaike info criterion 7.1588
Sum squared resid 733348.0000    Schwarz criterion 7.1910
Log likelihood -35148.6900    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.1697
F-statistic 17.2244    Durbin-Watson stat 1.8358








Heteroskedasticity Test: White 1999
F-statistic 17.7142     Prob. F(43,9788) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 709.8917     Prob. Chi-Square(43) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:17
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.9229 1.0020 4.9131 0.0000
(LOG(GDPGDP))^2 -0.0076 0.0011 -7.1162 0.0000
(LOG(DISRAD))^2 0.0649 0.0084 7.7688 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEX))^2 0.2724 0.0738 3.6919 0.0002
(LOG(PRICEY))^2 0.0437 0.0215 2.0295 0.0424
(LOG(TAX))^2 -0.0223 0.0358 -0.6244 0.5324
(LOG(REMOX))^2 0.0409 0.0303 1.3510 0.1767
(LOG(REMOY))^2 -0.0040 0.0172 -0.2344 0.8147
FTA^2 -3.7728 0.7703 -4.8977 0.0000
BORDER^2 0.4092 0.5358 0.7638 0.4450
COLONY^2 -0.2548 0.3536 -0.7206 0.4712
LANGUE^2 0.4724 0.4008 1.1787 0.2385
LBX^2 -0.9339 0.3835 -2.4354 0.0149
LBY^2 -0.2852 0.2132 -1.3377 0.1810
ASIAN^2 -1.1283 0.6069 -1.8589 0.0631
DCAFTA^2 -1.0403 1.0646 -0.9771 0.3285
EC^2 -0.1772 0.4505 -0.3934 0.6941
NAFTA^2 0.7991 1.3455 0.5939 0.5526
EFTA^2 -2.2597 0.4968 -4.5483 0.0000
SAARC^2 1.2396 1.7407 0.7121 0.4764
WTO^2 -1.3613 0.6095 -2.2336 0.0255
R-squared 0.0722     Mean dependent var 4.4187
Adjusted R-squared 0.0681     S.D. dependent var 8.1320
S.E. of regression 7.8501    Akaike info criterion 6.9634
Sum squared resid 603184.0000    Schwarz criterion 6.9956
Log likelihood -34188.1100    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.9743
F-statistic 17.7142    Durbin-Watson stat 1.8368





Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –IV 
Table 4(D) 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White 2000
F-statistic 15.6512     Prob. F(43,9788) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 632.5367     Prob. Chi-Square(43) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:14
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.9554 1.4314 3.4620 0.0005
(LOG(GDPGDP))^2 -0.0062 0.0012 -5.1882 0.0000
(LOG(DISRAD))^2 0.0591 0.0084 7.0567 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEX))^2 0.3032 0.0812 3.7344 0.0002
(LOG(PRICEY))^2 0.0117 0.0162 0.7195 0.4719
(LOG(TAX))^2 -0.0445 0.0340 -1.3089 0.1906
(LOG(REMOX))^2 0.0417 0.0313 1.3314 0.1831
(LOG(REMOY))^2 0.0277 0.0201 1.3756 0.1690
FTA^2 -2.8499 0.8702 -3.2750 0.0011
BORDER^2 -0.2045 0.3950 -0.5178 0.6046
COLONY^2 -0.4748 0.2937 -1.6164 0.1060
LANGUE^2 0.4897 0.4147 1.1806 0.2378
LBX^2 -0.9621 0.4292 -2.2418 0.0250
LBY^2 -0.4769 0.2422 -1.9694 0.0489
ASIAN^2 -0.7947 0.6200 -1.2817 0.2000
DCAFTA^2 -0.8618 0.9660 -0.8921 0.3724
EC^2 -0.3338 0.4549 -0.7338 0.4631
NAFTA^2 -0.3289 1.0922 -0.3011 0.7633
EFTA^2 -2.3709 0.5131 -4.6211 0.0000
SAARC^2 2.3456 2.0027 1.1712 0.2415
WTO^2 -1.8817 1.2667 -1.4855 0.1374
R-squared 0.0643     Mean dependent var 4.3037
Adjusted R-squared 0.0602     S.D. dependent var 8.5949
S.E. of regression 8.3321    Akaike info criterion 7.0826
Sum squared resid 679523.8000    Schwarz criterion 7.1148
Log likelihood -34773.9500    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.0935
F-statistic 15.6512    Durbin-Watson stat 1.8519
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Heteroskedasticity Test: White 2001
F-statistic 15.2790     Prob. F(47,9784) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 672.2925     Prob. Chi-Square(47) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:11
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.8543 1.0121 4.7964 0.0000
(LOG(GDPGDP))^2 -0.0073 0.0012 -6.0382 0.0000
(LOG(DISRAD))^2 0.0543 0.0082 6.6280 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEX))^2 0.3141 0.0743 4.2251 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEY))^2 0.0157 0.0194 0.8085 0.4188
(LOG(TAX))^2 -0.0359 0.0436 -0.8219 0.4111
(LOG(REMOX))^2 0.0316 0.0311 1.0172 0.3091
(LOG(REMOY))^2 0.0105 0.0247 0.4265 0.6698
FTA^2 -3.3022 0.5853 -5.6418 0.0000
BORDER^2 -0.2273 0.3517 -0.6463 0.5181
COLONY^2 -0.3571 0.3889 -0.9180 0.3586
LANGUE^2 0.1273 0.3592 0.3543 0.7231
LBX^2 -1.0691 0.4777 -2.2381 0.0252
LBY^2 -0.0106 0.2663 -0.0399 0.9682
ASIAN^2 -0.8130 0.5921 -1.3731 0.1697
DCAFTA^2 -0.8320 1.1544 -0.7207 0.4711
EC^2 0.5027 0.4697 1.0704 0.2845
NAFTA^2 0.7488 1.6047 0.4667 0.6408
EFTA^2 -1.6624 0.4884 -3.4042 0.0007
SAARC^2 0.9778 1.7365 0.5631 0.5734
WTO^2 -0.9734 0.7498 -1.2982 0.1943
R-squared 0.0684     Mean dependent var 4.2249
Adjusted R-squared 0.0639     S.D. dependent var 8.6984
S.E. of regression 8.4159    Akaike info criterion 7.1030
Sum squared resid 692976.1000    Schwarz criterion 7.1381
Log likelihood -34870.3200    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.1149
F-statistic 15.2790    Durbin-Watson stat 1.8483
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Heteroskedasticity Test: White 2002
F-statistic 11.9604     Prob. F(47,9784) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 534.2021     Prob. Chi-Square(47) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:08
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 3.1760 1.1181 2.8404 0.0045
(LOG(GDPGDP))^2 -0.0072 0.0011 -6.7280 0.0000
(LOG(DISRAD))^2 0.0613 0.0090 6.8011 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEX))^2 0.2680 0.0707 3.7891 0.0002
(LOG(PRICEY))^2 0.0086 0.0131 0.6567 0.5114
(LOG(TAX))^2 0.0118 0.0358 0.3302 0.7412
(LOG(REMOX))^2 0.0796 0.0326 2.4378 0.0148
(LOG(REMOY))^2 0.0137 0.0165 0.8313 0.4058
FTA^2 -2.1618 0.6116 -3.5344 0.0004
BORDER^2 -0.3037 0.3771 -0.8054 0.4206
COLONY^2 0.0219 0.4192 0.0522 0.9584
LANGUE^2 -0.0428 0.3897 -0.1098 0.9126
LBX^2 -1.7010 0.4610 -3.6896 0.0002
LBY^2 0.1281 0.2842 0.4508 0.6521
ASIAN^2 -0.6267 0.5993 -1.0457 0.2957
DCAFTA^2 -0.6470 0.9414 -0.6873 0.4919
EC^2 0.5228 0.4262 1.2266 0.2200
NAFTA^2 1.2596 1.2372 1.0181 0.3087
EFTA^2 -1.9052 0.4875 -3.9083 0.0001
SAARC^2 1.2785 2.2221 0.5753 0.5651
WTO^2 -0.0707 0.7682 -0.0921 0.9266
R-squared 0.0543     Mean dependent var 4.2554
Adjusted R-squared 0.0498     S.D. dependent var 9.3945
S.E. of regression 9.1576    Akaike info criterion 7.2719
Sum squared resid 820500.5000    Schwarz criterion 7.3070
Log likelihood -35700.7300    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.2838
F-statistic 11.9604    Durbin-Watson stat 1.8780









Heteroskedasticity Test: White 2003
F-statistic 16.0802     Prob. F(47,9784) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 705.0177     Prob. Chi-Square(47) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:06
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.7615 1.0997 4.3300 0.0000
(LOG(GDPGDP))^2 -0.0076 0.0011 -7.1500 0.0000
(LOG(DISRAD))^2 0.0596 0.0084 7.0735 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEX))^2 0.3175 0.0601 5.2818 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEY))^2 -0.0151 0.0102 -1.4821 0.1384
(LOG(TAX))^2 -0.0117 0.0353 -0.3305 0.7410
(LOG(REMOX))^2 0.0611 0.0283 2.1565 0.0311
(LOG(REMOY))^2 0.0253 0.0169 1.4969 0.1345
FTA^2 -1.0735 0.6276 -1.7104 0.0872
BORDER^2 -0.2375 0.3809 -0.6236 0.5329
COLONY^2 -0.0609 0.3432 -0.1776 0.8591
LANGUE^2 -0.0074 0.3072 -0.0242 0.9807
LBX^2 -1.1438 0.3998 -2.8607 0.0042
LBY^2 0.1428 0.2411 0.5922 0.5537
ASIAN^2 -0.4678 0.6180 -0.7570 0.4491
DCAFTA^2 -0.1392 1.0327 -0.1348 0.8928
EC^2 0.6494 0.4114 1.5785 0.1145
NAFTA^2 1.3900 1.1512 1.2074 0.2273
EFTA^2 -1.6514 0.4758 -3.4707 0.0005
SAARC^2 0.3994 1.8591 0.2148 0.8299
WTO^2 -1.2019 0.8383 -1.4337 0.1517
R-squared 0.0717     Mean dependent var 4.1564
Adjusted R-squared 0.0672     S.D. dependent var 8.5353
S.E. of regression 8.2433    Akaike info criterion 7.0616
Sum squared resid 664846.4000    Schwarz criterion 7.0967
Log likelihood -34666.6000    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.0735
F-statistic 16.0802    Durbin-Watson stat 1.8352
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Heteroskedasticity Test: White 2004
F-statistic 16.4755     Prob. F(47,9784) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 721.0763     Prob. Chi-Square(47) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:03
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 9.5962 3.1602 3.0366 0.0024
(LOG(GDPGDP))^2 -0.0071 0.0011 -6.4371 0.0000
(LOG(DISRAD))^2 0.0279 0.0127 2.1950 0.0282
(LOG(PRICEX))^2 0.3594 0.0645 5.5718 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEY))^2 -0.0141 0.0152 -0.9293 0.3527
(LOG(TAX))^2 -0.0183 0.0379 -0.4825 0.6294
(LOG(REMOX))^2 0.0731 0.0266 2.7461 0.0060
(LOG(REMOY))^2 -0.0025 0.0178 -0.1421 0.8870
FTA^2 -1.0508 0.6784 -1.5490 0.1214
BORDER^2 -0.2145 0.5038 -0.4258 0.6702
COLONY^2 -0.2238 0.4015 -0.5575 0.5772
LANGUE^2 0.2019 0.5493 0.3675 0.7133
LBX^2 -1.0121 0.4140 -2.4445 0.0145
LBY^2 0.5120 0.3322 1.5412 0.1233
ASIAN^2 -1.2151 0.5905 -2.0579 0.0396
DCAFTA^2 -1.8173 0.9619 -1.8893 0.0589
EC^2 -2.6938 0.5166 -5.2148 0.0000
NAFTA^2 -0.0528 1.3473 -0.0392 0.9687
EFTA^2 -3.4844 0.6573 -5.3011 0.0000
SAARC^2 -0.2137 1.6685 -0.1281 0.8981
WTO^2 -3.8545 3.0888 -1.2479 0.2121
R-squared 0.0733     Mean dependent var 4.1630
Adjusted R-squared 0.0689     S.D. dependent var 9.3388
S.E. of regression 9.0114    Akaike info criterion 7.2397
Sum squared resid 794504.5000    Schwarz criterion 7.2748
Log likelihood -35542.4500    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.2516
F-statistic 16.4755    Durbin-Watson stat 1.8866
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
 170
Statistical Appendix 
Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –IV 
Table 4(I) 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White 2005
F-statistic 12.5055     Prob. F(47,9784) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 557.1688     Prob. Chi-Square(47) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 09:51
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=11)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.9647 1.5931 3.1164 0.0018
(LOG(GDPGDP))^2 -0.0093 0.0013 -6.9215 0.0000
(LOG(DISRAD))^2 0.0528 0.0131 4.0290 0.0001
(LOG(PRICEX))^2 0.2852 0.0497 5.7355 0.0000
(LOG(PRICEY))^2 -0.0191 0.0112 -1.7116 0.0870
(LOG(TAX))^2 -0.0211 0.0510 -0.4135 0.6792
(LOG(REMOX))^2 0.0644 0.0285 2.2543 0.0242
(LOG(REMOY))^2 0.0123 0.0191 0.6419 0.5210
FTA^2 -0.8052 0.7636 -1.0546 0.2916
BORDER^2 -0.2126 0.3813 -0.5575 0.5772
COLONY^2 0.2252 0.4556 0.4944 0.6211
LANGUE^2 0.2923 0.5774 0.5062 0.6127
LBX^2 -0.7250 0.6027 -1.2028 0.2291
LBY^2 -0.1322 0.2704 -0.4889 0.6249
ASIAN^2 -1.4286 0.5565 -2.5672 0.0103
DCAFTA^2 -1.6449 0.9270 -1.7745 0.0760
EC^2 -1.8668 0.5390 -3.4631 0.0005
NAFTA^2 1.2738 1.2656 1.0064 0.3142
EFTA^2 -3.2543 0.6854 -4.7481 0.0000
SAARC^2 -0.8864 1.2822 -0.6913 0.4894
WTO^2 0.5329 0.9134 0.5834 0.5596
R-squared 0.0567     Mean dependent var 4.2104
Adjusted R-squared 0.0521     S.D. dependent var 10.1373
S.E. of regression 9.8695    Akaike info criterion 7.4216
Sum squared resid 953032.7000    Schwarz criterion 7.4568
Log likelihood -36436.8200    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.4335
F-statistic 12.5055    Durbin-Watson stat 1.9057
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 1997
F-statistic 440.2120    Prob. F(5,9783) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:21
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.0763 0.3234 -0.2358 0.8136
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.0651 0.0089 7.3336 0.0000
LOG(DISRAD) -0.1614 0.0307 -5.2514 0.0000
LOG(PRICEX) -0.0019 0.0220 -0.0857 0.9317
LOG(PRICEY) -0.0204 0.0187 -1.0944 0.2738
LOG(TAX) -0.0258 0.0275 -0.9371 0.3487
LOG(REMOX) -0.0175 0.0199 -0.8755 0.3813
LOG(REMOY) 0.0252 0.0167 1.5141 0.1300
FTA 0.3258 0.4471 0.7287 0.4662
BORDER -0.1321 0.1268 -1.0420 0.2974
COLONY -0.0666 0.0940 -0.7086 0.4786
LANGUE 0.0396 0.0894 0.4435 0.6574
LBX 0.0252 0.0639 0.3945 0.6932
LBY -0.0623 0.0569 -1.0938 0.2741
ASIAN -0.1170 0.3422 -0.3420 0.7324
DCAFTA 0.1746 0.3981 0.4386 0.6609
EC -0.1132 0.1824 -0.6205 0.5349
NAFTA -0.1945 0.8563 -0.2271 0.8203
EFTA 0.2448 0.8051 0.3041 0.7611
SAARC 0.3303 0.5471 0.6038 0.5460
WTO 0.1124 0.1067 1.0540 0.2919
RESID(-1) 0.1858 0.0100 18.5102 0.0000
RESID(-2) 0.1009 0.0101 9.9461 0.0000
RESID(-3) 0.1358 0.0101 13.4408 0.0000
RESID(-4) 0.1224 0.0101 12.0680 0.0000
RESID(-5) 0.1271 0.0100 12.6847 0.0000
R-squared 0.1837     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1797    S.D. dependent var 2.1522
S.E. of regression 1.9493    Akaike info criterion 4.1778
Sum squared resid 37172.1700    Schwarz criterion 4.2136
Log likelihood -20488.8800    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.1899
F-statistic 45.8554     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0160
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 1998
F-statistic 462.9162    Prob. F(5,9783) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:20
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.1043 0.3213 0.3247 0.7454
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.0646 0.0088 7.2969 0.0000
LOG(DISRAD) -0.1791 0.0307 -5.8432 0.0000
LOG(PRICEX) -0.0100 0.0218 -0.4578 0.6471
LOG(PRICEY) -0.0218 0.0187 -1.1683 0.2427
LOG(TAX) -0.0334 0.0247 -1.3531 0.1760
LOG(REMOX) -0.0164 0.0198 -0.8280 0.4077
LOG(REMOY) 0.0312 0.0167 1.8712 0.0614
FTA 0.2227 0.4115 0.5412 0.5884
BORDER -0.1929 0.1260 -1.5310 0.1258
COLONY -0.0879 0.0935 -0.9410 0.3467
LANGUE 0.0061 0.0889 0.0689 0.9450
LBX 0.0165 0.0634 0.2600 0.7948
LBY -0.0594 0.0566 -1.0496 0.2939
ASIAN -0.1492 0.3402 -0.4386 0.6610
DCAFTA 0.1980 0.3959 0.5003 0.6169
EC -0.1577 0.1806 -0.8734 0.3824
NAFTA -0.3890 0.8442 -0.4608 0.6450
EFTA 0.2525 0.8006 0.3155 0.7524
SAARC 0.2663 0.5438 0.4898 0.6243
WTO 0.1319 0.1062 1.2420 0.2143
RESID(-1) 0.1959 0.0100 19.5411 0.0000
RESID(-2) 0.1061 0.0102 10.4426 0.0000
RESID(-3) 0.1268 0.0101 12.5082 0.0000
RESID(-4) 0.1204 0.0102 11.8452 0.0000
RESID(-5) 0.1297 0.0100 12.9443 0.0000
R-squared 0.1913     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1874    S.D. dependent var 2.1498
S.E. of regression 1.9380    Akaike info criterion 4.1661
Sum squared resid 36742.2200    Schwarz criterion 4.2020
Log likelihood -20431.6900    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.1783
F-statistic 48.2204     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0134
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 1999
F-statistic 470.4012    Prob. F(5,9783) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:17
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.1313 0.3217 0.4080 0.6833
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.0613 0.0087 7.0473 0.0000
LOG(DISRAD) -0.1784 0.0299 -5.9728 0.0000
LOG(PRICEX) -0.0108 0.0211 -0.5130 0.6080
LOG(PRICEY) -0.0181 0.0177 -1.0212 0.3072
LOG(TAX) -0.0249 0.0274 -0.9092 0.3633
LOG(REMOX) -0.0144 0.0190 -0.7597 0.4475
LOG(REMOY) 0.0282 0.0161 1.7475 0.0806
FTA 0.3468 0.3738 0.9276 0.3536
BORDER -0.1613 0.1229 -1.3124 0.1894
COLONY -0.0903 0.0913 -0.9900 0.3222
LANGUE 0.0113 0.0867 0.1299 0.8967
LBX 0.0287 0.0625 0.4598 0.6457
LBY -0.0671 0.0554 -1.2122 0.2255
ASIAN -0.1927 0.3321 -0.5805 0.5616
DCAFTA 0.2136 0.3866 0.5525 0.5806
EC -0.1427 0.1755 -0.8129 0.4163
NAFTA -0.0589 0.8192 -0.0719 0.9427
EFTA 0.3312 0.7817 0.4237 0.6718
SAARC 0.2065 0.5335 0.3871 0.6987
WTO 0.1313 0.1115 1.1778 0.2389
RESID(-1) 0.1862 0.0100 18.5923 0.0000
RESID(-2) 0.1134 0.0101 11.2008 0.0000
RESID(-3) 0.1228 0.0101 12.1374 0.0000
RESID(-4) 0.1247 0.0101 12.3075 0.0000
RESID(-5) 0.1371 0.0100 13.7005 0.0000
R-squared 0.1938     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1899    S.D. dependent var 2.1022
S.E. of regression 1.8921    Akaike info criterion 4.1183
Sum squared resid 35024.6100    Schwarz criterion 4.1541
Log likelihood -20196.3300    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.1304
F-statistic 49.0001     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0119
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 2000
F-statistic 483.5682    Prob. F(5,9783) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:14
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.1736 0.3253 0.5335 0.5937
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.0637 0.0086 7.4031 0.0000
LOG(DISRAD) -0.1923 0.0294 -6.5475 0.0000
LOG(PRICEX) -0.0013 0.0207 -0.0610 0.9513
LOG(PRICEY) -0.0202 0.0169 -1.1936 0.2326
LOG(TAX) -0.0265 0.0270 -0.9813 0.3265
LOG(REMOX) -0.0117 0.0185 -0.6332 0.5266
LOG(REMOY) 0.0265 0.0156 1.6949 0.0901
FTA 0.0991 0.3018 0.3284 0.7426
BORDER -0.1479 0.1209 -1.2238 0.2211
COLONY -0.0349 0.0898 -0.3887 0.6975
LANGUE -0.0371 0.0849 -0.4369 0.6622
LBX 0.0346 0.0621 0.5578 0.5770
LBY -0.0351 0.0549 -0.6387 0.5230
ASIAN -0.2073 0.3268 -0.6342 0.5260
DCAFTA 0.2401 0.3804 0.6312 0.5279
EC -0.1387 0.1726 -0.8034 0.4217
NAFTA -0.5206 0.7876 -0.6610 0.5087
EFTA 0.2179 0.7693 0.2833 0.7770
SAARC 0.1692 0.5240 0.3229 0.7468
WTO 0.1673 0.1200 1.3939 0.1634
RESID(-1) 0.1916 0.0100 19.1070 0.0000
RESID(-2) 0.1112 0.0101 10.9651 0.0000
RESID(-3) 0.1292 0.0101 12.7586 0.0000
RESID(-4) 0.1315 0.0101 12.9688 0.0000
RESID(-5) 0.1251 0.0100 12.4930 0.0000
R-squared 0.1982     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1942    S.D. dependent var 2.0747
S.E. of regression 1.8623    Akaike info criterion 4.0865
Sum squared resid 33928.9300    Schwarz criterion 4.1223
Log likelihood -20040.0900    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.0986
F-statistic 50.3717     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0066
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 2001
F-statistic 483.4305    Prob. F(5,9779) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:12
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.2570 0.3329 0.7719 0.4402
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.0620 0.0084 7.3523 0.0000
LOG(DISRAD) -0.1966 0.0293 -6.7098 0.0000
LOG(PRICEX) -0.0021 0.0205 -0.1045 0.9168
LOG(PRICEY) -0.0225 0.0167 -1.3469 0.1780
LOG(TAX) -0.0330 0.0305 -1.0817 0.2794
LOG(REMOX) -0.0061 0.0181 -0.3346 0.7379
LOG(REMOY) 0.0269 0.0154 1.7494 0.0803
FTA 0.0813 0.2826 0.2876 0.7737
BORDER -0.1385 0.1198 -1.1560 0.2477
COLONY -0.0563 0.0890 -0.6329 0.5268
LANGUE -0.0143 0.0844 -0.1692 0.8657
LBX 0.0383 0.0641 0.5979 0.5499
LBY -0.0476 0.0546 -0.8721 0.3832
ASIAN -0.2637 0.3243 -0.8131 0.4162
DCAFTA 0.1378 0.3768 0.3658 0.7145
EC -0.1373 0.1711 -0.8024 0.4223
NAFTA -0.3756 0.7894 -0.4758 0.6342
EFTA 0.0828 0.7623 0.1086 0.9135
SAARC 0.1379 0.5193 0.2656 0.7905
WTO 0.1537 0.1546 0.9943 0.3201
RESID(-1) 0.1838 0.0100 18.3032 0.0000
RESID(-2) 0.1237 0.0101 12.2109 0.0000
RESID(-3) 0.1313 0.0101 12.9549 0.0000
RESID(-4) 0.1374 0.0101 13.5739 0.0000
RESID(-5) 0.1129 0.0100 11.2520 0.0000
R-squared 0.1982     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1939    S.D. dependent var 2.0556
S.E. of regression 1.8455    Akaike info criterion 4.0688
Sum squared resid 33306.7500    Schwarz criterion 4.1076
Log likelihood -19949.1000    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.0819
F-statistic 46.4837     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0075
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Table 4(O) 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 2002
F-statistic 467.5789    Prob. F(5,9779) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:08
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.2933 0.3362 0.8726 0.3829
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.0583 0.0085 6.8760 0.0000
LOG(DISRAD) -0.2012 0.0296 -6.8017 0.0000
LOG(PRICEX) -0.0049 0.0208 -0.2355 0.8138
LOG(PRICEY) -0.0138 0.0164 -0.8408 0.4005
LOG(TAX) -0.0206 0.0317 -0.6510 0.5150
LOG(REMOX) -0.0063 0.0183 -0.3454 0.7298
LOG(REMOY) 0.0315 0.0156 2.0211 0.0433
FTA 0.0802 0.2652 0.3023 0.7624
BORDER -0.1564 0.1206 -1.2972 0.1946
COLONY -0.0684 0.0896 -0.7626 0.4457
LANGUE 0.0391 0.0852 0.4586 0.6465
LBX 0.0362 0.0646 0.5606 0.5751
LBY -0.0503 0.0550 -0.9155 0.3600
ASIAN -0.2650 0.3266 -0.8113 0.4172
DCAFTA 0.1491 0.3794 0.3929 0.6944
EC -0.1400 0.1740 -0.8045 0.4211
NAFTA -0.3301 0.7876 -0.4191 0.6752
EFTA 0.1023 0.7678 0.1332 0.8940
SAARC 0.2302 0.5227 0.4405 0.6596
WTO 0.1993 0.1559 1.2781 0.2012
RESID(-1) 0.1834 0.0101 18.2236 0.0000
RESID(-2) 0.1211 0.0101 11.9498 0.0000
RESID(-3) 0.1302 0.0101 12.8367 0.0000
RESID(-4) 0.1385 0.0101 13.6579 0.0000
RESID(-5) 0.1092 0.0100 10.8786 0.0000
R-squared 0.1929     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1887    S.D. dependent var 2.0630
S.E. of regression 1.8582    Akaike info criterion 4.0825
Sum squared resid 33766.5200    Schwarz criterion 4.1213
Log likelihood -20016.5000    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.0956
F-statistic 44.9595     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0046
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 2003
F-statistic 479.9249    Prob. F(5,9779) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:06
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.1022 0.3419 0.2989 0.7650
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.0555 0.0084 6.6349 0.0000
LOG(DISRAD) -0.1853 0.0291 -6.3781 0.0000
LOG(PRICEX) -0.0025 0.0204 -0.1237 0.9015
LOG(PRICEY) -0.0192 0.0167 -1.1518 0.2494
LOG(TAX) -0.0152 0.0309 -0.4913 0.6232
LOG(REMOX) -0.0056 0.0181 -0.3101 0.7565
LOG(REMOY) 0.0263 0.0154 1.7057 0.0881
FTA 0.1303 0.2423 0.5378 0.5907
BORDER -0.1648 0.1189 -1.3862 0.1657
COLONY -0.0092 0.0883 -0.1038 0.9174
LANGUE 0.0090 0.0840 0.1071 0.9147
LBX 0.0338 0.0619 0.5467 0.5846
LBY -0.0485 0.0539 -0.9000 0.3681
ASIAN -0.2217 0.3220 -0.6884 0.4912
DCAFTA 0.2126 0.3740 0.5684 0.5698
EC -0.1102 0.1713 -0.6436 0.5199
NAFTA -0.1498 0.7760 -0.1931 0.8469
EFTA 0.1750 0.7571 0.2311 0.8172
SAARC 0.1069 0.5150 0.2075 0.8356
WTO 0.2952 0.1684 1.7531 0.0796
RESID(-1) 0.1879 0.0100 18.7061 0.0000
RESID(-2) 0.1326 0.0101 13.0785 0.0000
RESID(-3) 0.1127 0.0102 11.0620 0.0000
RESID(-4) 0.1251 0.0101 12.3259 0.0000
RESID(-5) 0.1271 0.0100 12.6731 0.0000
R-squared 0.1970     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1928    S.D. dependent var 2.0388
S.E. of regression 1.8318    Akaike info criterion 4.0539
Sum squared resid 32813.3400    Schwarz criterion 4.0926
Log likelihood -19875.7300    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.0670
F-statistic 46.1466     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0072








Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 2004
F-statistic 457.9787    Prob. F(5,9779) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 10:04
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0068 0.3610 0.0187 0.9851
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.0518 0.0084 6.1807 0.0000
LOG(DISRAD) -0.1565 0.0316 -4.9585 0.0000
LOG(PRICEX) 0.0056 0.0210 0.2646 0.7913
LOG(PRICEY) -0.0114 0.0173 -0.6599 0.5093
LOG(TAX) -0.0274 0.0320 -0.8545 0.3929
LOG(REMOX) -0.0152 0.0185 -0.8213 0.4115
LOG(REMOY) 0.0233 0.0157 1.4830 0.1381
FTA 0.1167 0.2204 0.5295 0.5965
BORDER -0.1552 0.1196 -1.2977 0.1944
COLONY -0.0344 0.0886 -0.3880 0.6980
LANGUE 0.0917 0.0854 1.0728 0.2834
LBX 0.0395 0.0617 0.6392 0.5227
LBY -0.0700 0.0538 -1.3008 0.1934
ASIAN -0.1073 0.3234 -0.3317 0.7401
DCAFTA 0.2948 0.3443 0.8561 0.3920
EC -0.2091 0.1227 -1.7038 0.0885
NAFTA -0.4408 0.7759 -0.5681 0.5700
EFTA 0.1764 0.7625 0.2313 0.8171
SAARC 0.2283 0.5175 0.4411 0.6592
WTO 0.2379 0.1712 1.3896 0.1647
RESID(-1) 0.1854 0.0101 18.4232 0.0000
RESID(-2) 0.1246 0.0101 12.2846 0.0000
RESID(-3) 0.1204 0.0102 11.8348 0.0000
RESID(-4) 0.1183 0.0101 11.6564 0.0000
RESID(-5) 0.1272 0.0100 12.6715 0.0000
R-squared 0.1897     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1854    S.D. dependent var 2.0404
S.E. of regression 1.8416    Akaike info criterion 4.0645
Sum squared resid 33164.5500    Schwarz criterion 4.1033
Log likelihood -19928.0700    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.0776
F-statistic 44.0364     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0089








Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 2005
F-statistic 432.8963    Prob. F(5,9779) 0.0000




Date: 08/28/07   Time: 09:52
Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.1804 0.3668 0.4920 0.6228
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.0502 0.0085 5.9402 0.0000
LOG(DISRAD) -0.1751 0.0320 -5.4677 0.0000
LOG(PRICEX) -0.0010 0.0213 -0.0464 0.9630
LOG(PRICEY) -0.0164 0.0176 -0.9337 0.3505
LOG(TAX) -0.0099 0.0340 -0.2919 0.7704
LOG(REMOX) -0.0101 0.0186 -0.5411 0.5885
LOG(REMOY) 0.0230 0.0159 1.4452 0.1484
FTA 0.0770 0.2188 0.3520 0.7249
BORDER -0.2001 0.1209 -1.6547 0.0980
COLONY -0.0396 0.0896 -0.4419 0.6586
LANGUE 0.1028 0.0865 1.1889 0.2345
LBX 0.0268 0.0623 0.4300 0.6672
LBY -0.0617 0.0545 -1.1313 0.2579
ASIAN -0.1621 0.3270 -0.4957 0.6201
DCAFTA 0.1524 0.3478 0.4383 0.6612
EC -0.2559 0.1239 -2.0660 0.0389
NAFTA -0.2138 0.7831 -0.2730 0.7849
EFTA 0.0979 0.7708 0.1271 0.8989
SAARC 0.2729 0.5232 0.5217 0.6019
WTO 0.2210 0.1732 1.2756 0.2021
RESID(-1) 0.1734 0.0101 17.1712 0.0000
RESID(-2) 0.1154 0.0101 11.3932 0.0000
RESID(-3) 0.1308 0.0101 12.9237 0.0000
RESID(-4) 0.1374 0.0101 13.5661 0.0000
RESID(-5) 0.1094 0.0101 10.8692 0.0000
R-squared 0.1812     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.1769    S.D. dependent var 2.0520
S.E. of regression 1.8617    Akaike info criterion 4.0863
Sum squared resid 33894.3300    Schwarz criterion 4.1250
Log likelihood -20035.0700    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.0994
F-statistic 41.6246     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0084
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
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Dependent Variable: LOG(X) Dependent Variable: LOG(X)
Method: Least Squares Method: Least Squares
Date: 09/11/07   Time: 10:45 Date: 09/11/07   Time: 10:46
Sample: 1 9832 Sample: 1 9832
Included observations: 9832 Included observations: 9832
Coefficient Std. Erro t-StatisticProb.  Coefficient Std. Errort-StatisticProb.  
C -1.944 0.33 -5.82 0.00 C -1.944 0.33 -5.82 0.00
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.514 0.01 62.15 0.00 LOG(GDPGDP) 0.514 0.01 62.15 0.00
LOG(DISRAD) -0.800 0.04 -22.12 0.00 LOG(DISRAD) -0.800 0.04 -22.12 0.00
LOG(PRICEX) -0.873 0.02 -35.99 0.00 LOG(PRICEX) -0.873 0.02 -35.99 0.00
LOG(PRICEY) 0.060 0.02 2.74 0.01 LOG(PRICEY) 0.060 0.02 2.74 0.01
TAX -0.020 0.00 -7.55 0.00 TAX -0.020 0.00 -7.55 0.00
BORDER 1.697 0.15 11.33 0.00 BORDER 1.697 0.15 11.33 0.00
COLONY 1.230 0.11 11.10 0.00 COLONY 1.230 0.11 11.10 0.00
LANGUE 0.651 0.10 6.23 0.00 LANGUE 0.651 0.10 6.23 0.00
LBX -1.030 0.07 -14.44 0.00 LBX -1.030 0.07 -14.44 0.00
LBY -0.966 0.07 -14.26 0.00 LBY -0.966 0.07 -14.26 0.00
CURR -0.756 0.23 -3.25 0.00 CURR -0.756 0.23 -3.25 0.00
ILANDX -0.272 0.07 -3.70 0.00 ILANDX -0.272 0.07 -3.70 0.00
ILANDY -0.301 0.07 -4.60 0.00 ILANDY -0.301 0.07 -4.60 0.00
FTA -0.124 0.20 -0.61 0.54 FTA -0.124 0.20 -0.61 0.54
ASIAN 2.568 0.40 6.44 0.00 ASIAN 2.568 0.40 6.44 0.00
DCAFTA 2.098 0.47 4.43 0.00 DCAFTA 2.098 0.47 4.43 0.00
EC 0.433 0.24 1.78 0.07 EC 0.433 0.24 1.78 0.07
NAFTA 1.698 0.96 1.77 0.08 NAFTA 1.698 0.96 1.77 0.08
EFTA -0.829 0.96 -0.87 0.39 EFTA -0.829 0.96 -0.87 0.39
SAARC 0.234 0.65 0.36 0.72 SAARC 0.234 0.65 0.36 0.72
CARICOM 2.267 0.47 4.78 0.00 CARICOM 2.267 0.47 4.78 0.00
NATO 0.124 0.12 1.08 0.28 NATO 0.124 0.12 1.08 0.28
OECD 1.751 0.11 15.44 0.00 OECD 1.751 0.11 15.44 0.00
WTO 0.437 0.05 8.44 0.00 WTO 0.437 0.05 8.44 0.00
R-squared 0.505     Mean dependen 2.57 R-squared 0.505    Mean dependent 2.57
Adjusted R-squared 0.503     S.D. dependent 3.30 Adjusted R-squared 0.503    S.D. dependent v 3.30
S.E. of regression 2.324     Akaike info crite 4.53 S.E. of regression 2.324    Akaike info crite 4.53
Sum squared resid 52945     Schwarz criterio 4.54 Sum squared resid 52945    Schwarz criterion 4.54
Log likelihood -22228     Hannan-Quinn c 4.53 Log likelihood -22228    Hannan-Quinn cr 4.53
F-statistic 416     Durbin-Watson 0.93 F-statistic 416    Durbin-Watson s 1.44
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000








Dependent Variable: LOG(X) 
2 3 4
Method
SD errors & Cov method 
(d.f corrected)
Coef t-S t Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t -St
C -5.83 *** -41.87 -4.53 ** * -8.58 -5.90 *** -17.73 -4.52 *** -11 .43
YD98 -0.02 *** -26.17 0.00  -1.20   
YD99 -0.11 *** -77.56 -0.08 ** * -17.07   
YD00 -0.08 *** -44.86 -0.04 ** * -5.61   
YD01 -0.11 *** -35.96 -0.04 ** * -4.30   
YD02 -0.13 *** -39.40 -0.05 ** * -5.03   
YD03 -0.08 *** -24.62 0.00  0.36   
YD04 -0.05 *** -6.15 0.10 ** * 7.95   
YD05 0.03 *** 3.24 0.17 ** * 11.39   
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.71 *** 323.24 0.66 ** * 64.21 0.71 *** 68.29 0.66 *** 40 .56
LOG(DISRAD) -0.93 *** -75.40 -0.95 ** * -20.60 -0.93 *** -28.57 -0.95 *** -27 .94
LOG(PRICEi) -0.96 *** -70.31 -1.01 ** * -21.78 -0.96 *** -25.72 -1.01 *** -35 .28
LOG(PRICEj) 0.11 *** 27.08 0.28 ** * 7.09 0.11 *** 5.98 0.28 *** 14 .19
TAXj -0.02 *** -16.66 -0.01 ** * -3.83 -0.02 *** -6.71 -0.01 *** -4 .39
LOG(REMOi) -0.15 *** -45.25 -0.16 ** * -6.37 -0.15 *** -8.53 -0.16 *** -9 .57
LOG(REMOj) -0.02 *** -3.02 -0.05 ** -2.27 -0.02  -1.07 -0.05 *** -3 .27
BORDERij 1.53 *** 101.26 1.57 ** * 19.84 1.53 *** 14.00 1.57 *** 14 .18
COLONYij 1.00 *** 39.80 1.10 ** * 5.97 1.00 *** 10.44 1.10 *** 11 .06
LBi -1.19 *** -119.1 -1.28 ** * -15.67 -1.19 *** -17.50 -1.28 *** -18 .99
LBj -0.87 *** -38.20 -0.97 ** * -6.34 -0.87 *** -14.89 -0.97 *** -15 .97
CURRij 0.60 *** 5.42 1.29 ** * 7.56 0.60 *** 4.28 1.29 *** 9 .75
ILANDi 0.55 *** 24.41 0.48 ** * 2.98 0.55 *** 6.90 0.48 *** 5 .84
ILANDj 0.31 *** 19.75 0.15  1.49 0.31 *** 5.02 0.15 ** 2 .17
FTAij 0.92 *** 11.24 0.09 ** 1.98 0.92 *** 12.39 0.09 *** 2 .84
ASIANij 2.22 *** 53.36 2.48 ** * 8.57 2.22 *** 8.58 2.48 *** 9 .45
DCAFTAij 1.44 *** 61.53 0.59 ** * 3.96 1.44 *** 5.00 0.59 *** 2 .77
ECij 1.42 *** 12.80 0.24 ** * 5.66 1.42 *** 14.77 0.24 *** 8 .17
NAFTAij 2.70 *** 90.21 3.20 ** * 10.10 2.70 *** 6.64 3.20 *** 7 .97
EFTAij 1.12 *** 20.70 0.96 ** 2.25 1.12 *** 6.46 0.96 *** 5 .79
SAARCij 1.31 *** 18.27 1.42 ** * 3.48 1.31 ** 2.12 1.42 ** 2 .36
CARICOMij 1.23 *** 12.78 0.37  0.83 1.23 *** 4.81 0.37  1 .10
R-squared 0.53 0.16 0.53 0.16
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.16 0.53 0.16
F-statistic 3271 573 3271 573
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DW St 0.21 1.27 0.21 1.27
Cross-Obs 9832 9832 9832 9832
Total panel (balanced) obs 88488 88488 88488 88488
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
1
Gravity Model Estimations by Different Panel Data Specifications for the Period 1997-2005 [Un-
weighted Data]
White cross-section White cross-section 
EGLS (Cross-section 
random effects)
OLS (Period Fixed 
effect)
EGLS (Cross-se 
random & period fixed 
effects)









Dependent Variable: LOG(X)*W 
1
Method
SD errors & Cov method 
(d.f corrected)
Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St Coef t-St
C -5.78 *** -23.01 -6.24 *** -26.82 -6.18 *** -79.77 -3.62 *** -18.51
YD98 0.00 *** -4.94 0.00  0.11 0.00 * -1.88 -0.01 *** -8.08
YD99 -0.11 *** -54.50 -0.10 *** -11.17 -0.10 *** -84.70 -0.06 *** -33.11
YD00 -0.13 *** -58.21 -0.12 *** -11.23 -0.12 *** -75.35 -0.05 *** -19.28
YD01 -0.17 *** -50.70 -0.14 *** -12.12 -0.15 *** -57.89 -0.06 *** -24.27
YD02 -0.22 *** -62.15 -0.18 *** -14.76 -0.17 *** -59.78 -0.07 *** -22.76
YD03 -0.16 *** -45.17 -0.12 *** -8.97 -0.10 *** -44.07 0.01 * 1.68
YD04 -0.20 *** -16.12 -0.07 *** -4.77 -0.06 *** -22.28 0.05 *** 14.26
YD05 -0.14 *** -11.47 0.00  -0.24 0.00  -1.55 0.07 *** 17.42
LOG(GDPGDP) 0.78 *** 78.52 0.82 *** 125.15 0.75 *** 227.81 0.64 *** 137.88
LOG(DISRAD) -1.09 *** -146.3 -1.16 *** -51.64 -0.98 *** -193.9 -0.96 *** -36.73
LOG(PRICEi) -0.94 *** -84.86 -0.97 *** -75.46 -0.93 *** -132.5 -0.86 *** -147.2
LOG(PRICEj) 0.09 *** 26.96 0.16 *** 12.95 0.10 *** 38.48 0.31 *** 58.80
TAXj -0.02 *** -18.94 -0.01 *** -12.57 -0.02 *** -23.92 -0.01 *** -24.99
LOG(REMOi) -0.13 *** -38.68 -0.13 *** -10.62 -0.12 *** -43.67 -0.11 *** -17.02
LOG(REMOj) 0.01 * 1.83 0.01  0.83 -0.01 *** -4.58 -0.03 *** -3.77
BORDERij 1.00 *** 37.66 1.02 *** 19.96 1.50 *** 267.91 1.00 *** 19.89
COLONYij 0.95 *** 34.34 0.85 *** 20.94 0.88 *** 97.34 0.40 *** 10.89
LBi -0.99 *** -20.15 -0.75 *** -19.80 -1.06 *** -94.17 -1.10 *** -22.23
LBj -0.74 *** -24.78 -0.64 *** -17.11 -0.84 *** -69.04 -1.03 *** -17.74
CURRij 0.18 ** 2.46 0.75 *** 12.40 0.61 *** 8.22 0.14 *** 3.12
ILANDi 0.54 *** 16.66 0.50 *** 7.83 0.54 *** 22.15 0.71 *** 17.09
ILANDj 0.43 *** 15.26 0.47 *** 10.22 0.37 *** 33.48 0.23 *** 6.14
FTAij 0.94 *** 17.65 0.41 *** 18.24 0.75 *** 28.50 0.24 *** 13.37
ASIANij 1.92 *** 63.08 2.01 *** 13.47 2.02 *** 83.02 0.80 *** 9.88
DCAFTAij 1.15 *** 52.82 0.81 *** 3.71 1.41 *** 46.66 0.96 *** 10.30
ECij 1.31 *** 23.44 0.66 *** 22.89 1.23 *** 15.28 0.37 *** 12.78
NAFTAij 2.28 *** 35.45 2.48 *** 12.94 2.27 *** 41.20 1.98 *** 10.56
EFTAij 0.94 *** 18.19 0.96 *** 16.59 0.99 *** 21.28 -0.43 *** -4.41
SAARCij 0.64 *** 5.95 0.81 *** 2.95 1.18 *** 33.07 -1.00  -1.22
CARICOMij 1.16 *** 15.74 0.72 *** 5.05 1.29 *** 69.57 -1.00 *** -4.55
R-squared 0.86 0.62 0.93 0.84
Adjusted R-squared 0.86 0.62 0.93 0.84
DW St 0.20 2.00 0.38 1.99
Cross-Obs 9832 9832 9832 9832
Total panel (balanced) obs 88488 88488 88488 88488
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
^^^^Weights are the exponated fitted values of an auxiliary regression; log of squared OLS residuals on original 
explanatory variables 
^^Weights are time variances of OLS residuals for each Cross-unit taken from 9 period specific OLS regressions 
White cross-section Period SUR (PCSE) Period SUR (PCSE) White cross-section
2 3 4






















Total panel (balanced) observations: 9832
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -10.1744 0.3980 -25.5647 0.0000
LOG(GDPi) 1.0390 0.0149 69.7136 0.0000
LOG(GDPi) 0.6726 0.0132 50.9323 0.0000
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.0717 0.0280 -38.2893 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -0.7520 0.0241 -31.1578 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.0961 0.0203 4.7312 0.0000
TAX -0.0289 0.0040 -7.3179 0.0000
LOG(REMOi) -0.2417 0.0162 -14.8731 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) 0.0243 0.0165 1.4688 0.1419
BORDER 0.9782 0.1405 6.9631 0.0000
COLONY 0.8225 0.1022 8.0474 0.0000
LBi -0.9615 0.0693 -13.8832 0.0000
LBj -0.8588 0.0656 -13.0940 0.0000
CURR 1.2256 0.1670 7.3379 0.0000
ILANDi 0.9162 0.0745 12.2933 0.0000
ILANDj 0.2321 0.0696 3.3340 0.0009
LOG(PCAPi) -0.6613 0.0197 -33.5189 0.0000
LOG(PCAPj) 0.1858 0.0267 6.9511 0.0000
R-squared 0.5835     Mean dependent var 2.9566
Adjusted R-squared 0.5828     S.D. dependent var 3.3283
S.E. of regression 2.1498     Akaike info criterion 4.3705
Sum squared resid 45358.3400     Schwarz criterion 4.3837
Log likelihood -21467.3300     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.3750
F-statistic 808.7929     Durbin-Watson stat 0.0000
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
 184
Statistical Appendix 









Total panel (balanced) observations: 9832
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -10.1566 0.3962 -25.6377 0.0000
LOG(GDPi) 1.0279 0.0149 69.2039 0.0000
LOG(GDPi) 0.6718 0.0131 51.4146 0.0000
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.0599 0.0279 -37.9995 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -0.7557 0.0238 -31.7776 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.0754 0.0197 3.8199 0.0001
TAX -0.0245 0.0034 -7.1172 0.0000
LOG(REMOi) -0.2407 0.0163 -14.7810 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) 0.0411 0.0166 2.4766 0.0133
BORDER 0.9654 0.1401 6.8896 0.0000
COLONY 0.8934 0.1020 8.7613 0.0000
LBi -1.0030 0.0692 -14.4951 0.0000
LBj -0.8945 0.0657 -13.6189 0.0000
CURR 1.3928 0.1667 8.3562 0.0000
ILANDi 0.9980 0.0745 13.4051 0.0000
ILANDj 0.2191 0.0692 3.1660 0.0016
LOG(PCAPi) -0.6350 0.0196 -32.3597 0.0000
LOG(PCAPj) 0.1956 0.0268 7.2877 0.0000
R-squared 0.5809     Mean dependent var 2.7384
Adjusted R-squared 0.5802     S.D. dependent var 3.3092
S.E. of regression 2.1441     Akaike info criterion 4.3651
Sum squared resid 45116.1100     Schwarz criterion 4.3783
Log likelihood -21441.0100     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.3696
F-statistic 800.2595     Durbin-Watson stat 0.0000













Total panel (balanced) observations: 9832
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -10.0564 0.3992 -25.1942 0.0000
LOG(GDPi) 0.9962 0.0150 66.3740 0.0000
LOG(GDPi) 0.6681 0.0132 50.6333 0.0000
LOG(DISTANCE) -1.0210 0.0282 -36.2389 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -0.7757 0.0243 -31.9516 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.0700 0.0202 3.4700 0.0005
TAX -0.0106 0.0033 -3.2213 0.0013
LOG(REMOi) -0.2455 0.0162 -15.1768 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) 0.0111 0.0166 0.6711 0.5022
BORDER 0.9870 0.1416 6.9683 0.0000
COLONY 0.9503 0.1031 9.2152 0.0000
LBi -1.0120 0.0700 -14.4518 0.0000
LBj -0.9915 0.0668 -14.8394 0.0000
CURR 1.2731 0.1685 7.5545 0.0000
ILANDi 1.0218 0.0753 13.5728 0.0000
ILANDj 0.1532 0.0699 2.1933 0.0283
LOG(PCAPi) -0.6043 0.0197 -30.6855 0.0000
LOG(PCAPj) 0.2119 0.0276 7.6692 0.0000
R-squared 0.5650     Mean dependent var 2.6722
Adjusted R-squared 0.5643     S.D. dependent var 3.2844
S.E. of regression 2.1681     Akaike info criterion 4.3874
Sum squared resid 46130.7000     Schwarz criterion 4.4005
Log likelihood -21550.3300     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.3918
F-statistic 749.8312     Durbin-Watson stat 0.0000
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
 186
Statistical Appendix 









Total panel (balanced) observations: 88488
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.934 0.01822 -106.126 0.000
YD98 0.014 0.00001 1474.690 0.000
YD99 0.027 0.00002 1445.394 0.000
YD00 0.052 0.00003 1895.092 0.000
YD01 0.065 0.00004 1788.604 0.000
YD02 0.088 0.00004 1954.965 0.000
YD03 0.114 0.00005 2152.487 0.000
YD04 0.155 0.00006 2541.792 0.000
YD05 0.178 0.00007 2597.754 0.000
LOG(POPX) 0.833 0.00110 756.100 0.000
R-squared 0.524     Mean dependent var 11.946
Adjusted R-squared 0.524     S.D. dependent var 2.009
S.E. of regression 1.387     Akaike info criterion 3.492
Sum squared resid 170134.4     Schwarz criterion 3.493
Log likelihood -154482.3     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.492
F-statistic 10815.5     Durbin-Watson stat 0.001
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Dependent Variable: LOG(GDPY)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -4.060 0.01426 -284.809 0.000
YD98 0.018 0.00001 1409.006 0.000
YD99 0.028 0.00002 1126.702 0.000
YD00 0.043 0.00004 1177.565 0.000
YD01 0.060 0.00005 1253.348 0.000
YD02 0.092 0.00006 1544.713 0.000
YD03 0.115 0.00007 1618.946 0.000
YD04 0.152 0.00008 1853.004 0.000
YD05 0.173 0.00009 1853.456 0.000
LOG(POPY) 0.928 0.00090 1031.517 0.000
R-squared 0.708     Mean dependent var 10.769
Adjusted R-squared 0.708     S.D. dependent var 2.167
S.E. of regression 1.171     Akaike info criterion 3.153
Sum squared resid 121262.5     Schwarz criterion 3.154
Log likelihood -139499.9     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.154




Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –IV 
Table 4(Z) 
Correlation Matrix for Gravity Model
Sample: 1997 2005
Included observations: 88488




GDPj 0.23 -0.04 1.00
71.16 -13.13 ----- 
POPi 0.13 0.61 -0.04 1.00
39.61 228.43 -10.84 ----- 
POPj 0.07 -0.03 0.63 -0.03 1.00
20.18 -9.24 238.74 -8.99 ----- 
PCAPi -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.02 1.00
-2.15 11.25 11.64 -9.01 5.47 ----- 
PCAPj 0.14 -0.05 0.28 -0.04 -0.06 0.06 1.00
41.04 -16.11 88.06 -13.26 -17.49 17.65 ----- 
DISTANCE -0.05 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.03 1.00
-15.49 33.89 15.77 26.54 18.90 18.90 -8.44 ----- 
PRICEi -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 1.00
-3.08 -12.07 6.36 -9.10 5.00 -2.54 6.99 -20.03 ----- 
PRICEj -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 1.00
-2.99 2.44 -8.91 2.22 -6.34 -2.02 -20.14 -14.23 -1.38 ----- 
TAX -0.08 0.04 -0.12 0.03 0.13 -0.04 -0.51 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 1.00
-24.53 10.99 -37.47 10.04 40.33 -10.55 -176.0 12.52 -9.14 -6.42 ----- 
REMOi 0.02 0.15 -0.02 0.33 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.15 -0.04 0.00 0.03 1.00
5.55 45.64 -4.71 102.72 -3.50 -8.92 -6.70 45.20 -12.16 -0.60 10.31 ----- 
REMOj 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.24 0.01 -0.15 0.12 0.00 -0.05 0.19 0.00 1.00
1.93 -0.36 27.71 -0.91 73.06 2.00 -46.47 34.79 -0.25 -14.33 58.16 0.44 ----- 
BORDER 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 1.00
35.67 1.50 1.46 9.01 3.46 -3.18 -4.40 -60.83 4.03 4.96 -7.22 -6.35 -7.50 ----- 
COLONY 0.08 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.11 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.17 1.00
24.84 13.33 10.54 -2.35 2.55 14.60 19.75 -32.81 -0.43 1.52 -13.54 -13.30 -7.12 50.15 ----- 
LBX -0.03 -0.16 0.03 -0.12 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.12 0.17 0.00 -0.05 -0.15 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
-9.31 -47.37 9.93 -37.32 7.67 -5.35 12.55 -36.22 50.58 -0.67 -13.79 -45.85 -1.45 16.75 1.30 ----- 
LBY -0.04 0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.16 -0.12 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.01 0.01 1.00
-10.79 7.80 -35.89 6.54 -27.34 -5.50 -47.07 -34.70 2.28 29.77 -1.36 1.69 -20.95 16.74 2.70 2.47 ----- 
CURR 0.09 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.03 1.00
27.58 -4.69 3.91 -9.60 -5.96 -2.36 34.41 -44.26 -3.62 -1.52 -21.66 -11.00 -13.08 36.83 32.50 5.08 9.70 ----- 
ILANDi -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.34 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.15 -0.04 -0.04 1.00
-3.33 -6.28 8.76 -12.30 3.62 40.24 12.67 38.83 -10.23 -3.76 -3.18 106.01 1.42 -18.26 0.56 -44.43 -11.41 -11.64 ----- 
ILANDj -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.04 0.16 -0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.02 0.17 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 -0.05 0.03 1.00
-5.88 10.35 -18.20 7.60 -22.61 1.86 11.21 48.04 -8.18 -14.36 31.12 6.77 51.48 -21.90 0.53 -14.54 -59.43 -14.36 8.49 ----- 
FTA 0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.14 -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 1.00
14.03 -7.50 1.63 -9.55 -5.32 -2.95 40.87 -42.97 -1.86 -4.35 -22.91 -16.01 -18.49 13.52 6.22 -0.64 -9.68 -7.72 -5.65 -13.35 ----- 
ASIAN 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 1.00
10.55 -4.12 -3.12 0.10 0.09 -1.49 -5.54 -19.34 -1.66 -1.93 -4.90 46.89 27.81 24.36 0.55 -6.96 -1.85 -2.39 19.48 3.74 -0.71 ----- 
DCAFTA 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 1.00
0.36 12.02 14.96 -1.04 0.44 -1.03 -1.84 -16.39 -1.43 -1.65 -9.68 -0.79 -1.27 25.58 -2.94 -6.01 -6.49 -2.06 -5.79 -7.12 -2.97 -0.92 ----- 
EC 0.11 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.24 -0.20 -0.01 -0.01 -0.17 -0.07 -0.08 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.53 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1.00
33.68 -6.58 6.93 -12.54 -7.57 -2.19 72.52 -60.50 -2.59 -4.20 -51.81 -20.55 -22.83 26.21 34.03 6.21 0.76 184.53 -16.70 -18.64 -9.81 -3.03 -2.62 ----- 
NAFTA 0.41 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
134.07 14.04 21.70 2.09 4.56 -0.31 9.36 -7.34 -0.66 -0.77 -3.30 2.33 2.18 20.77 -1.69 -2.88 -3.11 -0.99 -2.77 -3.41 11.73 -0.44 -0.38 -1.25 ----- 
SAARC 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.00
0.45 2.92 1.04 20.00 11.61 -1.19 -8.25 -11.08 -1.04 -1.18 11.83 18.46 14.92 18.09 -2.49 -4.24 2.39 -1.45 13.58 3.71 4.86 -0.65 -0.56 -1.84 -0.27 ----- 
CARICOM -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00
-1.74 -7.11 -4.92 -5.37 -4.49 -1.56 -3.19 -19.07 -1.41 -1.64 9.03 -1.80 2.88 -2.66 15.16 -6.05 -6.53 19.87 34.09 23.53 -2.99 -0.92 -0.80 -2.63 -0.38 -0.56 ----- 
X GDPi GDPj POPi POPj PCAPi PCAPj DISTANCEPRICEi PRICEj TAX REMOi REMOj BORDER COLONY LBX LBY CURR ILANDi ILANDj FTA ASIAN DCAFTA EC NAFTA SAARC CARICOM
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Statistical Appendix 
Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –V 
Table 5(A) 
D ep enden t V ariable: W * LO G(X )
M ethod : P anel E GLS (P er iod  SUR )
P er iods inclu ded : 9  (1 997 -2 0 05)
C ross -sections  in clu ded: 98 3 2
Total p anel (b alan ced )  o bs ervatio ns: 8 84 88
P er iod  SUR  (P C S E) stan dard  er ro rs & covarian ce (d .f . co rrected)
EC t-s t N AF TA t-st AS EAN t-st EF TA t-st
C C -3 .7 9 ** * -22 .9 4 -3.06 *** -1 8.59 -3 .5 7 ** * -22.6 4 -2 .58 * ** -1 5.93
Y D9 8 -0 .0 2 ** * -14 .9 2 -0.02 *** -1 4.14 -0 .0 2 ** * -12.8 4 -0 .02 * ** -1 4.05
Y D9 9 -0 .0 7 ** * -51 .6 9 -0.07 *** -5 0.40 -0 .0 7 ** * -48.0 8 -0 .07 * ** -5 0.24
Y D0 0 -0 .0 7 ** * -35 .3 0 -0.06 *** -3 3.88 -0 .0 6 ** * -30.7 9 -0 .06 * ** -3 3.51
Y D0 1 -0 .0 9 ** * -44 .8 8 -0.09 *** -4 3.62 -0 .0 8 ** * -40.6 6 -0 .09 * ** -4 3.30
Y D0 2 -0 .1 0 ** * -52 .7 4 -0.10 *** -5 2.42 -0 .0 9 ** * -49.9 8 -0 .10 * ** -5 2.35
Y D0 3 -0 .0 3 ** * -25 .1 9 -0.03 *** -2 6.70 -0 .0 3 ** * -25.6 5 -0 .03 * ** -2 7.18
Y D0 5 -0 .1 9 ** * -9 .5 1 -0.29 *** -1 5.11 -0 .3 2 ** * -16.8 7 -0 .32 * ** -1 6.70
LOG(GD PGD P ) 0 .6 7 ** * 158 .7 7 0.69 *** 16 2.60 0 .6 9 ** * 170.7 8 0 .68 * ** 16 3.79
LOG(GD PGD P )* Y D0 5 0 .0 0  1 .6 2 0.00  -1.33 0 .0 0 * 1.6 6 0 .00  0.58
LOG(DIS R AD ) -0 .8 1 ** * -47 .0 5 -0.93 *** -5 7.33 -0 .9 3 ** * -58.1 5 -0 .98 * ** -6 0.84
LOG(DIS R AD )*Y D0 5 0 .0 3 ** * 12 .9 6 0.04 *** 2 3.02 0 .0 4 ** * 21.5 1 0 .04 * ** 2 3.47
LOG(P R IC Ei) -0 .8 5 ** * -14 4.3 -0.84 *** -1 43.1 -0 .8 3 ** * -141 .6 -0 .83 * ** -1 41.9
LOG(P R IC Ei)* Y D0 5 -0 .0 6 ** * -21 .9 9 -0.07 *** -2 6.78 -0 .0 6 ** * -25.0 7 -0 .08 * ** -2 9.69
LOG(P R IC Ej) 0 .3 1 ** * 57 .6 3 0.31 *** 5 8.34 0 .3 2 ** * 59.8 6 0 .31 * ** 5 8.17
LOG(P R IC Ej)* Y D0 5 -0 .0 1 ** * -5 .4 9 -0.01 *** -6.56 -0 .0 1 ** * -5.7 6 -0 .01 * ** -6.31
TAXj -0 .0 1 ** * -25 .4 1 -0.01 *** -2 6.70 -0 .0 1 ** * -26.1 9 -0 .01 * ** -2 7.39
TAXj* Y D0 5 0 .0 0 ** * -7 .7 8 0.00 *** -5.51 0 .0 0 ** * -5.9 4 0 .00 * ** -6.54
LOG(R EM O i) -0 .1 0 ** * -16 .7 4 -0.14 *** -2 2.78 -0 .2 3 ** * -34.5 3 -0 .14 * ** -2 3.57
LOG(R EM O i)* YD 0 5 0 .0 0  0 .0 4 0.00  1.35 -0 .0 1 ** * -5.6 4 0 .00  -0.12
LOG(R EM O j) -0 .0 5 ** * -7 .4 3 -0.05 *** -7.12 -0 .0 3 ** * -4.9 0 -0 .05 * ** -7.83
LOG(R EM O j)* YD 0 5 0 .0 0  -0 .9 8 0.00 * -1.71 0 .0 0  1.6 3 0 .00  -0.39
B O R D ER ij 1 .0 3 ** * 20 .1 2 0.98 *** 1 9.08 1 .0 0 ** * 20.0 2 0 .98 * ** 1 9.01
B O R D ER ij*Y D 05 0 .0 7 ** * 13 .5 9 0.06 *** 1 2.31 0 .0 7 ** * 12.6 8 0 .07 * ** 1 3.69
C O LO N Yij 0 .3 6 ** * 9 .6 7 0.42 *** 1 1.01 0 .5 4 ** * 14.5 8 0 .39 * ** 1 0.28
C O LO N Yij*Y D05 -0 .0 5 ** * -14 .2 8 -0.05 *** -1 3.60 -0 .0 5 ** * -12.6 0 -0 .06 * ** -1 5.22
LB i -1 .0 5 ** * -20 .9 4 -1.03 *** -2 0.45 -1 .1 3 ** * -23.1 8 -1 .04 * ** -2 0.58
LB i*Y D 05 0 .0 3 ** * 5 .0 1 0.02 *** 3.25 0 .0 1  1.2 2 0 .02 * ** 3.47
LB j -1 .0 2 ** * -17 .1 9 -1.09 *** -1 8.31 -1 .0 2 ** * -17.6 5 -1 .15 * ** -1 9.26
LB j*Y D 05 -0 .0 2 ** * -3 .4 7 -0.02 ** -2.51 -0 .0 1  -1.2 9 -0 .01 * * -2.36
ILA ND i 0 .8 5 ** * 21 .4 8 0.83 *** 2 0.68 0 .5 7 ** * 14.0 6 0 .83 * ** 2 0.82
ILA ND i* YD 0 5 -0 .1 0 ** * -21 .6 9 -0.08 *** -1 9.89 -0 .0 9 ** * -21.3 3 -0 .09 * ** -2 2.07
ILA ND j 0 .2 4 ** * 6 .5 9 0.20 *** 5.44 0 .1 0 ** * 2.7 7 0 .22 * ** 6.07
ILA ND j* YD 0 5 0 .0 1 ** * 2 .7 5 0.02 *** 4.54 0 .0 2 ** * 4.9 8 0 .02 * ** 5.39
F TA ij 0 .3 3 ** * 8 .3 8 0.24 *** 1 2.86 0 .2 7 ** * 14.0 7 0 .33 * ** 1 5.47
F TA ij* Y D05 -0 .0 7 ** * -3 .6 6 0.00  -0.24 -0 .0 2 ** -2.2 3 0 .01  0.49
D 1 0 .4 3 ** * 18 .4 8 1.64 *** 8.49 1 .2 8 ** * 15.9 9 -0 .88 * ** -9.00
D 1* Y D05 -0 .0 5 ** * -12 .7 1 0.00  0.17 0 .0 2 * 1.8 7 -0 .02 * * -2.23
D 2 0 .1 0 ** * 8 .0 5 -0.10 * -1.87 1 .2 6 ** * 26.8 7 -0 .08  -1.10
D 2* Y D05 -0 .0 2 ** * -4 .2 0 0.00  -0.21 0 .0 7 ** * 13.0 1 0 .01  1.42
D 3 -0 .0 9 ** * -7 .7 5 -0.46 *** -6.80 0 .7 4 ** * 9.0 9 -1 .23 * ** -7.87
D 3* Y D05 0 .0 0  0 .6 9 -0.01  -1.12 -0 .0 5 ** * -6.0 6 -0 .01  -0.28
D 2* F TA -0 .1 4 ** * -2 .9 1 0.29 ** 2.09 -0 .0 9  -1.0 1 -0 .27 * ** -4.82
D 2* F TA*Y D 05 0 .1 3 ** * 4 .7 6 -0.07 ** -2.20 0 .0 9  0.9 9 -0 .13 * ** -4.97
D 3* F TA -0 .1 7 ** * -2 .7 2 0.14 * 1.69 -0 .0 8  -0.6 9 -0 .16 * ** -2.93
D 3* F TA*Y D 05 -0 .0 5 * -1 .7 3 0.04  0.70 0 .1 6  1.4 2 0 .04  1.02
R -s quared 0 .8 7 0.86 0 .8 6 0 .86
Adjus ted  R -sq u ared 0 .8 7 0.86 0 .8 6 0 .86
D urbin -W atso n stat 2 .0 1 2.02 2 .0 1 2 .01
* **  Sig n ifica n t a t 1% * *  S ig nifica nt at 5% *  S ign ifica n t a t 10 %
All th e var iab les  a re w eig h ted  by cr oss- sectio nal weig htes;   tim e va ria nces of OL S  resid ua ls for  ea ch  C ro ss-




Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –V 
Table 5(A) ....Continued 
Dependent Variable: W *LOG(X)
M ethod: Panel E GLS (Period SUR )
Periods included: 9 (1997-2005)
Cross -sections  included: 9832
Total panel (balanced) observations: 88488
Period SUR  (P CS E) standard errors & covariance (d.f . corrected)
DCAFTA t-s t SAAR C t-st CARICOM t-st W TO t-st
CC -3.07 *** -19.03 -3.05 *** -18.85 -2.47 *** -14.92 -2.86 *** -17.83
Y D98 -0.02 *** -14.15 -0.02 *** -14.72 -0.02 *** -14.15 -0.02 *** -14.01
Y D99 -0.07 *** -50.38 -0.07 *** -51.46 -0.07 *** -49.86 -0.07 *** -50.53
Y D00 -0.06 *** -33.92 -0.07 *** -35.27 -0.06 *** -32.58 -0.07 *** -34.14
Y D01 -0.09 *** -43.56 -0.09 *** -45.16 -0.09 *** -41.97 -0.09 *** -44.97
Y D02 -0.10 *** -52.29 -0.10 *** -53.77 -0.10 *** -52.28 -0.10 *** -53.56
Y D03 -0.03 *** -26.41 -0.04 *** -27.85 -0.03 *** -27.34 -0.04 *** -28.01
Y D05 -0.27 *** -14.45 -0.27 *** -14.23 -0.26 *** -13.26 -0.37 *** -11.67
LOG(GDPGDP ) 0.69 *** 164.65 0.69 *** 164.68 0.67 *** 159.79 0.68 *** 162.96
LOG(GDPGDP )*YD05 0.00 * -1 .83 0.00 *** -3.20 0.00 *** -2.66 0.00 * -1.65
LOG(DIS RAD) -0.94 *** -58.55 -0.93 *** -57.51 -0.96 *** -59.42 -0.95 *** -59.59
LOG(DIS RAD)*Y D05 0.04 *** 23.08 0.04 *** 23.69 0.04 *** 22.00 0.04 *** 22.79
LOG(PRICEi) -0.84 *** -143.4 -0.85 *** -144.2 -0.84 *** -141.8 -0.84 *** -143.4
LOG(PRICEi)*YD05 -0.07 *** -26.00 -0.07 *** -26.72 -0.07 *** -28.71 -0.06 *** -25.66
LOG(PRICEj) 0.31 *** 58.83 0.31 *** 58.03 0.32 *** 58.96 0.31 *** 58.20
LOG(PRICEj)*YD05 -0.02 *** -6 .95 -0.01 *** -3.32 -0.01 *** -6.06 -0.01 *** -5.82
TAXj -0.01 *** -25.97 -0.01 *** -25.96 -0.01 *** -27.09 -0.01 *** -25.82
TAXj*YD05 0.00 *** -4 .87 0.00 *** -7.92 0.00 *** -4.44 0.00 *** -4.35
LOG(REM Oi) -0.14 *** -22.96 -0.12 *** -19.43 -0.14 *** -23.56 -0.14 *** -22.84
LOG(REM Oi)*YD05 0.00 *** 2.94 0.00  0.33 0.00  1.10 0.00 *** 2.84
LOG(REM Oj) -0.05 *** -7 .32 -0.05 *** -7.77 -0.05 *** -6.94 -0.05 *** -6.92
LOG(REM Oj)*YD05 0.00  -1 .03 0.00 ** -2.19 0.00  -1.57 0.00 ** -1.99
BORDERij 1.02 *** 19.71 0.99 *** 19.20 0.95 *** 18.58 1.01 *** 19.49
BORDERij*YD05 0.06 *** 12.15 0.07 *** 12.92 0.07 *** 12.62 0.07 *** 12.79
COLONYij 0.43 *** 11.12 0.43 *** 11.37 0.52 *** 13.33 0.40 *** 10.46
COLONYij*YD05 -0.05 *** -13.13 -0.05 *** -14.18 -0.05 *** -12.70 -0.05 *** -12.01
LBi -1.02 *** -20.18 -1.01 *** -19.99 -1.05 *** -21.01 -1.02 *** -20.13
LBi*Y D05 0.02 *** 3.56 0.02 *** 3.16 0.02 *** 3.39 0.02 *** 3.12
LBj -1.06 *** -17.76 -1.08 *** -18.03 -1.15 *** -19.35 -1.10 *** -18.31
LBj*Y D05 -0.02 *** -2 .95 -0.01 * -1.66 -0.01 ** -2.21 -0.01  -0.99
ILA NDi 0.84 *** 20.94 0.84 *** 21.10 1.00 *** 24.02 0.81 *** 20.30
ILA NDi*YD05 -0.09 *** -21.22 -0.09 *** -21.09 -0.08 *** -18.06 -0.08 *** -18.89
ILA NDj 0.23 *** 6.26 0.19 *** 5.16 0.22 *** 5.87 0.21 *** 5.66
ILA NDj*YD05 0.02 *** 4.14 0.01 ** 2.45 0.02 *** 6.20 0.01 *** 3.75
F TA ij 0.25 *** 13.51 0.27 *** 14.92 0.26 *** 14.48 0.26 *** 14.37
F TA ij*Y D05 0.00  0.07 -0.02  -1.36 -0.01  -1.08 -0.02  -1.54
D 1 0.88 *** 9.31 -1.16  -1.37 0.28  1.11 0.05 *** 3.24
D 1*YD05 -0.08 *** -8 .47 0.04  0.45 -0.18 *** -6.51 0.10 *** 3.88
D 2 -0.04  -0 .49 -0.49 *** -8.15 -1.87 *** -13.96 0.06 *** 4.61
D 2*YD05 -0.03 *** -3 .84 0.01 * 1.87 0.03 ** 2.20 0.09 *** 3.38
D 3 -0.02  -0 .87 -0.08  -1.23 0.02 ** 2.14 -0.04 ** -2.30
D 3*YD05 -0.01  -1 .07 0.09 *** 12.51 -0.02 ** -2.59 0.09 *** 2.99
D 2*F TA 0.84 *** 3.68    
D 2*F TA*YD 05 -0.08 ** -2 .40    
D 3*F TA 0.05  0.29    
D 3*F TA*YD 05 -0.02  -0 .39    
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Adjus ted R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
D urbin-W atson stat 2.02 2.01 2.02 2.01
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%
All the var iables  are weighted by cross-sectional weightes;  time variances of OL S resid uals for  each C ross-




Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –VI 
 
Table 6(A)  
Full Output Related to Column 1 of Table 6.2 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)




Total panel (balanced) observations: 88488
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -15.5669 0.7514 -20.7185 0.0000
YD98 -0.0153 0.0025 -6.0445 0.0000
YD99 -0.0800 0.0046 -17.3810 0.0000
YD00 -0.0731 0.0067 -10.8474 0.0000
YD01 -0.0846 0.0092 -9.1909 0.0000
YD02 -0.1050 0.0125 -8.4173 0.0000
YD03 -0.0687 0.0181 -3.8013 0.0001
YD04 -0.0300 0.0246 -1.2188 0.2229
YD05 -0.0031 0.0280 -0.1119 0.9109
LOG(GDPi) 1.0488 0.0683 15.3508 0.0000
LOG(GDPj) 0.4297 0.0304 14.1251 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -1.0123 0.0427 -23.6826 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.5732 0.0311 18.4314 0.0000
TAX -0.0035 0.0009 -3.7096 0.0002
LOG(REMOi) -0.1827 0.0405 -4.5068 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) -0.4698 0.0572 -8.2114 0.0000
FTA 0.0234 0.0083 2.8053 0.0050
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9934     Mean dependent var 12.0244
Adjusted R-squared 0.9925     S.D. dependent var 21.8310
S.E. of regression 0.9205     Sum squared resid 66626.4600
F-statistic 1196.2     Durbin-Watson stat 1.3321
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9933     Mean dependent var 2.6533
Sum squared resid 67622.3100     Durbin-Watson stat 1.4392  
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Table 6(B)  
Full Output Related to Column 2 of Table 6.2 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 09/30/07   Time: 14:25
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 9832
Total panel (balanced) observations: 78656
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -10.7884 0.8103 -13.3145 0.0000
YD99 -0.0778 0.0010 -76.1063 0.0000
YD00 -0.0414 0.0056 -7.3519 0.0000
YD01 -0.0898 0.0050 -17.9495 0.0000
YD02 -0.1230 0.0045 -27.2125 0.0000
YD03 -0.0981 0.0107 -9.1416 0.0000
YD04 -0.0566 0.0177 -3.1924 0.0014
YD05 -0.0515 0.0207 -2.4929 0.0127
LOG(GDPi) 0.6792 0.0587 11.5615 0.0000
LOG(GDPj) 0.3033 0.0390 7.7868 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -0.7588 0.0608 -12.4746 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.3787 0.0333 11.3827 0.0000
TAX -0.0043 0.0007 -6.5655 0.0000
LOG(REMOi) -0.2252 0.0225 -10.0094 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) -0.4516 0.0502 -8.9990 0.0000
FTA 0.0310 0.0079 3.9094 0.0001
LOG(X(-1)) 0.3700 0.0494 7.4875 0.0000
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9951     Mean dependent var 13.6904
Adjusted R-squared 0.9944     S.D. dependent var 24.4638
S.E. of regression 0.8685     Sum squared resid 51896.5400
F-statistic 1409.3     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0172
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9949     Mean dependent var 2.6851
Sum squared resid 53947.4000     Durbin-Watson stat 2.2664   
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Table 6(C)  
Full Output Related to Column 3 of Table 6.2 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/05/07   Time: 13:55
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 9832
Total panel (balanced) observations: 78656
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 5.7752 3.8866 1.4859 0.1373
YD99 -0.0624 0.0022 -28.7257 0.0000
YD00 0.0026 0.0044 0.6004 0.5482
YD01 -0.0326 0.0049 -6.5810 0.0000
YD02 -0.0525 0.0105 -5.0135 0.0000
YD03 -0.0091 0.0213 -0.4253 0.6706
YD04 0.0604 0.0308 1.9578 0.0503
YD05 0.0805 0.0361 2.2267 0.0260
LOG(POPi) -0.4473 0.1328 -3.3685 0.0008
LOG(POPj) 0.1035 0.1155 0.8965 0.3700
LOG(PRICEi) -0.7479 0.0625 -11.9629 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.3862 0.0366 10.5410 0.0000
TAX -0.0045 0.0007 -6.0934 0.0000
LOG(REMOi) -0.4040 0.0579 -6.9808 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) -0.5639 0.0623 -9.0446 0.0000
FTA 0.0350 0.0080 4.3736 0.0000
LOG(X(-1)) 0.3798 0.0502 7.5742 0.0000
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9948     Mean dependent var 13.2752
Adjusted R-squared 0.9941     S.D. dependent var 23.1881
S.E. of regression 0.8691     Sum squared resid 51972.7700
F-statistic 1346.5600     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0216
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9946     Mean dependent var 2.6851
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Table 6(D)  
Full Output Related to Column 4 of Table 6.2 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)




Total panel (balanced) observations: 88488
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -12.2855 0.3673 -33.4526 0.0000
YD98 0.0011 0.0023 0.4833 0.6289
YD99 -0.0745 0.0041 -18.0836 0.0000
YD00 -0.0314 0.0066 -4.7361 0.0000
YD01 -0.0317 0.0097 -3.2766 0.0011
YD02 -0.0406 0.0112 -3.6209 0.0003
YD03 0.0076 0.0131 0.5785 0.5629
YD04 0.1051 0.0178 5.8941 0.0000
YD05 0.1774 0.0218 8.1338 0.0000
LOG(GDPi) 0.6720 0.0315 21.3487 0.0000
LOG(GDPj) 0.5847 0.0116 50.2024 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -0.9780 0.0411 -23.8049 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.3413 0.0512 6.6708 0.0000
TAX -0.0076 0.0022 -3.4915 0.0005
LOG(REMOi) -0.1304 0.0352 -3.7014 0.0002
LOG(REMOj) -0.1415 0.0287 -4.9309 0.0000
FTA 0.1108 0.0610 1.8158 0.0694
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 2.3538 0.8659
Idiosyncratic random 0.9263 0.1341
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1237     Mean dependent var 0.3451
Adjusted R-squared 0.1235     S.D. dependent var 0.9949
S.E. of regression 0.9314     Sum squared resid 76750.0400
F-statistic 780.2402     Durbin-Watson stat 1.2684
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.3972     Mean dependent var 2.6533
Sum squared resid 587747.8000     Durbin-Watson stat 0.1656  
 194
Statistical Appendix 
Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –VI 
 
Table 6(E)  
Hausman Test for Endogeneity in GDPi
Dependent Variable: RES*
Method: Panel Least Squares




Total panel (balanced) observations: 88488
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
RES3** -0.2868 0.0030 -94.5972 0.0000
R-squared 0.0221     Mean dependent var -0.0498
Adjusted R-squared 0.0221     S.D. dependent var 2.5408
S.E. of regression 2.5126     Akaike info criterion 4.6805
Sum squared resid 558627.70     Schwarz criterion 4.68
Log likelihood -207083.70     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.68
Durbin-Watson stat 0.1777
*RES is the residual series from the Structural Equation (6.10)
**RES3 is the residuals from the Reduced form equation (6.11) for GDPi  
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Table 6(F)  
Hausman Test for Endogeneity in FTA
Dependent Variable: RES*
Method: Panel Least Squares




Total panel (balanced) observations: 88488
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
RES2** 0.0183 0.1567 0.1170 0.9069
R-squared 0.0000     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.0000     S.D. dependent var 2.5391
S.E. of regression 2.5391     Akaike info criterion 4.7015
Sum squared resid 570464.90     Schwarz criterion 4.70
Log likelihood -208011.50     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.70
Durbin-Watson stat 0.1743
*RES is the residual series from the Structural Equation (6.10)
**RES2 is the residuals from the Reduced form equation (6.11) for FTA  
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Table 6(G) 
Hausman Test for Endogeneity in POPi
Dependent Variable: RES*
Method: Panel Least Squares




Total panel (balanced) observations: 88488
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
RES4** 0.0044 0.0066 0.6718 0.5017
R-squared -0.0006     Mean dependent var -0.0655
Adjusted R-squared -0.0006     S.D. dependent var 2.6448
S.E. of regression 2.6456     Akaike info criterion 4.7837
Sum squared resid 619319.70     Schwarz criterion 4.7838
Log likelihood -211647.00     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.7837
Durbin-Watson stat 0.1642
*RES is the residual series from the Structural Equation (6.10)
**RES4 is the residuals from the Reduced form equation (6.11) for POPi  
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Table 6(H)  
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: ZZEQ01
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. StatiChi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 0.0000 16.0000 1.0000
* Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero.
** Warning: robust standard errors may not be consistent with
        assumptions of Hausman test variance calculation.
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
YD98 -0.0089 0.0011 0.0000 0.1173
YD99 -0.0938 -0.0745 0.0001 0.0959
YD00 -0.0683 -0.0314 0.0003 0.0219
YD01 -0.0716 -0.0317 0.0005 0.0867
YD02 -0.0914 -0.0406 0.0012 0.1389
YD03 -0.0634 0.0076 0.0025 0.1594
YD04 0.0072 0.1051 0.0046 0.1506
YD05 0.0600 0.1774 0.0062 0.1374
LOG(GDPi) 1.0896 0.6720 0.0203 0.0033
LOG(GDPj) 0.2061 0.5847 0.0014 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -1.1393 -0.9780 0.0038 0.0085
LOG(PRICEj) 0.5804 0.3413 0.0030 0.0000
TAX -0.0038 -0.0076 0.0000 NA
LOG(REMOi) -0.2361 -0.1304 0.0060 0.1710
LOG(REMOj) -0.5784 -0.1415 0.0212 0.0027
FTA 0.0201 0.1108 -0.0031 NA
Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: LOG(X)
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample: 1997 2005 Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 9832 Total panel (balanced) observ: 88488
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -13.9723 1.8851 -7.4120 0.0000
YD98 -0.0089 0.0068 -1.3110 0.1898
YD99 -0.0938 0.0123 -7.6154 0.0000
YD00 -0.0683 0.0174 -3.9198 0.0001
YD01 -0.0716 0.0252 -2.8373 0.0046
YD02 -0.0914 0.0361 -2.5328 0.0113
YD03 -0.0634 0.0521 -1.2160 0.2240
YD04 0.0072 0.0704 0.1016 0.9191
YD05 0.0600 0.0820 0.7321 0.4641
LOG(GDPi) 1.0896 0.1458 7.4753 0.0000
LOG(GDPj) 0.2061 0.0392 5.2550 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -1.1393 0.0738 -15.4431 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.5804 0.0746 7.7771 0.0000
TAX -0.0038 0.0021 -1.8708 0.0614
LOG(REMOi) -0.2361 0.0849 -2.7813 0.0054
LOG(REMOj) -0.5784 0.1484 -3.8969 0.0001
FTA 0.0201 0.0240 0.8384 0.4018
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.9308     Mean dependent var 2.6533
Adjusted R-squared 0.9221     S.D. dependent var 3.3195
S.E. of regression 0.9263     Akaike info criterion 2.7894
Sum squared resid 67476.4800     Schwarz criterion 3.8345
Log likelihood -113565.0     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.1083
F-statistic 107.4153     Durbin-Watson stat 1.4411
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Table 6(I)  
Full Output Related to Column 1 of Table 6.4 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(X))
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/06/07   Time: 11:43
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 9832
Total panel (balanced) observations: 78656
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.0089 0.0048 -1.8450 0.0650
YD99 -0.0539 0.0014 -38.5841 0.0000
YD00 0.0276 0.0017 16.6063 0.0000
YD01 -0.0057 0.0010 -5.4346 0.0000
YD02 -0.0052 0.0045 -1.1551 0.2480
YD03 0.0526 0.0081 6.5296 0.0000
YD04 0.0650 0.0073 8.8672 0.0000
YD05 0.0471 0.0036 12.9379 0.0000
D(LOG(GDPX)) 0.5833 0.1336 4.3648 0.0000
D(LOG(GDPY)) 0.5644 0.1895 2.9777 0.0029
D(LOG(PRICEX)) -0.9503 0.0539 -17.6290 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEY)) 0.4400 0.0343 12.8413 0.0000
D(TAX) -0.0024 0.0005 -4.4399 0.0000
D(LOG(REMOX)) -0.2605 0.0804 -3.2403 0.0012
D(LOG(REMOY)) -0.3666 0.0679 -5.3973 0.0000
D(FTA) 0.0306 0.0101 3.0370 0.0024
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1410     Mean dependent var 0.1932
Adjusted R-squared 0.1409     S.D. dependent var 1.1336
S.E. of regression 1.0403     Sum squared resid 85106.5600
F-statistic 860.7803     Durbin-Watson stat 2.2937
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1266     Mean dependent var 0.0697
Sum squared resid 86541.4500     Durbin-Watson stat 2.6999  
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Table 6(J)  
Full Output Related to Column 2 of Table 6.4 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(X))
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/06/07   Time: 11:46
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 9832
Total panel (balanced) observations: 78656
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0165 0.0055 3.0295 0.0025
YD99 -0.0535 0.0014 -37.6502 0.0000
YD00 0.0397 0.0030 13.1594 0.0000
YD01 -0.0083 0.0007 -12.7264 0.0000
YD02 -0.0053 0.0030 -1.7377 0.0823
YD03 0.0483 0.0061 7.9785 0.0000
YD04 0.0776 0.0051 15.2668 0.0000
YD05 0.0451 0.0021 21.2096 0.0000
D(LOG(POPX)) -0.1289 0.3676 -0.3507 0.7258
D(LOG(POPY)) -0.2421 0.3365 -0.7195 0.4719
D(LOG(PRICEX)) -0.8965 0.0522 -17.1699 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEY)) 0.4546 0.0357 12.7330 0.0000
D(TAX) -0.0029 0.0006 -4.7050 0.0000
D(LOG(REMOX)) -0.3061 0.0966 -3.1686 0.0015
D(LOG(REMOY)) -0.4668 0.0657 -7.1096 0.0000
D(FTA) 0.0375 0.0101 3.7045 0.0002
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1282     Mean dependent var 0.1910
Adjusted R-squared 0.1280     S.D. dependent var 1.1270
S.E. of regression 1.0424     Sum squared resid 85443.61
F-statistic 770.69     Durbin-Watson stat 2.2808
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1174     Mean dependent var 0.0697
Sum squared resid 86496.7800     Durbin-Watson stat 2.6985  
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Table 6(K)  
Full Output Related to Column 3 of Table 6.4 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(X))
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/07/07   Time: 12:30
Sample (adjusted): 2003 2005
Periods included: 3
Cross-sections included: 9832
Total panel (balanced) observations: 29496
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.0443 0.0046 -9.7254 0.0000
YD04 0.0240 0.0015 15.9241 0.0000
YD05 0.0417 0.0019 21.9832 0.0000
D(LOG(GDPi)) 1.6924 0.0323 52.3910 0.0000
D(LOG(GDPj)) 0.6366 0.0328 19.3996 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEi)) -0.6510 0.0105 -61.9906 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEj)) 0.3305 0.0258 12.7906 0.0000
D(LOG(REMOi)) -0.4082 0.0814 -5.0146 0.0000
D(LOG(REMOj)) -0.7124 0.0273 -26.0536 0.0000
D(TAX) -0.0089 0.0013 -6.7998 0.0000
D(FTA(-5)) 0.0127 0.0035 3.6590 0.0003
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.3762     Mean dependent var 0.3537
Adjusted R-squared 0.3760     S.D. dependent var 1.4506
S.E. of regression 1.0555     Sum squared resid 32849.3400
F-statistic 1778.3740     Durbin-Watson stat 2.1664
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.3714     Mean dependent var 0.0820
Sum squared resid 33105.3900     Durbin-Watson stat 2.6916  
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Table 7(A)  
Full Output Related to Column 1 of Table 7.1 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X+M)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Periods included: 9
Cross-sections included: 4936
Total panel (balanced) observations: 44424
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -23.5497 1.2022 -19.5884 0.0000
YD98 -0.0224 0.0022 -10.1364 0.0000
YD99 -0.0945 0.0041 -23.0497 0.0000
YD00 -0.0976 0.0064 -15.1384 0.0000
YD01 -0.1486 0.0085 -17.5248 0.0000
YD02 -0.1922 0.0116 -16.6081 0.0000
YD03 -0.1757 0.0167 -10.5439 0.0000
YD04 -0.1605 0.0233 -6.8984 0.0000
YD05 -0.1473 0.0266 -5.5445 0.0000
LOG(GDPi) 1.0722 0.0535 20.0394 0.0000
LOG(GDPj) 1.2555 0.0477 26.3053 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -0.2181 0.0169 -12.8728 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) -0.2426 0.0192 -12.6285 0.0000
TAX -0.0052 0.0006 -8.9997 0.0000
LOG(REMOi) -0.2642 0.0154 -17.1812 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) -0.1759 0.0163 -10.7911 0.0000
FTA 0.0337 0.0127 2.6551 0.0079
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9950     Mean dependent var 14.0634
Adjusted R-squared 0.9944     S.D. dependent var 18.4319
S.E. of regression 0.5121     Sum squared resid 10351
F-statistic 1584.56     Durbin-Watson stat 1.2331
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9949     Mean dependent var 4.8990
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Table 7(B)  
Full Output Related to Column 2 of Table 7.1 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(X+M))
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 4936
Total panel (balanced) observations: 39488
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.0130 0.0062 -2.1081 0.0350
YD99 -0.0547 0.0019 -29.3945 0.0000
YD00 0.0162 0.0046 3.4906 0.0005
YD01 -0.0317 0.0014 -22.2363 0.0000
YD02 -0.0120 0.0074 -1.6279 0.1035
YD03 0.0555 0.0159 3.4960 0.0005
YD04 0.0603 0.0135 4.4769 0.0000
YD05 0.0405 0.0067 6.0897 0.0000
D(LOG(GDPi)) 0.8701 0.1220 7.1321 0.0000
D(LOG(GDPj)) 0.9626 0.1296 7.4297 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEi)) -0.2886 0.0455 -6.3378 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEj)) -0.3068 0.0532 -5.7629 0.0000
D(TAX) -0.0029 0.0010 -2.9423 0.0033
D(LOG(REMOi)) -0.2778 0.0545 -5.0957 0.0000
D(LOG(REMOj)) -0.2260 0.0741 -3.0493 0.0023
D(FTA) 0.0340 0.0121 2.8018 0.0051
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1090     Mean dependent var 0.1520
Adjusted R-squared 0.1087     S.D. dependent var 0.5780
S.E. of regression 0.5397     Sum squared resid 11498
F-statistic 322.0327     Durbin-Watson stat 2.1999
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.0876     Mean dependent var 0.0675
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Table 7(C)  
Full Output Related to Column 3 of Table 7.1 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(X+M))
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 4936
Total panel (balanced) observations: 39488
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0313 0.0063 4.9454 0.0000
YD99 -0.0531 0.0023 -23.0438 0.0000
YD00 0.0374 0.0047 7.9784 0.0000
YD01 -0.0413 0.0010 -42.1994 0.0000
YD02 -0.0170 0.0060 -2.8213 0.0048
YD03 0.0453 0.0127 3.5567 0.0004
YD04 0.0808 0.0100 8.1071 0.0000
YD05 0.0359 0.0052 6.9138 0.0000
D(LOG(POPi)) -0.4455 0.2531 -1.7606 0.0783
D(LOG(POPj)) -0.5415 0.2407 -2.2497 0.0245
D(LOG(PRICEi)) -0.2394 0.0399 -5.9985 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEj) -0.2408 0.0417 -5.7794 0.0000
D(TAX) -0.0045 0.0016 -2.7251 0.0064
D(LOG(REMOi)) -0.3562 0.0685 -5.2026 0.0000
D(LOG(REMOj)) -0.3443 0.0699 -4.9248 0.0000
D(FTA) 0.0397 0.0121 3.2832 0.0010
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.0734     Mean dependent var 0.1498
Adjusted R-squared 0.0730     S.D. dependent var 0.5695
S.E. of regression 0.5407     Sum squared resid 11539
F-statistic 208.3442     Durbin-Watson stat 2.1684
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.0495     Mean dependent var 0.0675
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Table 7(D)  
Full Output Related to Column 1 of Table 7.2 
Dependent Variable: LOG(CONX)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/23/07   Time: 17:52
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 9805
Total panel (balanced) observations: 78440
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -5.5085 0.5240 -10.5119 0.0000
YD99 -0.0618 0.0029 -21.4432 0.0000
YD00 -0.0072 0.0077 -0.9250 0.3550
YD01 -0.0276 0.0088 -3.1501 0.0016
YD02 -0.0399 0.0117 -3.4129 0.0006
YD03 0.0060 0.0168 0.3572 0.7209
YD04 0.0292 0.0202 1.4482 0.1476
YD05 0.0146 0.0213 0.6851 0.4933
LOG(CONGDPi) 0.4828 0.0504 9.5753 0.0000
LOG(CONGDPj) 0.0210 0.0136 1.5363 0.1245
LOG(PRICEi) -0.3885 0.0630 -6.1709 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.3640 0.0406 8.9698 0.0000
TAX -0.0045 0.0007 -6.7357 0.0000
LOG(REMOi) -0.3256 0.0704 -4.6230 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) -0.5366 0.0604 -8.8780 0.0000
FTA 0.0306 0.0080 3.8176 0.0001
LOG(CONX(-1)) 0.3881 0.0525 7.3871 0.0000
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9945     Mean dependent var 11.7769
Adjusted R-squared 0.9937     S.D. dependent var 21.9627
S.E. of regression 0.8292     Sum squared resid 47182
F-statistic 1266     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0303
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9943     Mean dependent var 2.2251
Sum squared resid 49049    Durbin-Watson stat 2.2773  
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Table 7(E)  
Full Output Related to Column 2 of Table 7.2 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(CONX))
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/21/07   Time: 15:04
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 9805
Total panel (balanced) observations: 78440
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.0045 0.0038 -1.1853 0.2359
YD99 -0.0617 0.0016 -38.5048 0.0000
YD00 0.0311 0.0039 8.0850 0.0000
YD01 -0.0019 0.0009 -2.1495 0.0316
YD02 -0.0033 0.0049 -0.6698 0.5030
YD03 0.0578 0.0099 5.8530 0.0000
YD04 0.0766 0.0077 9.9293 0.0000
YD05 0.0477 0.0041 11.7246 0.0000
D(LOG(CONGDPi)) 0.7879 0.0305 25.8051 0.0000
D(LOG(CONGDPj)) 0.1382 0.0275 5.0273 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEi)) -0.7354 0.0714 -10.3003 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEj)) 0.3264 0.0218 14.9778 0.0000
D(TAX) -0.0029 0.0006 -5.1811 0.0000
D(LOG(REMOi)) -0.1944 0.0948 -2.0513 0.0402
D(LOG(REMOj)) -0.4368 0.0589 -7.4188 0.0000
D(FTA) 0.0366 0.0089 4.0910 0.0000
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1926     Mean dependent var 0.1278
Adjusted R-squared 0.1925     S.D. dependent var 1.1137
S.E. of regression 0.9916     Sum squared resid 77113
F-statistic 1247.35     Durbin-Watson stat 2.2823
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1844     Mean dependent var 0.0422
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Table 7(F)  
Full Output Related to Column 1 of Table 7.3 
Dependent Variable: LOG((X+M)/2)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/23/07   Time: 17:58
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 4936
Total panel (balanced) observations: 39488
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -15.1364 1.5749 -9.6113 0.0000
YD99 -0.0773 0.0018 -42.0065 0.0000
YD00 -0.0455 0.0080 -5.6944 0.0000
YD01 -0.1270 0.0080 -15.9629 0.0000
YD02 -0.1614 0.0086 -18.8298 0.0000
YD03 -0.1410 0.0086 -16.3570 0.0000
YD04 -0.1099 0.0131 -8.3870 0.0000
YD05 -0.1211 0.0142 -8.5543 0.0000
LOG(GDPi) 0.6504 0.0722 9.0051 0.0000
LOG(GDPj) 0.7525 0.0771 9.7599 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -0.1768 0.0259 -6.8282 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) -0.1799 0.0260 -6.9242 0.0000
TAX -0.0050 0.0007 -7.0097 0.0000
LOG(REMOi) -0.2389 0.0110 -21.7168 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) -0.1851 0.0101 -18.3380 0.0000
FTA 0.0249 0.0117 2.1314 0.0331
LOG((X(-1)+M(-1))/2) 0.4580 0.0573 7.9984 0.0000
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9964     Mean dependent var 13.7818
Adjusted R-squared 0.9958     S.D. dependent var 18.6959
S.E. of regression 0.4618     Sum squared resid 7366
F-statistic 1907     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0258
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9962     Mean dependent var 4.2358
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Table 7(G)  
Full Output Related to Column 2 of Table 7.3 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG((X+M)/2))
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/23/07   Time: 18:02
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 4936
Total panel (balanced) observations: 39488
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.0130 0.0062 -2.1081 0.0350
YD99 -0.0547 0.0019 -29.3945 0.0000
YD00 0.0162 0.0046 3.4906 0.0005
YD01 -0.0317 0.0014 -22.2363 0.0000
YD02 -0.0120 0.0074 -1.6279 0.1035
YD03 0.0555 0.0159 3.4960 0.0005
YD04 0.0603 0.0135 4.4769 0.0000
YD05 0.0405 0.0067 6.0897 0.0000
D(LOG(GDPi)) 0.8701 0.1220 7.1321 0.0000
D(LOG(GDPj)) 0.9626 0.1296 7.4297 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEi)) -0.2886 0.0455 -6.3378 0.0000
D(LOG(PRICEj)) -0.3068 0.0532 -5.7629 0.0000
D(TAX) -0.0029 0.0010 -2.9423 0.0033
D(LOG(REMOi)) -0.2778 0.0545 -5.0957 0.0000
D(LOG(REMOj)) -0.2260 0.0741 -3.0493 0.0023
D(FTA) 0.0340 0.0121 2.8018 0.0051
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1090     Mean dependent var 0.1520
Adjusted R-squared 0.1087     S.D. dependent var 0.5780
S.E. of regression 0.5397     Sum squared resid 11498
F-statistic 322     Durbin-Watson stat 2.1999
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.0876     Mean dependent var 0.0675




Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –VII 
 
Table 7(H)  
Full Output Related to Column 1 of Table 7.4 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X/GDPX)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/21/07   Time: 14:36
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 9832
Total panel (balanced) observations: 78656
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -10.2382 0.7328 -13.9711 0.0000
YD99 -0.0770 0.0013 -58.5068 0.0000
YD00 -0.0418 0.0069 -6.0589 0.0000
YD01 -0.0834 0.0067 -12.4867 0.0000
YD02 -0.1182 0.0048 -24.7351 0.0000
YD03 -0.0923 0.0088 -10.4832 0.0000
YD04 -0.0539 0.0150 -3.5816 0.0003
YD05 -0.0410 0.0177 -2.3188 0.0204
LOG(GDPj) 0.3035 0.0386 7.8705 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -0.7571 0.0646 -11.7177 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) 0.3830 0.0323 11.8673 0.0000
TAX -0.0043 0.0007 -6.4127 0.0000
LOG(REMOi) -0.2107 0.0290 -7.2747 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) -0.4531 0.0506 -8.9533 0.0000
FTA 0.0318 0.0080 3.9757 0.0001
LOG((X(-1))/(GDPX(-1))) 0.3647 0.0482 7.5680 0.0000
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9947     Mean dependent var -23.3073
Adjusted R-squared 0.9940     S.D. dependent var 19.1588
S.E. of regression 0.8691     Sum squared resid 51970.1
F-statistic 1322.2     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0094
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9945     Mean dependent var -9.2738





Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –VII 
Table 7(I)  
Full Output Related to Column 2 of Table 7.4 
Dependent Variable: LOG((X+M)/GDPX)
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/21/07   Time: 14:48
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2005
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 4936
Total panel (balanced) observations: 39488
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -13.4940 1.2898 -10.4623 0.0000
YD99 -0.0738 0.0017 -43.8913 0.0000
YD00 -0.0415 0.0077 -5.3497 0.0000
YD01 -0.1152 0.0080 -14.4908 0.0000
YD02 -0.1506 0.0077 -19.5539 0.0000
YD03 -0.1293 0.0062 -20.8437 0.0000
YD04 -0.1019 0.0096 -10.5834 0.0000
YD05 -0.1034 0.0106 -9.7479 0.0000
LOG(GDPj) 0.7537 0.0759 9.9307 0.0000
LOG(PRICEi) -0.1627 0.0283 -5.7405 0.0000
LOG(PRICEj) -0.1787 0.0261 -6.8423 0.0000
TAX -0.0049 0.0007 -6.8968 0.0000
LOG(REMOi) -0.2382 0.0124 -19.1647 0.0000
LOG(REMOj) -0.1811 0.0099 -18.3358 0.0000
FTA 0.0265 0.0117 2.2688 0.0233
LOG((X(-1)+M(-1))/(GDPX(-1))) 0.4584 0.0563 8.1435 0.0000
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9966     Mean dependent var -14.3710
Adjusted R-squared 0.9961     S.D. dependent var 11.5277
S.E. of regression 0.4617     Sum squared resid 7361.3
F-statistic 2022.4     Durbin-Watson stat 2.0321
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.9964     Mean dependent var -6.9193
Sum squared resid 7716.68    Durbin-Watson stat 2.2802  
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Statistical Tables Related to the Chapter –VII 
Table 7(J)  





Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=10)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0152 0.0507 0.2993 0.7647
D(GDPi) 1.3617 0.1164 11.6953 0.0000
D(GDPj) 0.1956 0.1031 1.8975 0.0578
D(PRICEi) -1.1744 0.0800 -14.6722 0.0000
D(PRICEj) 0.9083 0.0843 10.7713 0.0000
D(REMOi) -0.3835 0.1029 -3.7270 0.0002
D(REMOj) -0.3001 0.1297 -2.3128 0.0208
D(TAX) -0.0088 0.0030 -2.9077 0.0036
D(FTA) -0.0599 0.0598 -1.0019 0.3164
R-squared 0.0664     Mean dependent var 0.5664
Adjusted R-squared 0.0656     S.D. dependent var 1.5472
S.E. of regression 1.4956     Akaike info criterion 3.6439
Sum squared resid 20725.81     Schwarz criterion 3.6508
Log likelihood -16889.47     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.6462






Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=10)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.1928 0.0551 3.4987 0.0005
D(POPi) 0.3512 0.3059 1.1480 0.2510
D(POPj) 0.4807 0.2268 2.1196 0.0341
D(PRICEi) -1.0209 0.0875 -11.6677 0.0000
D(PRICEj) 0.9660 0.0846 11.4162 0.0000
D(REMOi) -0.6849 0.1004 -6.8244 0.0000
D(REMOj) -0.4250 0.1323 -3.2119 0.0013
D(TAX) -0.0071 0.0032 -2.2492 0.0245
D(FTA) -0.1034 0.0629 -1.6437 0.1003
R-squared 0.0504     Mean dependent var 0.5664
Adjusted R-squared 0.0496     S.D. dependent var 1.5472
S.E. of regression 1.5083     Akaike info criterion 3.6609
Sum squared resid 21080.86     Schwarz criterion 3.6678
Log likelihood -16968.24     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.6632
F-statistic 61.4866     Durbin-Watson stat 1.9138
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000







List of RTA and member countries 
Abbreviation Full Name Present Member Countries 
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area Brunei Darussalam Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar
Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations Brunei Darussalam Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar
Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam
BANGKOK Bangkok Agreement Bangladesh China India Republic of Korea Laos Sri Lanka
CAN Andean Community Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market Antigua & Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Belize Dominica Grenada
Guyana Haiti Jamaica Monserrat Trinidad & Tobago St. Kitts &
Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent & the Grenadines Surinam
CACM Central American Common Market Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement Bulgaria Croatia Romania
CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community of Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo Equatorial
Central Africa Guinea Gabon
CER Closer Trade Relations Trade Agreement Australia New Zealand
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States Azerbaijan Armenia Belarus Georgia Moldova Kazakhstan Russian
Federation Ukraine Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyz Republic
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Angola Burundi Comoros Democratic Republic of Congo Djibouti
Africa Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar Malawi Mauritius
Namibia Rwanda Seychelles Sudan Swaziland Uganda Zambia
Zimbabwe
EAC East African Community Kenya Tanzania Uganda
EAEC Eurasian Economic Community Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Russian Federation
Tajikistan
EC European Communities Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland
France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania
Luxembourg Malta Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia
Spain Sweden The Netherlands United Kingdom
ECO Economic Cooperation Organization Afghanistan Azerbaijan Iran Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Pakistan
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States Benin Burkina Faso Cape Verde Cote d'Ivoire The Gambia Ghana
Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra
Leone Togo
EEA European Economic Area EC Iceland Liechtenstein Norway
EFTA European Free Trade Association Iceland Liechtenstein Norway Switzerland




Table 1(A)…Continued  
List of RTA and member countries 
Abbreviation Full Name Present Member Countries 
GSTP General System of Trade Preferences among Algeria Argentina Bangladesh Benin Bolivia Brazil Cameroon Chile
Developing Countries Colombia Cuba Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ecuador
Egypt Ghana Guinea Guyana India Indonesia Islamic Republic of
Iran Iraq Libya Malaysia Mexico Morocco Mozambique Myanmar
Nicaragua Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Republic of Korea
Romania Singapore Sri Lanka Sudan Thailand Trinidad and
Tobago Tunisia United Republic of Tanzania Venezuela Vietnam
Yugoslavia Zimbabwe
LAIA Latin American Integration Association Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba Ecuador Mexico
Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group Fiji Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Vanuatu
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement Canada Mexico United States
OCT Overseas Countries and Territories Greenland New Caledonia French Polynesia French Southern
and Antarctic Territories Wallis and Futuna Islands Mayotte Saint
Pierre and Miquelon Aruba Netherlands Antilles Anguilla Cayman
Islands Falkland Islands South Georgia and South Sandwich
Islands Montserrat Pitcairn Saint Helena Ascension Island Tristan
da Cunha Turks and Caicos Islands British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory British Virgin Islands
PAN-ARAB Pan-Arab Free Trade Area Bahrain Egypt Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman
Qatar Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates
Yemen
PATCRA Agreement on Trade and Commercial Australia, Papua New Guinea
Relations between the Government of
Australia and the Government of Papua New
Guinea
PTN Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations Bangladesh Brazil Chile Egypt Israel Mexico Pakistan Paraguay
among Developing Countries Peru Philippines Republic of Korea Romania Tunisia Turkey
Uruguay Yugoslavia
SADC Southern African Development Community Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mauritius Mozambique
Namibia South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
SAPTA South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
SPARTECA South Pacific  Regional Trade and Economic Australia New Zealand Cook Islands Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands
Cooperation Agreement Micronesia Nauru Niue Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands
Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Western Samoa
TRIPARTITE Tripartite Agreement Egypt India Yugoslavia
UEMOA / WAEMWest African Economic and Monetary Union Benin Burkina Faso Côte d'Ivoire Guinea Bissau Mali Niger
Senegal Togo


























1 EFTA (Stockholm Convention) 3-May-60 14-Nov-59 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 41 El Salvador - Mexico 15-Mar-01 23-May-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
2 EC — Switzerland and Liechtenstein 1-Jan-73 27-Oct-72 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 42 Honduras - Mexico 1-Jun-01 10-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
3 EC — Iceland 1-Apr-73 24-Nov-72 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 43 EC —  FYROM 1-Jun-01 23-Oct-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
4 EC — Norway 1-Jul-73 13-Jul-73 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 44 EFTA - Mexico 1-Jul-01 25-Jul-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
5 EC — Syria 1-Jul-77 15-Jul-77 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 45 India — Sri Lanka 15-Dec-01 17-Jun-02 Enabling Clause FTA
6 United States — Israel 19-Aug-85 13-Sep-85 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 46 United States —  Jordan 17-Dec-01 15-Feb-02 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
7 EFTA — Turkey 1-Apr-92 6-Mar-92 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 47 EFTA —  Jordan 1-Jan-02 17-Jan-02 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
8 EFTA — Israel 1-Jan-93 30-Nov-92 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 48 EFTA —  Croatia 1-Jan-02 14-Jan-02 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
9 Armenia - Russian Federation 25-Mar-93 17-Jun-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 49 Chile —  Costa Rica 15-Feb-02 16-Apr-02 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
10 Faroe Islands — Norway 1-Jul-93 12-Feb-96 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 50 EC —  Croatia 1-Mar-02 17-Dec-02 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
11 Faroe Islands — Iceland 1-Jul-93 14-Dec-95 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 51 EC —  Jordan 1-May-02 17-Dec-02 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
12 NAFTA 1-Jan-94 29-Jan-93 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 52 Chile - El Salvador 1-Jun-02 29-Jan-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
13 Georgia —  Russian Federation 10-May-94 8-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 53 Albania - FYROM 1-Jul-02 9-Dec-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
14 Costa Rica - Mexico 1-Jan-95 17-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 54 FYROM - Bosnia and Herzegovina 15-Jul-02 24-Feb-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
15 Faroe Islands — Switzerland 1-Mar-95 12-Feb-96 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 55 Canada — Costa Rica 1-Nov-02 13-Jan-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
16 Kyrgyz Republic — Armenia 27-Oct-95 12-Dec-00 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 56 Japan - Singapore 30-Nov-02 8-Nov-02 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
17 Georgia —  Ukraine 4-Jun-96 8-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 57 EFTA - Singapore 1-Jan-03 14-Jan-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
18 Georgia —  Azerbaijan 10-Jul-96 8-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 58 EC - Chile 1-Feb-03 3-Feb-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
19 Armenia - Ukraine 18-Dec-96 17-Jun-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 59 EC - Lebanon 1-Mar-03 26-May-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
20 EC — Faroe Islands 1-Jan-97 17-Feb-97 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 60 Panama - El Salvador 11-Apr-03 24-Feb-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
21 Canada — Israel 1-Jan-97 15-Jan-97 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 61 Croatia - Albania 1-Jun-03 8-Mar-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
22 Turkey - Israel 1-May-97 16-Apr-98 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 62 Turkey - Bosnia and Herzegovina 1-Jul-03 29-Aug-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
23 Canada — Chile 5-Jul-97 30-Jul-97 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 63 Turkey - Croatia 1-Jul-03 2-Sep-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
24 Croatia - FYROM 30-Oct-97 23-Mar-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 64 Singapore - Australia 28-Jul-03 25-Sep-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
25 EC — Tunisia 1-Mar-98 15-Jan-99 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 65 China - Hong Kong, China 1-Jan-04 27-Dec-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
26 Mexico - Nicaragua 1-Jul-98 17-Oct-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 66 United States - Singapore 1-Jan-04 17-Dec-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
27 Georgia —  Armenia 11-Nov-98 8-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 67 United States —  Chile 1-Jan-04 16-Dec-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
28 India - Sri Lanka 28-Dec-98 FTA 68 Republic of Korea - Chile 1-Apr-04 8-Apr-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
29 Georgia —  Kazakhstan 16-Jul-99 8-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 69 EC - Egypt 1-Jun-04 3-Sep-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
30 Chile — Mexico 1-Aug-99 27-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 70 EFTA - Chile 1-Dec-04 3-Dec-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
31 EFTA — Morocco 1-Dec-99 20-Jan-00 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 71 Thailand - Australia 1-Jan-05 27-Dec-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
32 EC — Morocco 1-Mar-00 13-Oct-00 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 72 United States - Australia 1-Jan-05 22-Dec-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
33 EC — Israel 1-Jun-00 20-Sep-00 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 73 Japan - Mexico 1-Apr-05 31-Mar-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
34 Israel - Mexico 1-Jul-00 22-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 74 EFTA - Tunisia 1-Jun-05 3-Jun-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
35 EC — Mexico 1-Jul-00 25-Jul-00 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 75 Thailand - New Zealand 1-Jul-05 1-Dec-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
36
Turkey — Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 1-Sep-00 5-Jan-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 76 Turkey - Tunisia 1-Jul-05 1-Sep-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
37 Croatia - Bosnia and Herzegovina 1-Jan-01 25-Sep-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 77 Jordan - Singapore 22-Aug-05 7-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
38 New Zealand - Singapore 1-Jan-01 4-Sep-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 78 EC-Algeria 1-Sep-05 24-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
39
EFTA — Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 1-Jan-01 11-Dec-00 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 79 India — Thailand 25-Jun-05 FTA
40 Guatemala - Mexico 15-Mar-01 3-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA Singapore - Korea 27-Jun-05 FTA
Source : World Trade Organization 

























1 EC — OCTs 1-Jan-71 14-Dec-70 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 21 Moldova - Bosnia and Herzegovina 1-May-04 14-Jan-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
2 PATCRA 1-Feb-77 20-Dec-76 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 22 Croatia - Serbia and Montenegro 1-Jul-04 20-Sep-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
3 CER 1-Jan-83 14-Apr-83 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 23 Moldova - Serbia and Montenegro 1-Sep-04 14-Jan-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
4 Kyrgyz Republic — Russian Federation 24-Apr-93 15-Jun-99 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 24 Albania - Serbia Montenegro 1-Sep-04 8-Oct-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
5 CIS 30-Dec-94 29-Jun-99 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 25 Moldova - Croatia 1-Oct-04 14-Jan-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
6 Kyrgyz Republic — Kazakhstan 11-Nov-95 29-Jun-99 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 26 Albania - Moldova 1-Nov-04 17-Dec-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
7 Armenia - Moldova 21-Dec-95 17-Jun-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 27 Moldova - FYROM 1-Dec-04 14-Jan-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
8 Armenia - Turkmenistan 7-Jul-96 17-Jun-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 28 Albania - Bosnia and Herzegovina 1-Dec-04 9-Dec-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
9 Kyrgyz Republic — Moldova 21-Nov-96 15-Jun-99 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 29 Turkey - Palestinian Authority 1-Jun-05 1-Sep-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
10 EC — Palestinian Authority 1-Jul-97 29-May-97 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 30 Turkey - Morocco 1-Jan-06 10-Feb-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
11 Pan-Arab Free Trade Area 1-Jan-98 3-Oct-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 31 United States - Morocco 1-Jan-06 30-Dec-05 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
12 Kyrgyz Republic — Ukraine 19-Jan-98 15-Jun-99 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 32
Dominican Republic-Central America-
United States (CAFTA-DR) 1-Mar-06 17-Mar-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
13 Kyrgyz Republic — Uzbekistan 20-Mar-98 15-Jun-99 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 33 Republic of Korea - Singapore 2-Mar-06 21-Feb-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
14 EFTA — Palestinian Authority 1-Jul-99 23-Jul-99 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 34 Japan - Malaysia 13-Jul-06 12-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
15 Georgia —  Turkmenistan 1-Jan-00 8-Feb-01 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 35 United States - Bahrain 1-Aug-06 8-Sep-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
16 EC — South Africa 1-Jan-00 2-Nov-00 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 36 EFTA - Republic of Korea 1-Sep-06 23-Aug-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
17 SADC 1-Sep-00 2-Aug-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 37 Turkey - Syria 1-Jan-07 15-Feb-07 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
18 Armenia - Kazakhstan 25-Dec-01 17-Jun-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA 38 EFTA-Lebanon 1-Jan-07 22-Dec-06 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
19 Albania - UNMIK (Kosovo) 1-Oct-03 6-Apr-04 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
20 China - Macao, China 1-Jan-04 27-Dec-03 GATT Art. XXIV FTA
Source : World Trade Organization 







1 Afghanistan 32 Central African Rep. 63 FS Micronesia 94 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 125 Pakistan 156 Sri Lanka
2 Albania 33 Chad 64 Gabon 95 Latvia 126 Palau 157 Sudan
3 Algeria 34 Chile 65 Gambia 96 Lebanon 127 Panama 158 Suriname
4 Angola 35 China 66 Georgia 97 Liberia 128 Papua New Guinea 159 Sweden
5 Antigua and Barbuda 36 China, Hong Kong SAR 67 Germany 98 Libya 129 Paraguay 160 Switzerland
6 Argentina 37 Colombia 68 Ghana 99 Lithuania 130 Peru 161 Syria
7 Armenia 38 Comoros 69 Greece 100 Luxembourg 131 Philippines 162 Tajikistan
8 Australia 39 Congo 70 Grenada 101 Madagascar 132 Poland 163 TFYR of Macedonia
9 Austria 40 Costa Rica 71 Guatemala 102 Malawi 133 Portugal 164 Thailand
10 Azerbaijan 41 Côte d'Ivoire 72 Guinea 103 Malaysia 134 Qatar 165 Togo
11 Bahamas 42 Croatia 73 Guinea-Bissau 104 Maldives 135 Rep. of Korea 166 Tonga
12 Bahrain 43 Cuba 74 Guyana 105 Mali 136 Rep. of Moldova 167 Trinidad and Tobago
13 Bangladesh 44 Cyprus 75 Haiti 106 Malta 137 Romania 168 Tunisia
14 Barbados 45 Czech Rep. 76 Honduras 107 Marshall Isds 138 Russian Federation 169 Turkey
15 Belarus 46 Dem. People's Rep. of Korea 77 Hungary 108 Mauritania 139 Rwanda 170 Turkmenistan
16 Belgium 47 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 78 Iceland 109 Mauritius 140 Saint Kitts and Nevis 171 Uganda
17 Belize 48 Denmark 79 India 110 Mexico 141 Saint Lucia 172 Ukraine
18 Benin 49 Djibouti 80 Indonesia 111 Mongolia 142 St Vincent & the Grenadines 173 United Arab Emirates
19 Bermuda 50 Dominica 81 Iran 112 Morocco 143 Samoa 174 United Kingdom
20 Bhutan 51 Dominican Rep. 82 Iraq 113 Mozambique 144 Sao Tome and Principe 175 United Rep. of Tanzania
21 Bolivia 52 Ecuador 83 Ireland 114 Myanmar 145 Saudi Arabia 176 Uruguay
22 Bosnia Herzegovina 53 Egypt 84 Israel 115 Nepal 146 Senegal 177 USA
23 Brazil 54 El Salvador 85 Italy 116 Neth. Antilles 147 Serbia and Montenegro 178 Uzbekistan
24 Brunei Darussalam 55 Equatorial Guinea 86 Jamaica 117 Netherlands 148 Seychelles 179 Vanuatu
25 Bulgaria 56 Eritrea 87 Japan 118 New Caledonia 149 Sierra Leone 180 Venezuela
26 Burkina Faso 57 Estonia 88 Jordan 119 New Zealand 150 Singapore 181 Viet Nam
27 Burundi 58 Ethiopia 89 Kazakhstan 120 Nicaragua 151 Slovakia 182 Yemen
28 Cambodia 59 Fiji 90 Kenya 121 Niger 152 Slovenia 183 Zambia
29 Cameroon 60 Finland 91 Kiribati 122 Nigeria 153 Solomon Isds 184 Zimbabwe
30 Canada 61 France 92 Kuwait 123 Norway 154 Somalia
31 Cape Verde 62 French Polynesia 93 Kyrgyzstan 124 Oman 155 Spain
Country Sample used in the study
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